

The Translation of Modality from English into Arabic

Arif Abdullah Saleem Al-Ashoor
Assistant Lecturer / Mosul Technical Institute

Abstract

The study of modality and its translation was and is still controversial despite the fact that much ink has been spilt on it. Some linguists view it syntactically. Others view it semantically and / or pragmatically. For instance, it is reasonable to assume that "deontic necessity" and "deontic possibility" are semantic notions, whereas obligation and permission are pragmatic notions.

This paper aims at studying modality from semantic and pragmatic points of view. It also aims at showing how semantic and pragmatic elements affect its translation from English into Arabic. Consequently, the paper hypothesizes that (1) modality is ambiguous in that it has more than one interpretation, and (2) it is polysemous and homonymous in that it has different related and unrelated meanings. Hence, a translator does not know whether to tackle its literal meaning or its intentional meaning. This study will solve such a problem.

1. Modality: A General Perspective:

Things might be or might have been other than they actually are or were. To conceive of a state of affairs being otherwise is to conceive of its being true or real in some nonfactual world (s) or true or real in some state of the actual world at a point in time other than the present moment (Perkins 1983: 6-7). The essence of modality consists in the relativization of the validity of sentence meanings to a set of possible worlds. Talk about possible worlds can

thus be considered as talk about ways in which people could conceive the world to be different (Perkins, 1983: 8).

This view of modality covers most of what linguists usually treat under the heading of modality. It excludes however from the domain of modality factive evaluative predicates such as "**it is good**", "**it is bad**", "**it is amazing**". In the sentence "**it is amazing that Bill passed the exam**" it is taken for granted that Bill passed the exam which is qualified by the speaker's reaction to this state of affairs. Since the primary function of a factive predicate is to comment on or evaluate an aspect of the world that is rather than of some worlds that might be or might have been evaluations do not come within the scope of modality (Kiefer, 1998: 591).

How does negation fit into the adopted framework ? To paraphrase "**It is not true that Bill is sick**" the speaker would have to say that the proposition "**Bill is sick**" has to be evaluated in those possible worlds in which this proposition is false (Perkins 1983: 47-48). Or to put it differently the negation of an event would have to be characterized in terms of the occurrence of the event being made relative to its nonoccurrence which is a strange consequence. Negation is not a modal category (Perkins, 1983: 49).

As to illocutionary verbs these refer to an act and are not used to relativize the validity of a state of affairs such as "**I assert that all men are mortal**". What does it mean to say that something is compatible with what I assert ? There is no meaningful answer to this question: Illocution is alien to the notion of modality (Austin, 1962 and Searle, 1969).

The same holds true for perlocution. The effects that an act may bring about in the addressee cannot affect that act itself that is the proposition which describes the act is independent of the eventual consequences of the particular act (Kiefer 1987: 87).

On the other hand the concept of modality as the relativization of the validity of a proposition to a set of possible worlds also covers the logical modalities. Modality in logic is based on the concepts of **possibility** and **necessity**. The person who utters the sentence "**It is possible that it will rain tomorrow**" does not normally know for sure what the weather will be like tomorrow. That it will rain tomorrow is not excluded. It is one of the possibilities. Possibility thus means that the proposition in question is true in at least one possible world. Similar interpretation is available for the sentence "**It is certain that it will rain tomorrow**". This sentence means that whichever of the possible worlds comes to be realized it will rain tomorrow. In other words, it will rain tomorrow in all possible worlds (Allwood et al, 1977: 108 and Kearns, 2000: 52).

One can come to the conclusion that "**possible**" and "**certain**" can be defined in the following ways: "**possible**" involves truth in some possible world, whereas "**certain**" involves truth in all possible worlds.

2. The Linguistic Tradition:

Linguists often identify modality with the meaning of syntactically or morphologically defined "modal" expressions. It is possible to say, for example, that modality is whatever is expressed by the set of modal auxiliaries (e.g. in German, English). Modality in this sense refers to the meanings of modals. "It is not necessary to define precisely what kinds of meanings are involved". We take the formal category as our starting-point and is sufficient for our purpose that the meanings involved are such as to justify characterizing them as "modality" (Palmer 1979: 4-5 and Kiefer, 1987: 88).

There are several problems with such a proposal. One of the problems is connected with the fact that in whichever way the set of

modals is defined, not all modals will share all the properties. For example, traditionally the following differences have been noted, among other things, between modals and full verbs in English: (a) modals do not allow for "**do support**", (b) they undergo inversion with the subject in questions, and (c) they occur with the enclitic "**not**". These properties do not apply consistently to the semi-modals "**need**" and "**dare**". Moreover, the unverb - like properties of modals are idiosyncratic properties of these verbs in English. (They do not occur together, they do not participate in number agreement and perhaps most important they do not have participles or infinitives and so can only occur in the leftmost position (Calbert, 1975: 3-4 and Mey and Asher, 1998: 592).

Another view of modality identifies it with the speaker's evaluation of a state of affairs (Bally 1932, 1942). Each sentence consists of two parts: of what is said (the dictum) and of how it is said (the modus). The modus can be expressed in a large number of ways. For example:

- (1) I think it is raining.
- (2) It is probably raining.
- (3) It must be raining.
- (4) I hope it will be raining.

In these sentences the dictum can be identified as. "**It is raining**". Everything else has to do with modality (the modus). Modality can thus be defined as "the speaker's cognitive emotive or volitive attitude toward a state of affairs". Attitudes have to be distinguished from states which are brought about in the speaker by certain states of affairs. The linguistic expression of such states is not part of modality (Mey and Asher, 1998: 592).

The main task of the linguist is to separate the **modus** from the **dictum**. Whenever the modus is expressed by a higher predicate this task is relatively simple. What is needed is an adequate taxonomy of

predicates. If linguists have such a taxonomy at their disposal they can say that an attitudinal (non-causative transitive) verb occurring in the matrix clause is the expression of the **modus** and the embedded than-clause is the expression of the **dictum**. Verbs with this property are akin to the verbs of propositional attitude known from logic. The problem of separating the **modus** from the **dictum** becomes more complicated, however if the expression of the **modus** is made part of a simple sentence. In such cases the **modus** may appear in various forms: as an adverbial (**It is probably raining**) as a modal verb (**It must be raining**) or as mark on the verb (mood tense) which may be quite complex (**He would never have left us**) (Allwood et al, 1977: 115 and Kiefer, 1987: 70).

Linguists sometimes make a distinction between sentence mood and verbal mood. The former is a semantic category, whereas the latter a morphosyntactic category. Sentence mood is the modal value of sentence types. Several sentence types may express the same sentence mood. Thus for example, the sentence mood of interrogativity may be expressed by a Yes/No question, a disjunctive question, a wh-question. Declaratives, imperatives, interrogatives, optatives, and exclamatives ; all seem to express different sentence moods. Usually the meaning of a sentence mood is expressed in terms of speaker's attitudes. The speaker's attitudes corresponding to the various sentence types can be paraphrased as follows: The speaker "takes for granted that ... for declaratives", the speaker "wants to know ... for interrogatives", the speaker "is astonished about the fact that ... for exclamatives", the speaker "wants the addressee to bring about ... for imperatives", the speaker "desires ... be the case for optatives". Each of these formulations raises a number of problems. It is not quite clear, for example, whether exclamatives are distinguishable from declaratives and optatives from imperatives. In some way the exclamative attitude

contains the declarative attitude since to be astonished about a state of affairs implies that one takes this very state of affairs for granted. Consequently declaratives are more basic than exclamatives; the latter can be traced back to the former. As to imperatives and optatives they seem to have a common core meaning: in both cases the speaker wants something to be the case but while imperatives are addressee-oriented, optatives are not. This seems to indicate that there are perhaps only three basic sentence modalities (moods) declarative, interrogative and imperative / optative (Mey and Asher, 1998: 593).

The description of the modality of declaratives raises a different type of problem which boils down to the following question: What does it really mean that declaratives represent the unmarked modality ? It is arguable that Frege's distinction between thought judgement and assertion can profitably be used in the description of declaratives. Thought can be identified as referring to the state of affairs in question the propositional content of the sentence. Judgement may be considered as an attitudinal operator with the approximative sense to take for granted or to consider to be true and assertion expresses the fact that declaratives are typically used to make assertions. Declaratives may thus be conceived of as consisting of two parts: of the description of a state of affairs and of the expression of the judgement operator. The latter normally does not appear on the surface, hence the locution unmarked modality. It may ; however receive a special marker in so-called evidential systems. Semantically speaking, there is no reason to consider declaratives more basic and in this sense unmarked than the other modalities since this would imply that languages are considered to be essentially if not solely the instrument for the expression of propositional thought (Lyons 1982: 103).

The view of modality in terms of speaker's attitudes is consistent with the characterization of modality as envisaging several possible courses of events or considering the possibility of things being otherwise. Declaratives constitute the default case (Ibid).

3. Types of Modality:

Traditionally the main dividing line has been drawn between epistemic and deontic modalities, and functionally between epistemic, deontic and logical modalities.

3.1. Epistemic Modality:

Epistemics conveys information about the degree of probability of some event, action or state. They are typically expressed by adverbs of probability (probably, perhaps, maybe) by probability predicates (it is possible / probable that ...) and by modal verbs which are ambiguous between epistemic and deontic meaning (may, must) another less usual means of expression is verbal tenses The expressions for the epistemic modality should be viewed as expressing points of orientation on a continuous scale of probability, which is alternatively expressible as a percentage, from 0 to 100 percent (Koktova, 1987: 599).

Diachronically, epistemic modalities are posterior to deontic modalities, while synchronically they should preferably be treated apart from deontic modalities. As a special outer type of modality, the ordering in clusters of modal expressions can be only epistemic modality – deontic modality cf. **"It is probable that John must fly to London tomorrow"** (Koktova, 1987: 599).

3.2. Deontic Modality:

Within deontic modalities (typically expressed by modal verbs and their suppletive and periphrastic forms, such as can be, able to) the meanings of possibility necessity / obligation and volition have usually been distinguished ; the first two of these have sub meanings according to the causer of the modality (society / people or circumstances). Thus possibility has been subcategorized into ability permission and circumstantial / root possibility necessity / obligation has been subcategorized into social enforcement and circumstantial necessity. Mindt (1995) works with 17 modal meanings. Mitchell (1989) with eight modal meanings. Suzuki (1988) speaks about mergers of meaning (e.g. a merger of root possibility, epistemic possibility, and ability with can) and Gutknecht and Roelle (1996) point out the continuous translations between the specific types of possibility in such a concept as building a house. It should be emphasized that types and subtypes of meanings are readily disambiguated by context for example in "**I can afford a Porsche**", the financial possibility is evoked. Modal meanings also have degrees for example within obligation one can distinguish strict obligation (you must) and advisability (you should).

It has been pointed out that there is a neutral temporal ordering of deontic modalities in that possibility precedes necessity / permission: first one must be able to do something and only then can one be obliged or permitted to do it (cf. Luelsdorff 1997). This principle underlies the explanation of the inadmissibility or questionability of certain combinations of modals in the clauses of complex sentences and in modal clusters.

It appears as psycholinguistically adequate to model modality by means of a (formalized) prototype model with its central (unmarked) and less central (marked) parts. Several form-meaning

gestalts can be proposed as basic anthropological messages which would constitute the centre of a prototype model: (1) possibility of acting and of non-acting (you can and you needn't), (2) positive and negative necessity (you must and you must not), (3) Impossibility (you cannot), and (4) positive and negative volition / intention (I want to, and I don't want to). The less central (marked) cases would be constituted by a number of semantic and formal extensions of these central cases (Mey and Asher, 1998: 593).

Modal expressions can be alternatively considered as operators of natural language exhibiting regular scoping properties (cf. Koktova 1987).

4. Logical Modality:

There is a close relationship between certain types of linguistic modalities and modal notions as defined logic. Classical logic was primarily concerned with "logical" modality in ordinary language. However, it plays a rather peripheral role. Clear cases of "logically modal" sentences do not occur frequently in everyday discourse. From a linguistic point of view the notions of epistemic and deontic modality are much more important. Both epistemic necessity and epistemic possibility are expressed by contingent propositions. A proposition is "epistemically necessary" if it is logically entailed by what is known and a proposition is "epistemically possible" if it is compatible with what is known. Though epistemic logic has had an important impact on the study of modality in natural language, the notion of logical entailment is too strong to be useful in the description of linguistic modalities. "epistemic necessity" in natural language is typically based on modal reasoning rather than on logical entailment. Moreover, epistemic logic cannot account for subjective epistemic modality which seems to be in many ways

more basic in natural language than objective epistemic modality (Allwood et al, 1977: 57 and Kiefer, 1998: 595).

Like in modal logic the close relationship between deontic and modal concepts is reflected in natural languages. In most languages, the expressions of certainty, necessity and possibility are also used for obligations and permissions. If the divisions of labour between semantics and pragmatics is accepted, it is reasonable to assume that "deontic" necessity and "deontic possibility" are semantic notions whereas obligation and permission belong to pragmatics. To impose an obligation on somebody or to grant permission are speech acts. By uttering the sentence "**You can park your car here**" the speaker states a deontic possibility, but this sentence counts as a speech act of granting permission only if some additional conditions are met. (For example the speaker must have the authority to grant such a permission). It should also be noted that in everyday language the deontic background may just consist of what a recognized authority (parent, teacher, leader, etc.) wishes. In natural languages, deontic necessity can be explicated in terms of practical inferences (Allwood et al, 1977: 57).

5. Translation and Basic Approaches to Translation:

Translation has been defined as "a mental process whereby the lexicons, semantic elements, syntactic structures and cultural norms of the source language are replaced by the lexicons, semantic elements, syntactic structures and cultural norms of the Target language" (see Al-Sulaimaan, forthcoming: 20).

As for up-to-date approaches to translation, one can speak of Newmark's (1988) semantic and communicative translations. For Newmark, semantic translation represents a sort of literal translation. This means that this approach focuses on the content of the message and literal meaning. His communicative translation

represents free translation. This means that it focuses on the intentional meaning and the force of the message (for further comments on these approaches, see Newmark, (1991: 28).

6. Analysis, Commentary and Translation:

Text (1): John must talk to someone in London.

(Allwood et al, 1977: 116)

Interpretation and Commentary:

There are at least two ways of understanding this utterance, if one assumes that "must" is used deontically.

- a. John cannot go on living like a hermit ; he must talk to someone, or else he'll go mad.
- b. John must talk to someone when he comes to London, but he has lost the letter which says whom he must talk to.

One can say that only in (b) someone stands for a specific person in the actual world. In (a), we say that there must be some person that John will talk to, but it does not matter who this person is. This means that every "ideal world" contains at least one person whom John talks to, but it need not be the same person in each world. In the light of this interpretation, the following renderings are suggested.

1. يجب على جون أن يتحدث مع شخص ما في لندن. (necessity/any person)
2. يجب على جون أن يجد له صديقاً في لندن. (necessity/any person)
3. يجب على جون البحث عن الشخص الذي قصده في لندن. (necessity/specific person)

Text (2): David may be unmarried.

(Kiefer, 1998: 594).

Interpretation and Commentary:

A close examination of this sentence reveals that two interpretations can be given. Under one interpretation of the sentence (2), the speaker may be understood as subjectively qualifying his commitment to the possibility of David's being unmarried in terms of **uncertainty** and the sentence is more or less equivalent to **"Perhaps, David is unmarried"**. There are ; however, situations in which the **possibility** of David's being unmarried is presentable as an objective fact. The speaker might reasonably say that he knows, and does not merely think or believe, that there is **a possibility** of David's being unmarried (for further comments, see Lyons, 1977: 797). One can say that the objective modality refers to reality, whereas subjective modality is the expression of the speaker's belief. Thus the following renderings can be given:

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|--|------------------------|
| 1. يَحْتَمِلُ أن يكون داود غير متزوج. (اعزباً). | (Knowledge of Reality) |
| 2. يُمْكِنُ أن يكون داود غير متزوج. (اعزباً). | (Speaker's Belief) |
| Text (3): Catherine may come tomorrow. (Kiefer, 1998: 592) | |

Interpretation and Commentary:

This sentence may mean at least two different things. It may mean that **"Perhaps, Catherine will come tomorrow"** in which case it expresses the speaker's belief concerning the state of affairs **"she comes tomorrow"**. But it may also be interpreted as **"she is permitted to come tomorrow"**. When it expresses the permission of performing an act, the former is referred to as epistemic modality ; the latter as deontic modality. In the light of what has been mentioned, the following renderings are proposed.

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|--|----------------------------|
| 1. <u>قد</u> تأتي كاترين غداً . | (Speaker's Belief) |
| 2. <u>لربما</u> تأتي كاترين غداً . | (Speaker's Belief) |
| 3. <u>قد يؤذن</u> لكاترين بالمجيء غداً . | (Speech Act of Permitting) |
| 4. <u>قد يسمح</u> لكاترين بالمجيء غداً . | (Speech Act of Permitting) |

Text (4):

Guests: Do you think Peter will come ?

George: I don't know. He may come. (David, 2006: 15)

Interpretation and Commentary:

George invited Peter to a party. Peter is late. He has not come yet. The guests are asking George about him.

This sentence may mean that "Peter will probably come" whereby it expresses the speaker's **belief** of the state of affairs "Peter will come". However, it may also be interpreted as "Peter might be given a permission to come". Again, the former case is referred to as epistemic modality ; the latter as deontic modality. In the light of what has been explained, the following renderings are suggested:

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|---|----------------------------|
| 1. هل تعتقد بأن بطرس يأتي ؟ لا اعرف <u>قد يأتي</u> . | (Speaker's Belief) |
| 2. هل تعتقد بأن بطرس يأتي ؟ لا اعرف <u>لعله</u> يأتي . | (Speaker's Belief) |
| 3. هل تعتقد بأن بطرس يأتي ؟ لا اعرف <u>قد يؤذن</u> له بالمجيء . | (Speech Act of Permitting) |

Text (5):

A. Tom seems a bit out of sorts today.

B. Well. He must have a problem. (Practical Inference)

A. No, I think he is not feeling well. (Logical Necessity)

B. That's very likely. Therefore, he must see the doctor.

(David, 2006: 15)

Interpretation and Commentary:

A close look at this short dialogue reveals that the modal auxiliary "must" has been repeated twice. The first one may be interpreted as a practical inference, which means a sort of certainty. However, the second one can be interpreted as a sort of obligation, whereby Tom is obliged to see the doctor in order to have a medical test. Taking these two possibilities of interpretation, the following renderings are proposed,

A. يبدو توم منحرف المزاج اليوم.

B. حسناً: لاشك أن لديه مشكلة.

(Practical/Inference)

A. كلا: اعتقد بأنه مصاب بوعكة صحية.

B. من المحتمل جداً: لذلك يجب عليه الذهاب إلى الطبيب. (Logical/Necessity)

Text (6): He may not come. (Lyons, 2005: 329)

Interpretation and Commentary:

No doubt this sentence can be used to assert a modalized negative proposition (with either external or internal negation). In this case both the negative particle "**not**" and the modal verb "**may**" are construed as contributing to the propositional content of the sentence.

But, with this particular sentence (when it is uttered in most everyday contexts), the modality is more likely to be either epistemic or deontic. Both kinds of modality may be either objective or subjective. If our sample sentence is given an objective epistemic interpretation, its propositional content will be relative to what is known.

(1) It is possible that he will not come.

If it is given an objective deontic interpretation, its propositional content will be.

(2) It is not permitted that he come.

Drawing intuitively and informally upon the notion of possible worlds

one can paraphrase (1) and (2) respectively as:

(1a) There is some epistemically possible world in which he comes.

(2a) There is some deontically possible world in which he comes.

In both cases, the modality is represented as something that holds, as a matter of fact, in some epistemic or deontic world which is external to whoever utters the sentence on particular occasions of utterance. This is what I mean by objective (or propositional) modality. Both epistemic and deontic modality are always construed objectively in standard modal logic and in formal semantics (Lyons, 2005: 329).

However, independently of whether (6) is construed epistemically or deontically, the modality associated with "may" can be subjective, rather than objective: that is to say, in uttering this sentence, speakers may be expressing either their own beliefs and attitudes or their own will and authority, rather than reporting, as neutral observers, the existence of this or that state of affairs. Subjective modality is much more common than objective modality in most everyday uses of language ; and objective epistemic modality, in particular, is very rare. If (6) is uttered with subjective epistemic modality, it means something like.

(3) I think-it-possible that he will not come.

Where the hyphenated "I think-it-possible" is to be taken as a unit ; if it is uttered with subjective deontic modality, it means something like:

(4) I **forbid** him to come.

In the light of what has been said, the following renderings are proposed for text (6)

(1) قد لا يأتي.

(Speaker's Belief)

(2) **يحتمل** بأنه لا يأتي.

(Speaker's Belief)

(3) **قد لا يسمح** له بالمجيء.

(Speech Act of Permitting)

Text (7): The diameter of a circle **must** pass through the centre of the circle. (Kearns, 2000: 52)

Interpretation and Commentary:

Text (7) represents Logical necessity. The modal statement in (7) expresses the proposition that the contained proposition "The diameter of a circle passes through the centre of the circle" is necessarily true. It is not possible for this contained proposition to be false, in any circumstances. "The diameter of a circle passes through the centre of a circle" is indeed necessarily true, and so the proposition expressed in (7) is true. Because "The diameter of a circle passes through the centre of the circle" is necessarily true, obviously it is true in actuality-any necessarily true proposition is true in fact, because it is impossible for it to be false. In the light of what has been said the following renderings are suggested (Kearns, 2000: 52).

(1) **يجب أن يمر قطر الدائرة من خلال مركز الدائرة.** (Logical Necessity)(2) **من الضروري جداً أن يمر قطر الدائرة من خلال مركز الدائرة.**

(Logical Necessity)

Text (8): Napoleon **might have won** at Waterloo.

(Kearns, 2000: 53)

Interpretation and Commentary:

Text (8) represents logical possibility. A statement of logical possibility states that the truth of the contained proposition is compatible with the requirements of logic, and so the contained

proposition is not necessarily false. Logic allows it to be true. Whether or not the contained proposition is true in fact can vary.

The modal statement in (8) is true, as it was possible for Napoleon to have won at Waterloo. In fact we know that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo and "Napoleon won at Waterloo" is false, but if reality had developed differently he might have won.

From what has been mentioned, the following renderings are suggested.

(1) **يحتمل أن يكون نابليون قد انتصر في معركة واترلو.** (Speaker's Belief)

(2) **كان بإمكان نابليون أن ينتصر في معركة واترلو.** (Speaker's Knowledge)

Text (9): The dinosaurs **must have** died out suddenly.

(Kearns, 2000: 53)

Interpretation and Commentary:

What is expressed in (9) could be paraphrased as "given what we already know, it must be the case that the dinosaurs died out suddenly", or "The evidence we have leads to the inescapable conclusion that the dinosaurs died out suddenly". Epistemic necessity expresses what follows from our present knowledge, which may be incomplete. So epistemic necessity, unlike logical necessity, doesn't guarantee that the contained proposition is true in fact. Even if we take (9) as true, we can't thereby take it for granted that the dinosaurs died out suddenly. Thus, the following rendering is suggested.

مما لا ريب فيه أن الدينصورات كانت قد انقرضت فجأة. (Speaker's Knowledge)

Text (10): There **might / could** be intelligent life in deep space.

(Kearns, 2000: 53)

Interpretation and Commentary:

The proposition expressed in (10) is that the truth of "There is intelligent life in deep space" is compatible with our present knowledge. To say (10) is to speculate about how the actual universe might be in fact, not about how it might have been had things been otherwise than they are. Assuming that (10) is true, what we know now about the evolution of life on this planet is compatible with a similar scenario having unfolded elsewhere in the universe, but we don't know whether or not that has in fact happened. In reasoning from the evidence in hand to the conclusion that "There is intelligent life in deep space" is possibly true, we have to obey the requirements of logic, so "There is intelligent life in deep space" is also logically possible. Thus, the following renderings are proposed.

(1) **قد تكون هناك حياة في الفضاء الخارجي.** (Speaker's Belief)

(2) **من الممكن أن تكون هناك حياة في الفضاء الخارجي.** (Speaker's Knowledge)

Text (11): Visitors may use the downstairs sitting room after 6 p.m.
(Kearns, 2000: 53)

Interpretation and Commentary:

Modal auxiliaries also express deontic modality, which is concerned with compliance or compatibility with some code of behaviour or set of rules. Deontic possibility expresses what is a allowed or permitted. Text (11) may express also logical possibility. Taking these polysemous interpretations into consideration the following renderings are proposed.

(1) **قد يستخدم الزوار صالة الاستقبال في الطابق الأرضي بعد الساعة السادسة مساءً.**

(Logical Possibility)

(2) **يمكن الزوار استخدام صالة الاستقبال في الطابق الأرضي بعد الساعة السادسة مساءً.**

(Speech Act of Permitting)

Conclusions

The present paper arrived at the following Conclusions:

Theoretical Conclusions:

1. Modality is of three types: (a) epistemic modality, (b) deontic modality, and (c) logical modality.
2. All these types of modality involve epistemic necessity and epistemic possibility (see our theoretical part). However, epistemic necessity, unlike logical necessity, does not guarantee that the contained proposition is true.

Practical Conclusions:

1. Modality is both polysemous and homonymous in that it has both related and unrelated meanings (see our analysis from text 1 to text 11).
2. Modality is ambiguous in that it has more than one interpretation (see our analysis from text 1 to text 11).
3. The translation of modality is affected by both semantic elements and pragmatic elements (see our suggested renderings from text 1 to 11).
4. Interpretation of the texts and their renderings are cotext and context bound (see our data analysis and our renderings).

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