

Linguistic and Cognitive Redundancy in English Spoken Discourse

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The importance of this study arises from the fact that it deals with the phenomenon redundancy in spoken discourse in a pragmatic way. This shows that the term redundancy is essential for understanding the language of discourse whether in a linguistic or cognitive side. It reveals the importance of the two fields: pragmatics and discourse analysis. In the pragmatic side, it reflects the importance of the use of redundancy in that it makes communication move in a good manner. In the cognitive one, it reflects the disability of hearers to derive the right conclusions of the communicated utterances made by the speaker and this would be an effort consuming to the part of the hearer.

The study tackles the phenomenon redundancy in spoken discourse by the use of Sperber & Wilson's model (1995). They deal with language in a pragmatic way. Their model states that: other things being equal, the greater the contextual effects that the utterance has with the minimal processing effort, the greater the relevance of the utterance. It is a matter of balancing between the contextual effects and the processing effort (or cost). It works at two lines: cognitive and communicative; the former initiates that human cognition tends to the maximization of relevance; whereas the latter states that every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance

1. Manifestations of Linguistic Redundancy

Redundancy has certain manifestations. Grant-Davie (1995: 19) gives some types of linguistic redundancy.

In a text:

1. Repetition: this form of redundancy is considered the most significant type among others. Though it is usually argued that the use of repetition or the continuous use of it would make the text weak, Perrin & Ebbitt (1972:341, cited in Yasseen, 2008:19) assert that repeating words and phrases brings about the ideas to be a form of emphasis, and by the result, makes the text coherent. Akmajian et al (1984:310) state that the use of repetition, as far as redundancy is concerned, has a semantic value:
(1) She killed him dead.
the use of two synonyms repeatedly makes comprehensibility and emphasis larger.
2. Restatement: Grant-Davie (1995:20) says that restatement helps readers to understand concepts. Those who do not grasp an idea when is articulated may understand it better when it is phrased in different ways or when the subject is describable from different perspectives. He argues that restatement may actually contribute to the perceived conciseness of the writer. Writers tend to be most concise at placing where they restate in a "nut-shell" point they have just explained at a greater length. This would bring about the necessary clarity.
3. Meta-discourse: Grant-Davie (ibid) states that a common form of redundancy in document design is meta-discourse as " passages that remind the readers what they have read and announce what they are about to read".
4. Informative Headings: it is for elliptical readers, Grant-Davie says that elliptical readers are those who select passages from

the reading text because they either do not have enough time, or they get bored from the redundant lengthened paragraphs in the text. Informative headings may be both elliptical and redundant elliptical syntax if they take the form of tense phrases rather than complete clauses and they are not redundant in the sense that the information in a heading is repeated elsewhere in the text- in the section it heads and perhaps also in a table of contents compiles from headings in the body of the report (Grant-Davie, 1995:21).

5. The abundance of cohesive ties.

In Readers'/Hearers' knowledge:

Grant-Davie (ibid) assures that redundancy makes the reader/hearer aware of rhetorical situations, linguistic knowledge vocabulary, etc. and thereby increases his knowledge of the language.

2. Redundancy and Discourse

In the perspective of discourse, redundancy plays a major role in the coherence and cohesion. Along with ellipsis, redundancy is found in the structure of the text- the linguistic representation of discourse (Grant-Davie, 1995: 23). According to Flower (1989:187, cited in Horning:1991:2) she believes that what makes a text – a piece of discourse- readable and coherent to get meaning from are two factors: cohesion and redundancy. So, in what follows, the relation between redundancy and cohesion, on the one and; and the relation between redundancy and coherence, on the other hand will be explained respectively.

2.1.Redundancy and Cohesion

Halliday & Hassan (1976:4) define the term 'cohesion' as the linguistic units that connect the text in a discourse and are responsible to make the sentences in the paragraphs of the discourse appear logical. They say that cohesion is the relations of meaning that exist within the text, and define the text as a text. Having pointed out the standards of textuality to make the discourse communicative (as shown in chapter two), de Beaugrande & Dressler (1981: 2) explain that cohesion concerns the ways in which the components of the surface text – word in the text, are mutually connected within a sequence. The surface components depend on each other according to the grammatical forms and conventions.

On the basis of Halliday & Hassan (1976:2) cohesion is that characteristic which creates texture in a text. Halliday & Hassan (1976:2, cited in Verschueren, 1999: 104-6) classify cohesion into:

1. Conjunction: Brown & Yule (1983:191) explain that conjunctive relations are linguistic markers such as 'but, and, so, etc. and they clarify them as:

A: additive: and, or, furthermore, similarly, in addition.

B: adversative: but, however, on the other hand, nevertheless

C: causal: so, consequently, for this reason, it follows from this

D: temporal: then, after that, an hour later, finally, at last.

2. Anaphora and Reference: Halliday & Hassan (1976: 18) define anaphora as the relation that looks back in the text for its interpretation. It has an antecedent formed by the pronoun. If the antecedent comes in an utterance after the head, the relation is anaphoric; whereas if it comes before the head the relation then is cataphoric. Both anaphoric and cataphoric relations belong to the endophoric relations of reference. Reference has endophoric and exophoric relations. The former looks for the interpretation of the

sentence inside the text. The latter looks for the meaning outside the text (Halliday & Hassan, 1976: 18).

3. Exemplification: Verschueren (1999: 105) says that this is formed by using words like (for instance) in the text.
4. Explanation: this is concerned with using comma or other punctuation marks (ibid).
5. Ellipsis: Quirk & Greenbaum (1999:304) explain that ellipsis is a process of getting rid of repeating the same information.
6. Repetition and its forms: Verschueren (1999: 105) states that repetition is often incorporating elements of contrast and comparison. Or, it invokes different kinds of semantic relations such as synonymy and homonymy.
7. Substitution: Halliday & Hassan (1976: 2) state that substitution is a view that an expression may be replaced by another in the text.

Having been aware of cohesion, redundancy, on the other hand, has to do some part in the connection of the linguistic elements within the text. Given that the endophoric relations, i.e. , anaphoric expressions, Brown & Yule (1983: 143) show that repetition is one component of the cohesive ties that link the text. They exemplify repetition as subscribing under the label of anaphoric-endophoric relation, as in:

- (2) A: *Repeated form: The Prime Minister recorded her thanks to foreign Secretary. The Prime Minister was most eloquent.*
B: *Partially repeated form: Dr. Reeve invited Mr. Philip to report on the State of the garden.*

According to Horning (1991: 3), the relation between cohesion and redundancy is very close. He writes:

Cohesion and redundancy are related to one another in various ways. First, cohesive ties create redundancy. Where a pronoun refers back to a noun in a preceding sentence, information overlap or redundancy is created. Indeed, each kind of cohesive ties contributes to redundancy of the text as a whole

Horning explains that ellipsis may contribute to redundancy in the reader who knows well how to fill in the missing information. This redundancy derives from the reader's knowledge. Furthermore, conjunctions make explicit important meaning relations in the text. All of these connections in meaning are forms of cohesion which contribute to reader's ability to get the author's full message. Besides, they enhance information overlap, and hence derive redundancy (Horning, 1991:4).

2.2.Redundancy and Coherence

Communicative discourse is said to be coherent. Coherence is a property of discourse. de Beaugrandy & Dressler (1981:4) define coherence as the sequence of discourse of connected ideas in which the components i.e. linguistic elements and configuration of concepts and relations which underlie the surface text, are mutually accessible and relevant. Levinson (1983:286) claims that coherent discourse is that whose categories, i.e. sentences, paragraphs, etc. are put in a well formed sequence.

Blakemore (1987: 112-3) asserts that coherence has two types in discourse:

1. Coherence that arises when information made available by the interpretation of one segment of discourse is used in establishing the propositional content of the next.

2. Coherence that arises from when the information made available by the interpretation of one discourse segment is used in establishing the contextual effects of the next, as in:

(3) A: *I put the butterfly wing on the table. It broke.*

B: *I put the heavy book on the table. It broke.*

She argues that there is no linguistic rule that its application can enable the hearer to recover the correct interpretation. This is only recovered on the basis of contextual i.e. non-linguistic information made available by the interpretation of the first segment in the sequence in accordance with the principle of relevance. However, the interpretation of (3a) is to refer to 'the fragility of the butterfly wings' which achieves an interpretation in which the wings of the butterfly were caused to break; whereas the first segment of (3b) gives the access to the hearer about the weight of the book that made the table at the state of being broken.

Reference to the relation between redundancy and coherence, Horning (1991:5) states, that redundancy, semantic and syntactic one, raises comprehensibility of the text and makes it readable; hence coherent. He states that 'coherence comes from cohesion and redundancy'

According to Grant-Davie (1995:37), he asserts that the use of redundancy for rhetorical effects makes speech coherent, as in (4) below:

- (4) *We shall not flag or fail. We shall go on to the end. We shall fight in France. We shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in hills; we shall never surrender.*

Grant-Davie says that this use of figurative of speech, for rhetorical goals, creates redundancy and makes the text thereby coherent. For example the abundance of cohesive ties i.e. anaphoric expression formed by the repetition, creates redundancy and figures of speech alike, as in (4) above. 'Epistrophe' for example, repeats the same word or phrase at the end of each clause in 'sequence' as the passage of the Bible: 'when I was a child I spoke as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child: but when I became a man, I put away my childish things'. The repetition, in this passage, raises clarity and makes the lines cohesive and coherent.

3. Relevance Theory and Redundancy

Relevance theory is a psychopragmatic theory. It is crucially based on conversational implicature theory as first coined by Grice. The most important figures who contribute to Relevance theory are Sperber and Wilson. They argue that communication is achieved not by obeying Grice's maxims and sub maxims: but by a rather general principle of cognition (Verschueren, 1999:3). Evans and Green (2006:459) say:

Relevance theory represents a modern approach to pragmatics that adopts an explicitly generative view of language, and aims to provide mentalist account of communication that can be integrated with the generative model of language.

They also explain that Relevance theory is basically a theory of ostensive communication. The characteristic of communication that Relevance theory provides is to make manifest specific communication iteration. That is the communicator's intention is made manifest by a kind of ostensive behavior. For example, the response of a question 'How are you getting home?' can be made by signaling a manual gesture of car's steering. Thus, the addressee

can infer from this ostensive form of behavior (Evan & Green: 459).

Cruze (2006:52-53) says that Relevance theory has one general principle other than the four principles of Grice. This general principle of relevance theory is subdivided into two main principles: cognitive and communicative. Cruze says that, in what regards communication, the speaker is more active than the hearer. He says that the speaker's task is to produce an utterance which enables the hearer to understand the intended message. How this is to occur is that the speaker has to take into his account what is the hearer's knowledge and accessible its different parts of the hearer's knowledge- probably are. The assumptions made the speaker have certain effects-contextual effects- to the hearer. The hearer, then, is going to derive them by the procedure of assessing these contextual effects mentally. Assessing the processing effects requires some mental cost. The processing effort stops when the hearer arrives at the intended meaning when he derives the correct contextual effect the utterance has.

Wilson & Sperber (2002:251) define the term relevance in terms of contextual effects and the mental effort spent to derive them. So, they say in relevance-theoretic terms: 'other things being equal, the greater the processing effort required, the less relevant the input' and vice versa. (ibid.352)(cf. Wilson & Matsui (1998:3).

Relevance is a property of individual. Sperber & Wilson (1995:144-45) provides two definitions of the relevance to an individual. One is classificatory and the other is comparative. These are mentioned respectively below.

_ *Relevance to an individual (classificatory)*

An assumption is relevant to an individual at a given time if and only if it is relevant in one or more of contexts accessible to that individual at that time

_Relevance to an individual (comparative)

Extent condition 1: an assumption is relevant to an individual to the extent that the contextual effects achieved when it is optimally processed are large.

Extent condition 2: an assumption is relevant to an individual to the extent that the effort required to process it optimally is small.

Sperber & Wilson (1995:143-44) provide six situations that are essential for new assumption to be relevant to the individual in certain context at a given time. These are:

- a. An assumption is already contained in the initial context at a maximal strength. Then the new token of the assumption is irrelevant in any context, since these contexts are part of the initial context.
- b. An assumption is contained in none of the accessible contexts; the assumption has no context effect in any accessible context then, the new assumption is irrelevant too.
- c. An assumption is contained in the initial context and all accessible contexts, at less than the maximal strength. Then, the new assumption for the old assumption ensures its relevance in all the accessible contexts. Whatever the assumption may extend to, it still has the contextual effects in both the initial context and any other context.
- d. An assumption is contained in none of the accessible contexts, and it has some contextual implications in the initial context. The assumption, then, is relevant in the entire accessible contexts as long as it preserves the contextual implications.
- e. An assumption is contained in none of the contexts and has no contextual effects in the initial context. But, it has some contextual effects in some extensions of the initial context. The assumption, then, is relevant in some of the extended accessible contexts. In this

case, no relevance can be achieved until the context gets extended. The extension should follow (c) and (d) (ibid).

- f. An assumption is not contained in the initial context, but is contained (at a maximal strength) in some of the large accessible contexts; an assumption has contextual effects in some of the context in which it is not contained which either includes the initial context or not. Then, assumption is relevant in some of the accessible contexts, and its relevance will be that of 'reminder'. A reminder is relevant only in contexts which do not contain the information in question: its function is to make this information accessible at smaller processing cost than would be required to get it by successive extensions of the context.

3.1. Negative (cognitive) Redundancy in Relevance Theory

Negatively, redundancy is seen as the lost of economic effort that is required to yield the contextual effects. Sperber and Wilson (1995:150) confirm that redundancy is typically related to the amount of effort. They illustrate how cognitive redundancy can take place in an artificial example:

(5) *Mary: what I would like to eat tonight is an osso-bucco.*

Peter: I had a long day. I'm tired.

Mary accesses the initial context as:

(6) *A: Peter is tired.*

B: if Peter is tired, he wishes Mary would make the dinner.

C: Peter wishes Mary would make the dinner.

(6a) is the assumption made manifest by Peter (6b) and (6a) is combined to form the contextual implication (6c), which Mary makes it strong but not certain (ibid: 145).

Sperber and Wilson claim that the context gets extended in real life to include all the assumptions available around the communicator's environment. So, encyclopedic entries go into the hearer's mind to include the assumptions- both new and old. In example (5), there are several encyclopedic entries that go behind Mary's mind, given that Peter is a surgeon, he is tried (contained) in the initial context (6a) Mary concludes from the context, when extended, that she has to make the dinner herself because he had a long tiring day. The context may extend to other assumptions with the relation of the initial context through the encyclopedic information that may rise; as:

(7) *Mary: what I should like to eat tonight I
osso-bucco.*

*Peter: I had a long day. I'm tired- (I wish
you would make the dinner tonight,
and by the way. There's a dissert, a
chocolate mousse, in the
refrigerator.)*

The words between the brackets are not contained in the initial context, but have some contextual effects. Hence, they are relevant at a little processing cost (Sperber& Wilson 1995:149).

Sperber and Wilson point out that (7) suits the case (f) of the situations. The words in the brackets work as the 'reminder'. If the reminder is relevant, whatever spent to retain the information in the context will be small. Sperber & Wilson (1995:150) write:

*In these circumstances, a reminder is
relevant: the contextual effects it produces could
have been produced otherwise, but more slowly and
at a greater processing cost. On the other hand,
when a reminder comes after the context has been
extended to include the very information that the*

speaker is trying to bring to the hearer's attention, then, the extra effort needed to process an utterance which carries no new contextual effects is wasted, and redundancy rather than relevance is the result

Therefore, redundancy, i.e., economic-redundancy which is the cognitive waste of effort is the result. The relation between relevance the property of human's cognition and cognitive redundancy is a converse relation. Wilson & Sperber (1998:1-22) argue that cognitive effects do not seem free to derive. They cost some mental effort. The greater the effort they need to derive these contextual or cognitive effects, the lower the relevance will be, and hence cognitive redundancy appears. Causes of cognitive redundancy come from misunderstanding, which makes the effort rise with low relevance. The understanding of utterance also depends on the contextual or cognitive effects and the processing effort. Wilson & Sperber mention two factors. These are:

The form in which it is presented (audibility legibility, dialect, register, syntactic complexity and familiarity of constructions all affect processing effort); and the effort of memory and imagination needed to construct a suitable context. The greater the processing effort required, the lower will be the relevance, and the greater the risk of losing the hearer's attention
(ibid)

Hence, the hearer, when accosted with difficulty of the message sent by the speaker will take greater amount of effort that leads to some degree of cognitive redundancy.

3.2. Positive (linguistic) Redundancy in Relevance Theory

The term 'redundancy' is seen, linguistically, in the light of relevance theory as a matter of style, especially with the use of repetition. According to Sperber & Wilson (1995:219), repetition is a matter of style that pursues relevance- along with the use of figurative speech. They write:

Style arises, we maintain, in the pursuit of relevance the classical figures of speech were defined in terms of formal features which may or may not have the expected stylistic effects. Consider epizeuxis or repetition, for example. The effects of repetition on utterance interpretation are no means constant

Armed with this in mind, repetition, then, is consistent with the relevance and makes easier to reach to the interpretation of utterance. For example:

- (8) A: *Here is a red cock, here's a red rock, here's a blue sock*
B: *W went for along, long walk.*
C: *There were houses, houses everywhere.*
D: *I shall never, never smoke again.*
E: *There's a fox, a fox in the garden.*
F: *My childhood days are gone, gone.*

Considering (8a), in easy circumstances to imagine, the use of it might help to reveal that there were two red rocks. In (8b), the example shows that the speaker has gone in a very long walk. (8c) expresses that there were a great many houses. (8d) shows and asserts that the speaker of it will never smoke. (8e) reveals the speaker's excitement about the existence of the fox inside the garden, and (8f) that the speaker was moved by the disappearance of his/her childhood days. Therefore, the 'emphatic' effects created by the use of repetition are worked out

differently. Each use of repetition will affect utterance information (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:219). In the above examples, the use of repetition is reflected in the propositional content of the utterance especially in examples (8a-c); in the speaker's degree of commitment to that propositional content, as in (8d); or in some expressions of the speaker's attitude, as in (8e) and (8f) (ibid). Repetition is consistent with the principle of relevance. The criterion of being consistent with the principle of relevance is the characteristic of any utterance that creates an expectation of relevance. Wilson (1994:38-58) defines the criterion of consistency with principle of relevance as follows:

An utterance, on a given interpretation, is consistent with the principle of relevance if and only if the speaker might rationally have expected it to be optimally relevant to the hearer on that interpretation

In relevance-theoretic terms, the repetition in (8a) would be consistent with the principle of relevance. Sperber & Wilson (1995:220) say that the sentence

(8a) Here is a red rock, here's a red sock.

refers numerically to different objects. Hence, (8a) means that there are two rocks. Example (8b) would be consistent with the principle of relevance to assume that the speaker wanted to indicate that he walks in:

(8b) We went for a long, long walk.

was longer than the hearer expects it or thinks. In addition, the repetition in:

(8c) There were houses, houses everywhere.

is consistent with the relevance that the hearer expects. It is intended to make the hearer assume that the speaker indicates that there were more houses than what the hearer has thought; in other words, there were great many houses.

Sperber and Wilson (1995:221) say that in these cases the repetition modifies the propositional form of the utterance and hence results in constituting Explicature-the developmental proposition of the utterance, and achieves extra contextual effects thereby. Moreover, Sperber & Wilson confirm that example (8d):

(8d) I shall never, never smoke again.

has certain interpretation other than the examples of repetition shown above so far. (8d) would be consistent with the principle of relevance to assume that the speaker reveals a higher conformation value to the assumption expressed than the hearer would otherwise have thought of it. They say that realizing that her utterance will be sceptically received, she repeats the word 'never', the likely target of scepticism, to convince the hearer that she means what she says. In other words, 'never, never' is here similar in import to 'definitely never', and reflects the speaker's degree of commitment to the assumption expressed. This strengthens the explicature and all its contextual implications, thereby increasing the contextual effects of the utterance. Therefore, repeating the word 'never' makes the hearer sure of the speaker's commitment to his words (ibid).

Concerning the examples (8e) and (8f), they are also different from the preceding examples. Sperber & Wilson assert that no increase of effect is likely to be yielded by enriching the propositional content or by strength the implicature. Rather, they say that the repetition should achieve an increase in contextual effects by encouraging the hearer to extend the context, and by this, will add a further implicature. Example (8e):

(8e) *There's a fox, a fox in the garden.*

shows that the repetition here does not seem to provide the assumption that there are several foxes in the garden, neither does it show any strength of assumption that there is a fox. Instead, the hearer of it encouraged to go deeply into his encyclopedic entry for a fox, with the guarantee that the extra processing effort will be outweighed by the achievement of the contextual effects. That is, the fact that there is a fox in the garden is presented as more relevant than the hearer would have realized (Sperber & Wilson, 1995:221). Sperber & Wilson state that there are some differences between the example (8e) of repetition and (8f), though (8f) is used to refer to the encouragement of the hearer to extend the context, as that which is seen in example (8e) above. The difference is that in paying attention to the fact that there is a fox in the garden, and making the effort to remember basic facts about foxes, is likely to achieve some strong and predictable contextual implications, such as the chickens are in danger. These strong implications are extended by the encouragement to the hearer to extend the context. But in (8f), the extension of the context of the weak implicature is made by a wider array of weaker implicatures. In other words, the hearer is encouraged to be imaginative and to take as a large share of responsibility in imagining what it may be far the speaker refers to.

3.3 Relevance and Cognitive Environment

'Relevance' is a property of human's cognition. It is obvious that it carries certain aspects. Sperber & Wilson (1995:39) establishing the relation between 'relevance' and 'cognition', say that all human-beings living on the same physical environment share the same fact of this environment. They maintain that human cognitive ability is visual and conceptual. Visual is said to connect with the environment; whereas conceptual to his mental cognitive abilities. So, they stipulate:

- *A fact is 'manifest' to an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably true.*
- *A cognitive environment of an individual is a set of facts that are manifest to him.*

This reveals the interaction process of visual and conceptual cognition to an individual. They also say that the total cognitive environment of the individual is a function of his physical environment and his cognition abilities. They are also inferable, i.e. an individual can infer the fact made manifest to him' through them (ibid). Moreover, Sperber & Wilson (1995:41-42) confirm that people share the same cognitive environment. Being so is that because people share the same physical environment. So, Sperber & Wilson admit that this environment is cognitively 'mutual'. To communicate, the speaker makes an assumption that a hearer and speaker both share, manifest to the hearer.

Wilson & Sperber (2002:251) define 'relevance' cognitively or intuitively as sounds, sight, an utterance or a memory that interacts with background knowledge a hearer has available at the time. Intuitively, the 'relevance' of an input to an individual is when the processing of that input in its context yields a positive cognitive effect and hence makes it worth processing. Through these positive cognitive effects, the individual is going to make conclusions that have relationships to that input. False conclusions are not worthwhile, because they are not positive cognitive effect. Wilson and Sperber also say that these cognitive effects are achieved by the 'contextual implications'. These 'contextual implications' make obvious the

relevance of the input. Wilson and Sperber say that it is important to know that cognitive effects are easier or harder to derive, so they stipulate the relevance of input as:

a. Other things being equal, the greater the positive effects achieved by processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual.

b. Other things equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the lower the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.

Blakemore & Cartson (2004:20) assert that the processing effort is of a great importance in the relevance of the stimuli. To illustrate the effort and effect, Wilson & Sperber (2002: 251) explain that Mary who does not like meat is allergic to chicken, rings her bell to discover what exists on the menu. The waiter can tell her to choose one of the three that he offers.

(9) *A: We are serving meat.*

B: We are serving chicken.

C: Either we are serving chicken or (72-3) is not 46.

All servings are relevant to Mary. In these examples, b seems to be more relevant than the rest, because it requires less parsing and inference; whereas a & c though they are relevant to Mary, they are less relevant (Wilson & Sperber 2002:252-3). Hence, the aim of any process of communications is to maximize relevance and minimize the cognitive redundancy of that process.

Therefore, Wilson & Sperber provide the cognitive principle of relevance as follows:

Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance.

Concerning the cognitive principle, Sperber & Wilson (2006:360) assert that:

This principle has essential implications for human communications, in order to communicate; the communicator needs her audience's attention. If attention tends automatically to go to what is most relevance at the time, then, the success of communication depends on the audience taking the utterance to be relevant enough to be worth of attention.

Thus, the cognitive principle of relevance creates and paves the way to successful communication. It then reveals the importance of the second principle of relevance. That is, it activates the communicative principle of relevance.

3.4 Relevance and Ostensive Communication

Sperber & Wilson (1993:3-4) explain that ostensive communication involves four types. These are:

1. When having a state that makes informative intention without revealing this intention, e.g., Mary is sad; her voice reveals this but she does not want her audience to recognize this informative intention.
2. Non-ostensive informative intention: a state at which the communicator intends her informative to be informed to audience, e.g. Mary intends to tell her audience to informative intention (sadness) but she could bravely hide this. This is a form of covert communication.
3. Manifest but not mutual: here, the communicator intends to make her informative intention clear; but still not mutually manifest, e.g.,

Mary intends her audience to notice her informative intention (sadness) and yet her informative intention gets recognized; but not mutually communicated.

4. Mutually manifest: here, the informative intention is not merely recognized, but communicately intended; therefore, ostensibly communicated (Sperber & Wilson, 1993:4). So, they stipulate their second principle of relevance which stresses that:

Every act of ostensive communication conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance

Concerning 'optimal relevance', Sperber & Wilson define this notion as:

An ostensive stimulus is optimally relevant to an audience iff:

- a. It is relevant enough to be worth the audience's processing effort*
- b. It is the most relevant one compatible with communicator's abilities and preferences*

Therefore, the hearer pays attention to utterances that have great contextual whose task is to reduce his processing effort in deriving them and follows his expectations about the relevant information easily come from the speaker.

3.5 Relevance and Inference

'Inference' in relevance theory is said to be non-demonstrative one, especially in understanding ostensive communication is done implicitly. And, it is constructed explicitly that the hearer uses some premises to be represented conceptually in the process of inference on the other (Sperber & Wilson, 1982:73; 1995:55). Sperber & Wilson also confirm that their inference is global not local. It is global in the sense that it makes free the access of conceptual representation, local is

demonstrative, i.e. it is governed by certain domain. Sperber & Wilson state that there are two hypotheses in inference: formation and conformation. The former is a matter of imaginative; the latter is a logical process governed by inference rules (ibid: 68).

Luchjenbroers (1989:191) explains Sperber & Wilson's model of inference. She says that their model involves a process of 'formation' and 'confirmation'. First, environmental stimuli- verbal or non-verbal- is processed in the 'input system'. This 'input system' involves deductive processes that bear one-to-one relation between the perceptual stimulus and its cognitive interpretation. These interpretations are sent to the central systems. At this time, the interaction between the new information and memory happens. And, this forms the 'formation hypothesis'. Then, the 'formation hypothesis' of the new information goes towards the deductive device which non- demonstratively either confirms, denies (eliminates), or modifies (by strengthening) the formation. Thus, the hearer is going to have the optimal representation of the new information. See Fig (3):




Fig: 3
Sperber & Wilson's Inferential Processing Model

In what regards 'inference' of newly presented information, Wilson (1994:35-58) explains that the inference of relevant information yields some contextual effect to derive it. This takes place when it interacts with a context of existing assumptions in one of three ways:

1. *By strengthening an existing assumption;*
2. *By contradicting and eliminating an existing assumption;*
3. *Or, by combining with an existing assumption to yield a contextual implication- derivable neither from the new information alone, nor from the context alone*

Sperber & Wilson (1995: 109) stress that contextual implications are contextual effects that result from the synthetic implication in the deductive device. Contextual effects result from the interaction between the new and old information. The relevance here is of greatest degree when the utterance has great contextual effects.

3.6 Reduction of Cognitive Redundancy: Discourse Connectives

Sperber & Wilson (1993:1-25) assert that Blakemore's (1987), (1998) and (1992) idea behind the study of discourse connective is that to set up the distinction between conceptual and non conceptual decoding and inference. The idea is that discourse connectives are of two kinds: procedural and conceptual. For the analysis of so and after all, Sperber & Wilson say that in example (11) using so and after all in (12) respectively reduces the amount of effort:

- (10) A: *Peter's not stupid.* B: *He can find his own way home.*
(11) *Peter's not stupid, so he can find his own way home.*
(12) *Peter's not stupid, after all; he can find his own way home.*

On the first interpretation, (11a) provides an evidence for a conclusion drawn in (11b); on the second, (12a) is confirmed by evidence provided in (12b). Blakemore (cited in Sperber & Wilson, 1993:1-25) argues that discourse connectives such as 'so' and 'after all' do not contribute to the truth-condition of the utterance because they do not encode concepts. Blakemore (1989:21, cited in Rouchota (1996:3) the function of discourse connectives is:

Their sole function is to guide the interpretation process by specifying certain properties of context and contextual effects. In relevance-based framework, where the aim is to minimize processing costs, the use of such expressions is to be expected

Moreover, Blakemore (1990: 363-370, cited in Carston; 1998:24) says that the use of 'after all' saves the hearer's effort. For the analysis of 'but', Bach (1999:339, cited in Blakemore, 2000:470) argues that though 'but' can be used to conjoin propositions, it cannot be regarded as truth-conditional, because of the fact 'but' seems not to contribute to what is being said, but it is due to the main point of the utterance. Indeed, contrary to the common assumption of one sentence, one proposition, such utterances express more than one proposition, like:

(13) *Tom thinks that Sheila is rich but she is unhappy.*

Blakemore (2000:475) says that there are two ways in which linguistic meaning can perform as an input in the process of inference. She renews the types of linguistic meaning of discourse markers thus, she writes:

There are two different ways in which linguistics meaning can act as the input of the inferential processes involved in utterance comprehension. On one hand, expressions may encode CONCEPTS which are the

constituents of the conceptual representation that undergo inferential computations. And on the other hand, they may encode PROCEDURES, or the means for increasing the salience of a particular kind of inferential computation

The view of discourse connectives in the light of the studies made by Blakemore is of two distinct types:

- a. Those connectives that are non-truth conditional but conceptual.
- b. Those which are both non-truth conditional and non-conceptual.

Therefore, the treatment of discourse connectives or (discourse markers) can be seen in the following table:

Tab: (2)
The Analysis of Discourse Connectives in Relevance Theory

Utterance	First proposition	Discourse markers	Second proposition
Conditionality	Truth conditional	Non-truth conditional	Truth conditional
Meaning	Conceptual	Conceptual	Conceptual
Context	Linguistics	Linguistics	Linguistics

What is important in studying discourse connectives in the light of relevance and redundancy is that using discourse connectives will reduce 'cognitive redundancy' (Blakemore, 2000: 476).

Finally, Rouchota (1998:116, cited in Hedley, 2004:44) says that the use of two connectives with similar interpretations does not lead to redundancy or unacceptability if those connectives are procedural in nature, unlike his effort to reformulate (the hearer) the following example using conceptual items:

- (14) A: *I just saw a bird in the garden.*
B: *So, the cat didn't eat them all, then*

Therefore, whenever the speaker uses any item of discourse connectives, the result then is that the relevance will be maximum degree, this is due to the contextual effects that are raised by that use, and the cognitive redundancy will be minimum degree, because their use reduces the amount of processing effort. Nicole (1998: 3) states that the use of mood, tense, and aspect works as a procedural encoding. So, their use reduces the amount of effort.

4. The Analysis of Spoken Discourse

4.1 Discussion of text (1)

There is a cognitive redundancy that is raised through ambiguous utterance that seems unacceptable to the hearer. It is worth mentioning that, sometimes, linguistic redundancy formed by giving explanation for an already known thing can reduce cognitive redundancy. However, it seems clear that there is cognitive redundancy in the following exchange:

- (1) Farmer: These cars! I'd rather ride a horse- even up to London.
Horses are more reliable than cars any day.
- (2) Harry: Do you really think so? But surely- with a big farm like this- don't you have a car?

The speaker's utterance seems to have little ambiguity in the mind of the hearer who asks whether the speaker has got a car or not. The explicature made by the speaker of (1) 'horses are more reliable than cars any day', raises some contextual implications that the hearer tries to process into his mind. But the hearer of it has some cognitive redundancy asking whether the speaker of it does have a car or not. The contextual implications are like 'the speaker does not like driving cars; or that riding horses because of his environment is better than driving cars'.

The hearer is led to process them; but with the context in mind, that is, everyone or every farmer must have the object that aids him in his farm, so for the search of relevance, he asks. Thus, the analysis goes as follows:

Analysis of text (1):

trns	Optimality								Comprehens		Conf	C.P.R	Coh	Acct
	Relevance				Cog- red				Clarity	Ambiguity				
	C	S	W	VW	C	S	W	VW						
4	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	
9	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	

Discussion of text (2)

This conversation takes place between two speakers: Harry and the Fortune-teller. The obvious use of discourse connective and modal represented by use of 'can' as well as the use of aspect bring about relevance and impose constraints to cognitive redundancy because they encode procedural information, as in turns (1) and (2):

- (1) Fortune-teller: I can see that you come from a distant country.
- (2) Harry: Well, I've never pretended to speak English like an Englishman.

The use of the modal "can", the discourse connective "well", and the aspect phrase all are responsible for reducing the amount of cognitive effort, or in other words, they reduce cognitive redundancy. They are markers of procedural encoding. Whenever the speaker uses such markers his speech, his speech then is said to be coherent, because it is acceptable, relevant because it is

accessible, and not cognitively redundant. The use of 'I've never pretended' is an aspect form said by the speaker in turn (2) side by side with the discourse connectives 'well'. The two turns are therefore said to be of great degree of relevance. Besides, Harry's implicature works as a procedural encoding. It gives rise to the conceptual representation that Harry is not an Englishman. Thus, the piece of discourse is coherent, consistent with the principle of relevance, acceptable and accessible for the communicators.

This use of discourse connectives seems to perform a crucial role in understanding, maintaining the hearer's cognitive effort with a better ground of comprehensibility between the communicators. It maintains clarity and avoids ambiguity. Moreover, it saves the consistency with the principle of relevance in the overall conversation.

Not only discourse connectives that reduce the cognitive redundancy of the amount of effort, the obvious use of syntactically repeated structures like that repetition in turn-taking (21) seems to provide a method of reducing cognitive redundancy through raising the contextual effects and hereby reducing the amount of effort- the pragmaticity of relevance theory. This is obvious in the use of repetition in the following turns:

(21) Fortune-teller: Let me see- Ah, yes, it is clear. You will have an amazing success connected with umbrella, probably. You will be very rich, very rich indeed! I was not sure of the exact meaning of this small line. But I see clearly: the way moves upwards leaves no doubt.

(22) Harry : (delighted) Well, that's wonderful.

Repeating words or syntactic structures, pragmatically draws the inference. In relevance-theoretic terms, it guides the hearer to the easiest path of least effort and raises the contextual effects with confirmation as well as being consistent with the principle of relevance.

Analysis of text (2):

trns	Optimality								Comprehens		Conf	C.P.R	Coh	Act
	Relevance				Cog- red				Clarity	Ambiguity				
	c	s	w	vw	c	s	w	vw						
1	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
2	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
21	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
22	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+

Discussion of text (3)

Having put in mind that the repetition in the conversation brings about the confirmation to the hearer, in some other conversations it does not do this. Repetition, sometimes, leads to ambiguity in the hearer's mind. In relevance theoretic terms, they require greater amount of effort to get that repetition understood. Consider the following:

- (3) Harry: You know he just sat in his office and kept on offering me tea- as if that was what I wanted. 'Will you have some tea?' were almost the first words he said and 'won't you really have any tea?' were almost the last.

- (4) Peter: Perhaps he felt you needed strengthening?
(5) Harry: Perhaps. What happened to you?

The use of repeated utterances abide the context that they are used in makes the hearer process the wrong contextual implications, because of the ambiguity of that repeated act of utterance 'will you have some tea?'. But , once again, the repetition reduces the amount of processing effort, when the speaker Harry in turn (5) repeats Peter's word in turn (4) 'perhaps' to bring about the opposite meaning of Peter's wrong contextual implication of having strength from the official. Therefore, confirmation of inference takes place in the hearer's mind. In this sense, Peter is, though linguistically redundant, but cognitively economic. The repeated utterances, however, not only reduce the amount of effort and raise the contextual effects, but also give the cohesion and coherence to discourse. Once the speaker utters the repeated words or phrases, he brings to the hearer the full understanding of what the discourse is about. Besides, if cohesion and coherence are made manifest and done correctly in discourse like above, it is going to have some sense of acceptability in the receiver's part.

Sperber & Wilson (1995:49) admit that talking to strangers that do not belong to the same talked or prevailing language will lead to a greater amount of processing effort. In turn-takings (14) and (16), the speech contains some cognitive redundancy, because the speaker talks with strangers. Turns (15) and (17) are relevant and do not contain cognitive redundancy, because of the use of discourse connectives.

Analysis of text (3):

trns	Optimality								Comprehens		Conf	C.P.R	Coh	Acct
	Relevance				Cog- red				Clarity	Ambiguity				
	c	s	w	vw	c	s	w	vw						
3	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
4	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+
5	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
14	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
15	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
16	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
17	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+

Discussion of text (4)

In turn-taking (1), the speaker's assumption is recognized by the hearer through the speaker who makes it mutually manifest to him. Quite obvious is the relevance of the first assumption of the speaker in the first part of the turn-taking (2). But, it is also apparent that the speaker of turn-taking (2) makes the assumption of being late relevant to the hearer, who answers the speaker respectively saying that the distance that they are going to is not far. This would confirm and be relevant to the mother as in turn-taking in (3). From the turn-taking (1) to (3) there seems to have no cognitive redundancy. This is also due to the state that all the utterances given

from (1-3) contain enough contextual effects that have reduced the cognitive redundancy for the hearer. Furthermore, all assumptions are being made mutually manifest to the hearer in each turn-taking, so they are coherent and communicative in as much as they are cognitively relevant.

In turn-taking (4), the word (tyre) yields some cognitive redundancy in the mind of the hearer, because the hearer is new to learn English and is not aware to all of the word meanings. Having some degree of cognitive redundancy in the mind of the hearer is resulted because of the production of new encyclopedic entries. This makes the hearer process mentally in order to understand the new word on the one hand, and to satisfy his expectations of relevance for the communication purpose on the other. Of course, she knows that the word (tyre) is somehow related to the motorbike, but she does not know the meaning what it means exactly. The hearer of (4) who does not know the meaning of (tyre), searching for the optimal relevance that is of her preferences asks to make the utterance optimally relevant. It is obvious from the inquiry of the hearer Elsa in her turn-taking (5). The speaker, then, makes it optimally relevant to the hearer in making the assumption of the meaning of the word mutually manifest, that is, as being intentionally communicative and informationally as possible. This is done through explaining what the word (tyre) means; and thereby reducing cognitive redundancy caused by the use of (tyre).

Another item of cognitive redundancy but of a lower degree, is that the existence of a motorbike that Patrick wants to buy a new tyre for; it has no place in the mind of hearer, who then assumes that Patrick has a motorbike, because it is a new information that has entered to her encyclopedic entries. Afterall, she asks and makes it relevant to confirm her search of relevance in the one part, and for Patrick comes to confirm this assumption by saying (yes).

Analysis of text (4):

trns	Optimality								Comprehens		Conf	C.P.R	Coh	Acct
	Relevance				Cog- red				Clarity	Ambiguity				
	c	s	w	vw	c	s	w	vw						
1	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+
2	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+
3	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+
4	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
5	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
6	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
7	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+
8	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+

Discussion of text (5)

In turn-taking (1) in the above conversation, the speaker says or requests the speaker (B) to repeat what did (b) say in the last piece of discourse. The repetition is required by (A) because he misunderstands what does (B) say before. Asking for repetition in this case will bring about confirmation of already existed assumption. In relevance-theoretic terms, the repetition of speaking raises the contextual effects and reduces cognitive redundancy or

the amount of mental processing effort. Therefore, cognitive redundancy is dismissed by the use of linguistic redundancy (formed by the use of repetition) in this piece of discourse. Moreover, as far as it is relevant enough, it will bring about coherence to the conversation as well as acceptability and cohesion. In these two turn-takings (1) and (2), though they contain linguistic redundancy, are relevant (not cognitively redundant), coherent, and cohesive. However, repetition is requested in turn-taking (1) because of the cognitive redundancy that is raised in the mind of (A) in the previously ill-formed utterance, noise, or misunderstanding.

In the light of (3) or (4), these turn-takings are quite relevant to each other. Understanding through repetition found in turn-taking (2) would help the hearer to get the informative and the communicative intentions recognized and change his cognitive environment with the minimum mental processing effort. This would actually make the piece of discourse coherent, because the comprehension, though linguistically redundantly assessed by repetition, is in a process. In addition, repetition is essential to repair the piece of discourse distorted by the noise or the difficulty of the speaker's language or misunderstanding. It would also be acceptable for the hearer. Acceptability is typically related to the hearer. If the utterance is relevant and coherent, it would be acceptable as well. This is so, because of the importance of consistency with the principle of relevance. Repetition in the above text works line to line with this criterion. So, linguistic redundancy formed by repetition plays a major role in building the minimum degree of cognitive redundancy and the maximum degree of relevance helping the discourse to yield coherence and acceptability.

Analysis of text (5)

trns	Optimality								Comprehens		Conf	C.P.R	Coh	Acct
	Relevance				Cog- red				Clarity	Ambiguity				
	c	s	w	vw	c	s	w	vw						
//	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
1	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
2	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
3	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+
4	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+

4.2 Concluding Remarks

The following are the conclusions that are arrived at:

1. Cognitive redundancy has a converse relation with relevance. As known, relevance is defined in terms of contextual effects, and cognitive processing effort. The greater contextual effects the utterance has with respect to the lower processing effort, the greater the relevance of that utterance. Hence, the less the contextual effects the utterance has with the greater amount of processing effort, the greater the cognitive redundancy.
2. Concerning optimal relevance, as discussed in the analysis, relevance is of degrees depending on the contextual effects and the mental processing effort in terms of a balance between them: enough effects with worthwhile attention and small amount of mental processing effort. It follows from that assumption that

the hearer decides what is relevant and what is not, according to the contextual effects the speaker's utterance carries in a discourse and accessed by the hearer. That is so, because these contextual effects modify the hearer's cognition. If they do so, they are worth the hearer's attention and will be accepted then as relevant.

3. The importance of clear context as well as the total awareness of both the speaker and the hearer of it will save the hearer's processing effort, reducing cognitive redundancy and the gain is a successful communication.
4. The speaker's failure to be able to make his assumption mutually manifest leads to cognitive redundancy at different degrees to the hearer, for example, the speaker says what he lacks evidence for without giving warrant to the hearer. By this, the hearer will process mentally and linguistically for the search of relevance, as far as our cognition tends to search for it, but his attempt will be in vain; only if the speaker corrects what he wrongly makes.
5. Linguistic redundancy formed by repetition plays a crucial role in understanding and inference for the hearer. It helps the hearer in two ways: it raises the contextual effects of the speaker's utterance on the one hand, and it reduces the amount of mental cost for the hearer, on the other. Thereby, it reduces cognitive redundancy.
6. The process of communication, even though it contains cognitive redundancy, will successfully continue. This is so because cognitive redundancy, will lead to linguistic redundancy in each turn-taking in the conversation, as far as the idea of the search of relevance of communicator is concerned, leading to the confirmation of the assumption 'difficulty be existed or

wrongly implied utterance'; and the result therefore is successful communication, though redundant.

7. The prevailing use of discourse connectives helps to provide relevant utterances. As previously argued, discourse connectives do reduce the amount of processing mental effort and raise the contextual effects.

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Appendixes

Text (1):

(1) Farmer: These cars! I'd rather ride a horse- even up to London
horses are more reliable than cars any day.

(2) Harry: Do you really think so? But surely- with a big form like
this- don't you have a car?

(Haycraft, 2001: 164)

Text (2):

(1) Fortune-teller: I can see that you come from a distant
country.

(2) Harry : well I've never pretended to speak English like
an Englishman.

(21) Fortune-teller: let me see- Ah, yes, it is clear. You will have
an amazing success connected with
umbrellas, probably. You will become very
rich, very rich indeed. I was not sure of the
exact meaning of this small line. But now I
see clearly: the way it moves upwards
leaves no doubt.

(22) Harry : (delighted) well that's wonderful.

(Haycraft, 2001:209-11)

Text (3):

(3) Harry: You know, he just sat there in his office and kept on
offering me tea- as if that was what I wanted. 'Will you
have some tea?' were almost the first words he said to
me and 'won't you really have any tea?' were almost the
last.

(4) Peter: Perhaps he felt you need strengthening?

(5) Harry: Perhaps. What happened to you?

* * *

- (14) Peter: All right (he speaks to a passer-by) Excuse me. Could you give me some help? (a man replies in an unfamiliar language)
- (15) Harry: Well I'm quite sure he is not English! Ask that lady.
- (16) Peter: All right excuse me-
(The woman replies in another unfamiliar language)
- (17) Harry: Well it seems to be somewhat difficult to find an Englishman! Perhaps we aren't in London at all.
(Haycraft, undate:269-70)

Text (4):

- (1) Elsa: Do you know, Mother, I understand English very well.
- (2) Helen: Yes, I know you understand Patrick's English. Now, Elsa, please don't be long.
- (3) Elsa: No, I don't think we're going very far.
- (4) Patrick: I want to buy a new "tyre" for my motorbike.
- (5) Elsa: What does the word (tyre) mean?
- (6) Patrick: It's a rubber thing- you know, it goes on the wheel.
- (7) Elsa: Have you a motorbike?
- (8) Patrick: Yes; it's standing in the garage with father's car. Come out with me tomorrow on the back of the motorbike!
(Hicks, 1999: 99)

Text (3):

- (1) A: Sorry, but I didn't quite catch that.
- (2) B: I said 'Can I give you a lift?'
- (3) A: isn't it out your way?
- (4) B: No, it's on my way home.

(Ockenden,1980: 74)