The Effect of Linguistic and Contextual Features on Speech Acts Recognition: A Study of Iraqi FL Learners' Inferences of Some L2 Non-Conventional Indirect Speech Acts

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Abstract

A basic problem for a theory of communicative competence and speech acts (SAs) is to find a connection between linguistic and contextual features that help the hearer (H) to recognize the illocutions that speakers (Ss) intend to convey by their utterances. This seems to be even more necessary since illocutions can be realized with a various number of linguistic structures and sentence types. Accordingly, and to empirically prove this connection, a qualitative study had been conducted on 30 Iraqi foreign language (FL) learners of differing proficiency levels; viz. (12) high proficiency and (18) low proficiency groups. As a means of collecting data, a multiple-choice test of 16 situation items have been adopted investigating a subset of 8 SAs, namely: invitation, request, refusal, complaint, apology, comforting ,warning and reprimand. Each one of these SAs was represented in two items in the test. In an attempt to find answers to the questions being raised by the present study, the data collected had thus been analyzed relying on Excel 0.7 program to elicit the frequency count percentages of the responses that guessed the right SA prevailing in the items. Besides, overall score averages and overall frequency count percentages between the two groups of language proficiency had also been conducted and compared. The results obtained

showed that the participants especially those of the high level made much reliance on both features succeeding to attain the right locutions, thus outperforming their corresponding low level; and this is certainly attributed to the formers' L2 linguistic mastery.

Keyword: Indirect speech acts, illocutionary forces, non conventional indirect speech acts, contextual and situational features, pragmatic failure.

Introduction:

Within the increasing interest on the importance of developing pragmatic competence in the second language (L2) learning arena, sociolinguists (i.e. Thomas, 1983; Bardovi-Harlig, 2001) have highlighted the importance of both the production and comprehension of SAs as they occur in natural interactions as a major part of communicative competence. The ability both to produce and to infer the pragmatic meaning within the confine of metapragmatic context is the core interest of pragmatic competence. Hence, the development of this ability is an important area in L2 literature. However, conventional and non-conventional indirect speech acts (ISAs) are formed in a variety of ways by native speakers (NSs) of certain languages. This, therefore, makes them difficult for non-NSs (NNSs) both to encode and to recognize unless there are certain clues to rely on(Kasper,1984; Cook & Liddicoat, 2002). Although evasive research has dealt with how L2 learners formulate L2 pragmatic meaning in the form of SAs, little has but dealt with how these learners comprehend SAs as they occur in L2 natural interactions. This shortage in literature can be in part attributed to the difficulty in evaluating the comprehension process.

Speech Acts: Units & Categories:

SA theory has to do with functions and use of languages. Thus, SAs are all the acts that people perform or do in the settings of everyday life. Apart from conveying information and expressing oneself's desire or idea, people use language in social gathering to perform various acts such as giving reports, making requests, giving warning, making statements, approving, refusing, regretting and apologizing. SAs are, thus, in essence acts and not sentences; however, they cannot be equated with utterances. This is because with a single utterance, people perform more than one act (i.e. inform and request) such as "**I am hungry**". Besides, SAs cannot be equated with the notion of "turns" as an interactional unit since it may take several Ss' turns to accomplish one act, or conversely several acts may be performed within a single S's turn (Schmidt & Richard, 1980:133).

Searle (1976), in turn, presents a clearest taxonomy as the basis of classification or purposes of the acts. Based on the S's intension, Searle classifies SAs into a small number of basic types as follows:

- **representatives:** the core purpose of this class is to commit the S in varying degree to the truth of something. One of the basic things people do with language is telling others how and what things are. Thus, they assert, claim, report, say, deny and the like.
- **directives:** another basic thing people use languages for is trying to get others do things for their own favor. Thus, suggestions, commands, orders and requests are all examples of this class. Though these SAs differ in the force of attempt, they all are attempts by the S to get the H do something.

- **commissives:** the purpose of this class of acts is to commit the S to do something. Warning, threats and promises all fall into this category.

Something noteworthy here is that when comparing representatives with directives and commissives, Searle makes an interesting point stemming from the 'direction of fit' between the words of the SA and the state of affair in the world. Thus, with representatives, the 'direction of fit' is words to world (i.e. whether or not the words uttered match the world). On the contrary, the 'direction of fit' in both directives and commissives is world to words (i.e. future actions are to be performed in accordance with words previously uttered).

- **expressives:** the basic point of this category is to express feelings and attitudes about the state of affairs. Apology, thanking, welcoming and greeting are all acts that fall into this category.
- **declarations**: this class includes some SAs that bring about changes in the world through their successful execution. Thus, **"you are fired"** demands that the employee starts searching for a new job.

Additionally, several taxonomies have been suggested by different scholars added within Searle's aforementioned taxonomies. Fraser (1975), for instance, adds the act of evaluating to Searle's representatives, such as analyzing, hypothesizing and concluding; and the act of suggesting; i.e. suggesting, recommending and urging to Searle's directives. Hancher (1979), in turn, proposes two kinds of acts, namely those that require two participants, such as buying, selling, contracting, etc.; and those that combine commissives with directives, such as offering, inviting and refusing.

Classification of Illocutionary Forces:

Understanding the purpose behind an utterance is often considered essential to successful communications. However, the relationship between the surface form of an utterance and its underlying motive is not always straightforward. This is because most of the utterances serve both to express propositions and to perform actions as well, as Searle (1975) shows in his example:

(1)"Can you pass the salt?"

Sentence (1) is interrogative and therefore expresses a question; but, it plausibly implies a different purpose, namely a request. This is what Searle calls an ISA which according to him carries two illocutionary forces[1]. He says **"one illocutionary act is performed indirectly by means of performing another".** This illocutionary force, according to Austin (1962) which he used to call 'performatives', involves things that are used to change the world, such as promising, warning, refusing, requesting, etc., all of which are realized in performing locutionary acts (i.e. making utterances). Thus, ISAs are utterances that have two meanings: viz. the '**literal meaning**' that stems from the sentence type , and the '**implied meaning**' that expresses what the S actually intends or is trying to do by an utterance (Searle, 1975). The H, in turn, is required to comprehend both meanings so as to provide appropriate responses (Garcia, 2004: 98). Both the literal meaning and the implied meaning (i.e. the force of an utterance) are available for the interlocutors, viz. the S and the H. However, the main question that remains a topic for speculation among most of linguists and philosophers is how both the S and the H assign appropriate illocutionary values to given SAs. In order for an utterance to be an

[1] Illocutionary force is the meaning that the S intends to convey in performing a certain illocutionary act.

ISA, there must be some indications that the literal force and meaning are not suffice in a given context (ibid).

Conventional ISAs are those illocutionary acts that are customarily and standardly used to make ISAs. The S uses fixed linguistic forms and constructions, such as **"Can you…?" or "Do you mind…"** for a request. In those ISAs, both the S and the H may even not be conscious of the literal illocutionary force (Hengying & Meihua, 2003: 2). On the other hand, non-conventional ISAs are more complicated than the conventional ones. This is because the formers depend on the situational context, the mutually background knowledge and the types of actions that are conventionally and likely to occur in such context. In other words, they seemingly violate Gricean maxims[1] of communication and thus place a burden on the H to make the proper inferences, e.g.:

(2) A: Let's go to the movie tonight.

B: I have an exam tomorrow.

In sentence (2), B's answer is actually a refusal to A's suggestion. To infer such an answer, A has to resort to the background knowledge that when one has an exam next day, he will certainly not be able to go to movies (ibid). Clark (1979: 1), in turn, believes that both the S and the H must mutually adhere to certain conventions of direct SAs, observe Gricean cooperative principles and know certain cultural background knowledge in order that ISAs would take place. Only via these means, both interlocutors could then attain the intended meaning.

1 Grice (1975 cited in Yule, 1996: 37) formulates a general conversational principle calling it cooperative principles elaborated in four maxims. These maxims reflect the common standard of human communication and can be read, according to Yule, as follows: "**Make your conversational contribution such as is required (quantity), at the stage at which it occurs (quality), by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange (relation) in which you are engaged (manner)".**

It is assumed that there is a one-to-one relationship between sentence types and the illocutionary forces. Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), therefore, align sentence mood and other grammatical features to determine the illocutionary acts and goals of an utterance as follows:

- **Indicatives** align with the act of asserting and the goal of belief transfer.
- **Interrogatives** align with questioning and the goal of knowing an answer.
- **Imperatives** align with commands requesting and the goal of that the action be performed.

However, since Gazdar (1981), it has been taken for granted that sentence types do not always determine the illocutionary force of an utterance. Gazdar's example is the following sentence" **You will go home tomorrow".** As Gazdar claims, this sentence can be used to convey a great number of SAs or illocutionary forces, namely: an assertion, a question, a command and a directive. The poly-functionality of this sentence out of context can be seen in a gamut of answers the H may, in turn, perform when taken up (Beyssade & Marandin, N.D: 2). Similarly, Young (1989:32) believes that the assumption that there is a one-to-one correspondence between form and meaning is most often violated in actual usage. This is, he adds, because lexical forms usually involve various meanings. Besides, the traditional perspective fails to account for the role of the situational context[1] in any interaction. In general, the fit between sentence types and function is

[1] Situational context involves various factors interwoven during interactions, such as the shared experience of both the S and the H, the shared/background knowledge about the cultural beliefs, the immediate situational settings, the relationship between the S and the H, the formality of the situation, the prior or antecedent statements of the same related discussion, and the social factors (i.e. social status and distance) of the S and the H.

accordingly only typical and not absolute (Bolinger, 1967 cited in Schmidt & Richard, 1980: 136) since there are sentences, such as declarative sentences which are not always assertions but can also function as questions or even orders, e.g. **"No one will leave this room"**.

Something noteworthy here finally is that the hallmark of all ISAs seems to be that Gricean maxims provide a connection between one kind of SA and an incompatible kind of SAs as the coherent link between the question and the request in sentence(1). Thus, for conventionalized ISAs like sentence (1), Gricean reasoning leads to inferences of this utterance as request by grammar. However, for non-conventionalized ISAs where grammar doesn't lead to any inferences, Gricean reasoning compels Hs to accommodate content in order to preserve assumptions that the S was rational and that the discourse was semantically well-formed (Lewis, 1969 cited in Asher & Lascarides, 2001: 195).

Clues for Recognizing Pragmatic Meanings of ISAs:

Determining an ISA is then a pragmatic problem since there is no direct and simple correlation between sentence forms and meanings. However, there are certain clues that help recognition of the intended SA. A great number of factors and clues are involved in the meaning of any utterance, such as the words used, the arrangement of these words in the sentence, the compositional semantics, intonation, the tone of the voice, discourse features, such as prominence and structure, the intention and attitude of the S, the relation of the S to the H, the situational context and the mutually shared knowledge (Young, 1989: 34; Schulenburg & Pazzani, N.D: 2). Thus, many factors intervene in the meaning of an utterance than simply the semantic or the syntactic phenomena. However, the

puzzling dilemma is how these factors interact to derive a theory of meaning that takes everything into account.

Austin (1962) believes that for certain act to be performed, the S must have the 'right thoughts and feelings'. Searle (1976) and many recent work on SA theory (e.g. Vanderverken, 1990; Gros & Sinder, 1990 cited in Asher & Lascarides, 2001: 187)) similarly view that the distinction of illocutionary acts rests on certain factors related either to the S's cognitive state, as Searle believes, or to the S's intention as the recent studies claim. Thus, they all assume that understanding an ISA corresponds to the S's mental state in a certain way. Similarly, Young (1989: 33) claims that there are two basic interconnected elements for any utterance to be understood, namely:1) the propositional meaning which conveys what is being said, and 2) the illocutionary force which conveys how an utterance is to be taken (i.e. the intention of the S). Thus, inferences should, Young argues, be sensitive not only to the propositional meaning but also to the devices that mark the illocutionary force.

Asher & Lascarides (2001: 187), in turn, use theoretical semantic and linguistic behaviours for distinguishing the SA types of questioning and requesting. They believe that intentions are more important to SAs, but should not be taken as the sole or even the primary source for distinguishing the SA types. However, Sadock (1974), Horn (1989), Lakoff (1973) cited in Asher & Lascarides (2001: 1) argue that the semantic type of an utterance does no always determine its linguistic behaviour. They give evidence that there are some SAs, such as sentence (1), which linguistically behave as a 'request'; in that they can be modified with **'please'** like other requests where simple questions cannot, e.g.:

(3) a Can/Could you please pass the salt?
b Please pass the salt.
c ???? Where did you please pass the salt?

Besides, these SAs, such as sentence (1), can also behave linguistically as a question where a direct answer **"Yes/No"** is a felicitous response (Bach & Harnish, 1979) e.g.:

(4) a A: Can/Could you please pass the salt?
B: Yes/No.
b A: Please pass the salt.
B: ????? Yes/No.

Thus, if an illocutionary act fulfills its necessary conditions, it will help the H recognize what is meant by the utterance. In other words, the S must get the H recognize what is intended by his utterance to maintain effective communications. This, according to Young (1989) could be attained through several means, but which one the S chooses depends on the situational factors involved in the current interaction. The S could express his intention in either conventional manners through various means, such as 1)the standard formula; 2) a recognized device in the surface structure, such as mood, particles, adverbs or even the tone of voice; and 3) a sentence type which aligns with certain illocutionary force; or he could formalizes his intention in an non-conventional manner by formalizing his words in a way without utilizing any surface structure marker that could help the H make proper inferences. Therefore, Young argues that the type of the resources the H may rely on so that he could come up with an illocutionary assignment for the non-conventionally made ISAs are either 1) the context knowledge bearing on the H, the S, their relationship in the world and the current interaction, or 2)the syntactic features implied in the utterance which indicate how it should be taken up. Thus, to infer the meaning of an utterance relying solely on its grammatical

construction is a crucial fallacy that grammarians are prone to make (ibid: 33). It is believed that situational context affects the illocutionary force of an utterance in two ways, namely: 1) Ss most often depend on context to convey part of their messages for them believing that providing all obvious information in their utterances is a matter of insulting their Hs' intelligence. People, therefore, say just enough to be understood and leave the Hs to compare their utterances with the context and draw the proper inferences, thus, arriving at the intended meaning; 2)influenced by pragmatic concerns, the S may use some conditional constructions as politeness markers when, for instance, requesting a superior to do something, e.g. **"if you wouldn't mind…..", "if you would be willing to…."**. This interaction between the linguistic forms and the situational context suggests that the former cannot be purely used without regarding the latter (ibid). Ervin-Tripp (1976 cited in Schmidt & Richard, 1980:137) also claims that social factors determine the actual choice of any directive type. These factors include age, rank, familiarity, seriousness of the service being asked, etc. Accordingly, how much is said and how it is said actually depend on situational context on one hand, and on various pragmatic factors such as formality and social factors on the other.

A new analysis of illocutionary force in a dialogue furthermore observes, Beyssade & Marandin (N.D: 5) argue, that ISAs have 'double faces'; one is pertaining to the S's commitment, and the other is to what he commits or calls on the H to perform. In other words, the first commitment concerns what the S intends to change the context by removing or adding something in the shared common ground rather than showing his own private beliefs, desires or even knowledge. The second commitment relates to what the S calls on or requests the H to perform. Such commitments or updates, Beyssade & Marandin furthermore claim, should be well-

recognized and well-distinguished when analyzing any illocutionary force in an utterance.

It is important to add finally that many types of ISAs are, according to Asher & Lascarides (2001: 188), relationally understood because logically understanding them requires a relation between the utterance and the content of the antecedent proposal rather than being the property of the utterance itself. In other words, if someone wants to conclude something from an utterance, that conclusion should rely on some antecedent hypotheses or arguments. Besides, answers are also inherently dependent on some prior questions. Numerous SAs done in everyday interactions, such as explanations, giving answers, refusing offers, expressing apologies, etc. in fact cannot be defined via an individual utterance, but via means of an antecedent utterance in context, such as the following:

(5) a A: Who is coming? B: John and Mary.

b A: John failed in exam? B: No, he didn't, he got 60.

c A: Let's meet next weekend. B: How about Saturday.

Accordingly, the illocutionary force of an utterance is anaphorically dependent on antecedent contributions. In sentence (5)a, for instance, B's act of answering is dependent on the semantics of A's question. Dialogue (5)b is also relational since B's answer is trying to correct the A's perceived misunderstanding. In dialogue (5)c and being an interrogative, B's utterance is a clue to know the answer to the question. However, B utters this question with specific intention to gain information that will help achieve the aim behind A's utterance, namely knowing the time for meeting. Thus, through this method, viz. question-elaboration type, SAs are defined in terms of goals and content (ibid: 190).

In sum, a great number of clues are involved and interacted to help distinguishing the meaning of any utterance especially when non-conventionally uttered. However, as various prior studies, the present study is going to focus only on the interaction between the syntactic structure and the situational context involved in an utterance both of which have mutually proved to affect the ISAs recognition in an effective way.

Pragmatic Failure:

Communicative competence requires professing pragmatic knowledge, which Searle precisely believes as the knowledge of using acceptable SAs within a society as well as within the customs and rules that govern them in context. However, understanding the illocutionary forces of ISAs is a difficult task for L2 learners especially when non-conventionally made. This, in turn, leads to a phenomenon known as 'pragmatic failure' which refers, according to Thomas (1983), to the inability to understand the meaning of an utterance especially when Ss of the same language community misunderstand one another. However, cross-cultural PF refers to the misunderstanding that occurs between interlocutors of different speech communities. For example, an American learner of Japanese would understand the message **"that will be a little difficult"** to his request as a potential acceptance, while the Japanese S is, in fact, giving a refusal (Charlebois, 2003: 38).

Clark (1997 cited in Garcia, 2004: 98) claims that NSs may not need to have a high conscious awareness of pragmatic knowledge to recognize the pragmatic meaning of the conventional and non-conventional messages to respond appropriately. On the contrary, to facilitate their L2 SAs comprehension, L2 learners need to develop a conscious ability of the L2 pragmatic meanings since they lack the full mastery of L2 pragmatic competence. Therefore,

aside from syntactic and semantic aspects, cross-cultural understanding requires pragmatic comprehension in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the messages being conveyed on one hand, and to avoid any case of PF, on another (Oktoprimassakti, 2006: 103). Clyne (1975 cited in Schmidt & Richard, 1980: 140) attributes communication breakdowns (where an intention is misunderstood) and communication conflict (where misunderstanding leads to friction between interlocutors) to social, individual and cross-cultural differences in the communicative competence of rules that govern any particular SA. Accordingly, different factors including 1)L1 pragmatic transfer, 2)different realizations of SAs cross-culturally and 3)the lack of complete and adequate pragmatic knowledge as potential causes behind PF. These factors have been identified by previous studies, such as (Takahashi & Beebe, 1987; Takahashi & Beebe, 1996; cited in Charlebois, 2003) and different scholars. Thomas (1995) illustrates differences in the degrees of the directness of SAs among many different speech communities; for instance, Japanese Ss tend to use vague excuses when refusing invitations unlike the Americans who prefer very concrete excuses. Besides, various research on pragmatic knowledge of L2 learners support the claim that L2 SA knowledge is incomplete and inadequate for many L2 learners. Low proficiency L2 learners, for instance, tend to use very narrow range of linguistic realization devices as well as of illocutionary force mitigating devices and exhibit problems in varying their strategies according to context (Tanaka & Kawade, 1982). Moreover, they most often fail to comprehend the illocutionary linguistic devices in realizing the ISAs especially when non-conventionally made; therefore, they may perceive an utterance as suggestion when the S really intends it as command. Furthermore, there are studies that give evidences that even advanced L2 learners do not acquire the full native-like

pragmatic competence in both terms of their perception and production of L2 SAs (Walters, 1979; Carrel & Konner, 1981; Olshtain & Weinbach, 1983; Blum-Kulka & Olshtain, 1986; House & Kasper, 1987 cited in Charlebois, ibid). Thus, the ability to comprehend the ISA utterances formed either conventionally or non-conventionally is an important aspect of communicative competence for L2 learners to develop.

Literature Review:

A growing acknowledgment of the importance of pragmatic competence in L2 learning has made language researchers identify the comprehension of SAs occurring in natural interactions as essential to communicative competence.

In her analysis of 84 German speaking English interactions, Kasper (1984) finds that the failure to comprehend the illocution is due to the fact that SAs can linguistically be realized in non-conventional manners. Kasper attributes the failure of her participants, evidenced by the inappropriacy of their responses, to their inability to make use of the linguistic illocutionary devices to realize the intended non-conventional ISAs.

In his study, Joung (1989) argues that eliciting the meaning of conditional sentences solely relying on their surface structure such as mood, tense, and particles a prevailing approach of most previous work, is a fallacy theory and would certainly restrict the exegetical task. Thus, he postulates that the meaning of any utterance cannot be understood apart from various factors including S's intentions, situational and linguistic contexts as well as syntactic forms.

Focusing on the problem of the theory of communicative intentions and SA, Lenci (1994), in turn, studies the relevance between the linguistic behaviour and the contextual conditions that

together allow the H to recognize the illocutions behind the S's utterance. He analyzes the cases of requests, assertions and questions to see how it is possible to explain the recognition of these illocutions from different sentence structures inside a model of communication based on the principle of relevance. He finds out that the essence of understanding and producing illocutions in SAs are based on the linguistic competence, the knowledge of context, the knowledge of rational human behaviour during communication that stems from human behaviour and cognition, and the ability to balance between these three components in any given interaction.

Examining the illocutionary comprehension of 114 English learners of Spanish at three levels of university study, Koike (1996), in turn, finds that the more proficient participants could recognize the SAs especially when non-conventionally made better than the low proficient participants.

Similarly, in their study involving 50 NSs of English, 50 high proficiency and 50 low proficiency L2 learners of English, Cook & Liddicoat (2002) find an inevitable connection between language proficiency level and the ability to comprehend requests at varying levels of indirectness and non-conventionality. They reach a fact that NSs and high proficiency L2 learners were able to process both contextual and linguistic knowledge in comprehending the non-conventionality and indirectness of the messages. On the contrary, the low proficiency learners were unable to comprehend the non-conventionally made ISAs.

Utilizing a corpus of conversation taken place in academic settings, Garcia (2004) examines the differences between NSs' and 56 NNSs of differing proficiency level's abilities to recognize the ISAs of requests, suggestions, corrections and offers. The results of her study indicated that contextual knowledge and linguistic features, such as agent, lexical markers, hesitations, false starts and use of

modals may interact with SA type to account for performance variability.

Aims of the Present Study:

In order to empirically prove the interaction between both of the linguistic and contextual features in facilitating L2 learner' recognition of the ISAs especially of high indirectness and non-conventionality, the present study raised the following questions:

1. Does the interaction between the linguistic features and the contextual aspects in an utterance facilitate the Iraqi FL learners' recognition of English SAs especially when non-conventionally made?
2. Does the difference in Iraqis' English language proficiency lead to differences in L2 ISAs recognition and perception?

Thus, in order to find answers to these questions, the present study has posed the following hypotheses:

1. The interaction between the linguistic features and the contextual aspects in an utterance facilitates the Iraqi FL learners' recognition of English SAs especially when non-conventionally made?
2. The difference in Iraqis' English language proficiency leads to differences in L2 ISAs recognition and perception: high proficiency Iraqi learners of English, relying on both aforementioned features, outperform in their L2 ISAs recognition low proficiency learners.

Methodology:

Participants:

The participants selected for the present study were 30 Iraqi FL learners of approximately post-intermediate level of English language mastery. They were 19 males and 11 females. Their ages ranged from 19 -24; however, only one participant was 30 years of age, thus affecting the age average counted to be (22.2). It is worth noting, furthermore, that 25 of the participants were 4th year English students studying in the college of Arts at the University of Mosul, while the other five were 2nd year Electrical Management students studying in the Administrative Technical College who all have passed TOFEL test and having over 80% score in English language. This supposed that the participants' proficiency level of English mastery was not the same, and this was also proved and deduced from their degrees and scores average taken from their academic regular study sessions. Having in mind these two previously mentioned factors, and since the participants' L2 responses to the present study test were not of the same proficiency, they were, therefore, divided into two groups: high proficiency group of (12) participants and low-proficiency group of (18) participants. This task was done for the sake of providing answers to question #2 of the present study. It is worth noting, furthermore, that the participants were a variety of different backgrounds, viz. 27 were Iraqi Arabic Ss while 3 were Iraqi Kurdish Ss. However, all of them speak Iraqi Arabic dialect fluently, and use it in their daily interactions.

Instrument:

The present study is an analysis of recognizing a subset of 8 SAs, namely invitation, request, refusal, comforting, warning, complaint, reprimand and apology manifested in 16 multiple choice

items (see Appendix A). Each SA was non-conventionally and indirectly represented in two item-situations to provide a more clear and intensive investigation on how L2 SAs are recognized, on the one hand, and to provide more empirical and justified answers to the questions already being raised by the present study, on another. Each one of the 16 items contains 4 SA multiple choices, and the duty of the participants was to guess the right SA appropriate in each item. The situations have been extracted from various related prior research that focus on SAs, as well as from various English teaching books and website so as to maintain real authentic utterances. They were situations or turn-taking dialogues encountered at various everyday life settings, viz. university, friends or family (see Table 1 in Appendix B). It is worth noting that the utterances in some items were anticipated by certain explanatory statements while others were formed in two short turn-taking SAs dialogues. All these were deliberately done in order to clarify the situational setting accompanying a given situation. A set of 4 SA identifications, only one of which was the right choice, were provided for each one of the 16 items. The participants were thus required to make the right choice ticking it with (✓) symbol. It is worth noting that the participants were not instructed in the definition of these

SAs; instead, they were asked to depend on their on understanding and comprehension to decide the right SA appropriate for each situation. The instrument was thus administrated on the 30 participants in their regular session lasted for 45 minutes. The participants were asked beforehand to fill in the personal eliciting questionnaire provided at the top of each test paper including: name, age, gender, nationality, class and college.

Procedure and data analysis:

In an attempt to find answers to the questions being raised and the two hypotheses being posed by the present study, all the participants' right and the fallacy SA selection of each item were entered in a database file designed on Excel 0.7 program. Then frequency counts and percentages of each group of SA choice for each item were counted for all the participants assembly then for each proficiency group lately respectively. In addition, (5) scores have been put for the right choice and (0) for the faulty one, then all were summed up for each participant and adjusted to be out of 100 score. According to their proficiency level, the overall scores of the participants were divided into two groups and. T-test relying on SPSS program had then been applied on them in order to see whether the differences between the recognition of the two groups were statistically significant or non-significant to give answer to question #2 of the present study.

Results & Discussion :

Research Question #1 calls for a qualitative analysis of both the linguistic features and contextual aspects available in each item. This analysis was done to prove whether the availability or the lack of one of these two features or of them both facilitate or hinder SA recognition. Linguistic features were represented in the 16 items through implicit, explicit or even lack of agents or lexical markers, such as modals, adverbs, adjectives and SA verbs. As for the contextual features, they were represented by antecedental related utterances, or through explanations of the purpose of the occasion or the relationship between the interlocutors involved. As for the quantitative analysis, it relates to the overall frequency count percentages of the choices selected in each item and the overall

scores average counted for each item. In the light of these analyses, the following SA items are thus going to be analyzed and discussed.

1- <u>The Speech Act of Request: Items #4 & #8:</u>

Both request situations, i.e. items #4 and #8, were highly indirectly non-conventionalized. Accordingly, the request illocutional force was not explicitly mentioned, especially in item #4. In other words, with the lack of lexical features represented by the lack of agents as well as the lack of lexical markers, such as modals or even an explicit SA verb, except the use of the adjective 'cold' and the adverb 'here' had consequently led to a decrease in recognizing the request force that only 47% of the participants had made the right choice; therefore, scoring only 2.3 scores average (see Table 2 in Appendix C). However, when both the agent represented by the pronoun 'I', and the lexical markers represented by the modal 'can't', the verb 'reach' and the noun 'potatoes' are explicit; this caused an increase in the right choice frequency count percentage to score 63% and ,thus, recording high scores average of 3.2, but this is only part of the story of the analysis. As for the contextual features, it seemed that half percentage of the success of the participants' request recognition goes to the explicit mentioning of the situational factors in the two items. In other words, the antecedental mentioning of the occasion and the purpose of the utterance, such as ***'open door', 'cold day'*** and ***'standing on a stage'*** in item #4 and ***'sitting at a table'*** in item #8, gave hints to the participants to make the right SA choice. Something noteworthy here is that, with the lack of adequate linguistic features in items #4 and #8, on the one hand, and with some participants' overlooking of these items contextual information provided, one another, 37% of the participants had considered item #4 as 'warning', and 13% regarded it as 'suggestion'; whereas, 13% and 17% of them

regarded item #8 as ‘apology’ and ‘complaint’ respectively. Most of those who committed this PF were low-proficiency participants as going to be shown later on.

2- <u>The Speech Act of Invitation: Items #1 & #14:</u>

The explicit agents, i.e. ‘I’ as agent and ‘you’ as recipient, in both items #1 and #14 seemed to help the participants in making their right choice of the SA of invitation to account 60% for the former item, and highly accounting 93% for the latter, as Table 3 in Appendix C reveals. However, the explicit mentioning of the lexical marker ***‘party’*** in item #14, and its absence in item #1 could seem to be the real cause after the great variance between the two items’ percentages scored. Accordingly, the scores average highly accounted 4.7 for item #14 but only 3 for item #1; therefore, the overall scores average for the two invitation items recorded 3.8. It is worth saying, furthermore, that the contextual features provided in item #1 represented by a two turn-taking utterance seemed to help several participants, especially the high proficiency ones, in making their correct selection of invitation SA; whereas, 20% of the participants wrongly thought of the first turn as a ‘suggestion’.

<u>3- The Speech Act of Comforting: Items #3 & #10:</u>

As related prior studies suggest, the explicit interaction between linguistic and contextual features help L2 learners in making their right SAs recognition. Accordingly, as for the former factor, the explicit mentioning of the agents, such as ‘I’ and ‘your family’ in item #3, and ‘you’ in item #10, beside the use of the lexical markers common in comforting situations, such as ‘sorry’, ‘loss’ in the former item, and ‘things happens for a reason’ and ‘better off’ in the latter, seemed to help the participants in correctly identifying the comforting SA in the two items to record a high

percentage of 80% in item #10 and only a percentage of 57% in item #3 (see Table 4 in Appendix C). However, the decreased scoring in item #3 could seemingly be attributed either to the participants' confusion and fallacy distinction between comforting and apology as SAs, or to the appearance of the lexical item 'sorry', an expression commonly used to show regret of apology in daily interactions. This, therefore, explains why 33% of the participants had misleadingly judged item #3 as apology (refer back to Table 4). As for contextual factor, the mentioning of the 'death of son' in item #3, and the 'recovery of critical problem' in item #10, both of which were deliberately used to denote the sorrow occasion of two items, seemed to help the participants in making their right recognition to infer that the H is in a sorrow state and one has to soften his bad feeling. Accordingly, the interactions between the two features did help the participants in getting a score average of 4 for item #10, and only 2.8 for item #3 which was in fact due to the confusion previously mentioned. Thus, the overall scores average for invitation situations was 3.4, as the table illustrates.

4- <u>The Speech Act of Apology: Items #9 & #13:</u>

On analyzing the participants' choices of apology situations represented in items #9 and #13, Table 5 in Appendix C amazingly shows identical higher frequency count percentages and scores average in both items; viz. 83% respectively for the former calculation, and 4.2 respectively for the latter calculation. It was therefore evident that the participants had based their interpretations in identifying these two items' illocutional force on both linguistic as well as contextual features given in both items. As for item #9, the lexical markers provided including words and phrases, such as 'sorry', 'stereo on', 'turn down' and 'volume down', beside the contextual feature implying the meaning of having an exam another

day, both incorporated to facilitate inferences of the utterance as apology, since the common background norm suggests that there should be silence and quietness when there is a one who is having an exam the next day. Additionally, beside the influence of the metacognitive awareness of the linguistic features, it was apparent that the pragmalinguistic awareness also had played a great role in here, as well. In other words, the segmented representation of the apology utterance as 'regret', 'excuse' and 'promise' seemed to facilitate the participants' recognition of the right ISA. The same could be said when discussing item #13, except that the contextual feature that seemed to affect and accelerate the correct recognition of apology was represented as a sequence of turns in this item. In other words, the apology situation in this item comes as a response to a clear antecedantal complaint utterance. As for the linguistic features, it is apparent that the use of apology strategies represented by ***'Oh', 'sorry'*** as well as the pragmatic meaning of a 'regret', 'excuse', 'promise' and 'repair' seemed to play a great role in facilitating the apology ISA recognition. Accordingly, the percentages and scores calculated in both items were highly identical and thus significant.

5- <u>The Speech Act of Refusal: Items #6 & #16:</u>

Table 6 in Appendix C summarizes the participants' refusal recognition analysis and calculations. As the table reveals, there was a decrease in recognizing the refusal illocutional force in both items respectively. Thus, 73% of the participants correctly identified item #6 as a refusal situation; whereas, only 67% succeeded in guessing the right illocutional force in item #16. The overall scores average calculated accordingly reads only 3.5 out of 5. This shortage in both frequency count percentages and the scores average calculated could be therefore attributed to the highly indirectness and non-

conventionality of the refusal force uttered in spite of the explicit agents mentioned in both of their turn-taking utterances respectively, viz. 'we' , 'I', 'you' in item #6, and 'you', and 'I' in item #16. Nor, furthermore, did the contextual turn-taking interactions in both items seemed to declare the right prevailing SA for the participants. However, the slight greatness in the calculations scored for item #6 over item #16 could be attributed to the participants' recognition of the utterance as a refusal to an invitation since the antecedental turn of item #6 conveys a meeting of a group on Saturday evening and the refusal response turn accordingly contains lexical markers that convey denial and rejection to the invitation through the use of "but" and "isn't". On the contrary, item #16 came as a refusal to a request for a get-together meeting between two friends; however, it appeared that the highly indirectness and non-conventionality of the refusal force represented by the excuse ***'I have lots of things to manage'***, and the lack of an explicit denial strategy such as 'can't' or even the plane denial marker 'No' which is the direct way of refusing, seemed to hinder the participants' right recognition. Instead, 13% of the participants had faulty regarded item #6 as a request and 27% erroneously considered item #16 as an assertions. In other words, the linguistic affirmative construction of item #16 as a response to a request seemed to delude the participants' right recognition to figure it out as an assertion.

6- <u>The Speech Act of Warning: Items #5 & #7:</u>

A clear investigation of Table 7 in Appendix C shows that 73% and highly 97% of the participants had correctly succeeded in identifying the warning illocutional force in items #5 and #7 respectively. However, the great high frequency count percentage in item #7 and its respective 4.8 score average was definitely attributed

to the interaction between contextual features represented in the emotional relationship between the interlocutors involved there, viz. a mother vs. her child, on the one hand, and the conditional grammatical construction represented by 'if statement', the explicit lexical markers represented by the use of the verbs 'get burned' and 'touch the stove', and the repeated explicit recipient agent 'you', on another, had definitely contributed together to accelerate the participants' correct assignment of the 'warning' SA. Besides, it seemed that the participants had based their recognition on childhood background experience of similar personal past family interactions. On the contrary, in spite of the grammatical conditional constructions represented by 'if clause', the explicit agents used represented by the repeated use of 'I' and 'you', as well as the lexical markers manifested in this item through the adjective 'dangerous' and the verb 'cross', on the one hand, and the contextual aspects represented by identifying the status of the interlocutors involved in item #5, on another, only 73% of the participants scoring an overall scores average of 3.7 had succeeded in identifying the illocutional force of this item as a 'warning'. In other words, it seemed that not experiencing such situation neither in their everyday life interactions, nor even in their background knowledge, had apparently affected their recognition to faulty estimate it as 'suggestion' in about 13% or request in about 10%. Accordingly, the shortage in the contextual information in this item had apparently contributed to decrease 40% of the recognition of the right SA.

7- <u>The Speech Act of Reprimand: Items #11 & #15 :</u>

Table 8 in Appendix C focuses on the participants' recognition of the SA of reprimand represented in items #11 and #15. As the table illustrates, the participants' frequency count

percentages and in item #15, viz. 83% and 4.2 respectively, had outperformed their respective percentages and scores average, viz. 60% and 3 respectively, in item #11. In other words, the participants had highly succeeded in recognizing the right illocutional force of reprimand in item #15, but had slightly failed to guess the intended SA in item #16. To make it more clear, solely basing their recognition on the contextual features provided represented by a turn-taking utterances between two different social distant interlocutors, i.e. a mother and her son, and seemingly overlooking the exclamation mark '!' provided in the first turn utterance had apparently deluded the participants to wrongly figure out the dialogue as a 'request and its refusal', instead of being a 'reprimand and its corresponding denial'. The 33% frequency count of the participants' fallacy request choice did certainly confirm this finding. In other words, intonation and the tone of the voice used in speech represented by punctuation marks in writing also affected the type of the intended non-conventional ISA in any given utterance. On the contrary, the interaction between the contextual feature in item #15 which is also represented as a two turn-taking utterances between a mother and her daughter, and the linguistic feature represent by the explicit agent 'I' and recipient 'you' beside the lexical markers represented by 'must', 'ask' and 'keep' accompanied with the interrogative type of the utterance seemed to help 83% of the participants to figure out the mother's utterance in this item as a reprimand. However, only 10% of them had erroneously regarded this utterance as a preference .

8- <u>The Speech Act of Complaint: Items #2 & #12:</u>

When analyzing the responses related to complaint situations represented by items #2 and #12, Table 9 in Appendix C shows an obvious decrease in the percentages, viz. 73% and 53% and their

respective overall scores average 3.2, accounted for recognizing the right illocutional force in these situations. However, 73% of the participants had succeeded in guessing the complaint force in item #2. This could be due to the explicit contextual information, viz. ***"a long waiting at a date",*** provided before the direct speech to explain the purpose of the occasion and how nervous one would be when the other would be late. Besides, the use of explicit linguistic markers represented by the verb 'wait' and the lexical marker 'more', plus the explicit agents 'I' and 'you' had definitely accelerated the complaint recognition to record 3.7 score average. On the contrary, only providing a sequence of turns in item #12 without giving information about the occasion or the circumstance of these two utterances had obviously hindered the right SA recognition. Besides, the complaint utterance which is represented by two strategies utterance, namely: one is a negated interrogative strategy, viz. ***"Can't you look where you're going?",*** which had seemingly affected a partial percentage of 33% to go to 'warning' estimation , and another partial of 10% to refusal perception; and the other is a command strategy, viz***. "See what you've done!"***, which seemed to delude a slight partial of 3% to go to apology recognition in spite of the explicit mentioning of the agent 'you' as well as the lexical markers represented by the verbs 'can't', 'see', 'going' and 'done', all of which are referring to the offence committed.

Recognition Variability Related to Deferring Proficiency Levels:

In order to answer question #2 of the present study, namely "Does the difference in Iraqis' English language proficiency lead to differences in L2 ISAs recognition and perception?", frequency count percentages and overall scores average for each SA item had been accordingly counted (see Table 10 in Appendix C). A clear

observation of this table shows that the 12 high proficiency group had obviously outperformed their corresponding 18 low proficiency group in recognizing all of the ISAs investigated. Thus, the 12 participants were all able to guess the right illocutional forces of 'invitation' and 'warning' in their respective situations (i.e. items #1 and #14 for the former SA, and items #5 and #7 for the latter) to record 100% and accordingly an overall scores average of 5.0 respectively. Besides, 94% of this group had respectively succeeded in recognizing the 'refusal' and 'apology' SAs in their respective situations, thus recording 4.7 an overall scores average, and 92% were also able to guess the 'reprimand' force in its related items, viz. #11 and #15. However, the frequency count percentage was at its lowest to score only 69% when the participants of this group were attempting to guess the right force in 'request' situations. This was due, as discussed before, to the highly indirect non-conventionalized made request items that made the group failed in guessing the request force especially in items #4.

On the contrary the low proficiency group had failed to recognize the right SAs in approximately the whole 16 items except for invitation items. As Table 10 reveals, 83% of this group had succeeded in defining 'invitation' as the right SA dominant in items #1 and #14. Additionally, only 67% and 63% of this group were able to recognize 'apology' and 'warning' SAs as the right choices in their related items respectively. However, the rest items were scoring lower scores averages and percentages to reach their lowest when identifying 'request' SA to score only 33% and thus an overall scores average of 1.9. This was particularly due to the failure in recognizing request in item #4 that only scored 25% and 1.3 as an overall average (refer back to Table 10). The Low proficiency group PF was definitely due to their reliance solely on the lexical features provided in the situation and overlooking or neglecting the

pragmatic context that is part of the perception. Accordingly, when the situation is highly indirect and non-conventional or the lexical features were not explicit enough, this group could not thus identify the right SA dominant in that situation.

Finally, each participants' 16 items scores had been summed up, adjusted to be out of 100 score and then divided into two groups according to the participants' levels of proficiency, namely 12 scores for the high proficiency, and 18 for the low proficiency. Then, an independent T-test had been conducted on these two groups of scores so as to statistically prove whether the differences between the two groups' means were significant or non-significant. Table 11 below illustrates the results:

Table 11: The high and low proficiency Groups' Statistical Independent T-Test

Proficiency group	N	X	Sd	N	Computed T-Value	Tabulated T-Value
high	12	88.1667	6.1573	30	9.206	1.697
low	18	51.1667	14.1218			

As it is obvious in this table, the difference between the two groups' mean scores representing the computed T-value was 9.206. Accordingly, the computed T-value at df 30 at 0.05 level of significance were greater than the tabulated T-value 1.697 at the same df level of significance. Thus, the difference obtained

suggested that the two groups' results were statistically significant on the behalf of the high proficiency group's scores.

Conclusions & Pedagogical Implications :

As related prior studies, the present study has amalgamated linguistic analysis with situation and contextual study to closely investigating their effects on facilitating or hindering L2 learners' recognition L2 SAs. The quantitative analyses adopted in this study were meant to find answers to the two questions posed. In an attempt to answer question #1, the analyses revealed that the ISAs selected were easily inferred particularly when certain linguistic factors, namely agents, lexical markers, such as modals, SA verbs, certain nouns and adjectives, as well as the conditional and grammatical constructions of the utterance (e.g. interrogatives, commands, etc.) are explicitly and clearly stated. Besides, explicitly mentioning of the accompanying contextual aspects represented by the purpose and the occasion of the utterance, sequence of turns in an utterance, antecedental related utterance, and the relationship between the interlocutors involved also affect the second half of the ISAs perception. On the contrary, uncertainty, vagueness, implicitly mentioning and absence of one or both of the contextual and linguistic features would definitely hinder inferences and consequently result in failure in guessing the right illocutional forces intended. Accordingly, hypothesis #1 is positively confirmed and thus goes in line with Joung's (1989), Lenci's (1994) and Garcia's (2004) findings.

An amazing finding to be mentioned here was that lexical markers that might be shared in different SA utterances, such as 'Oh' and 'sorry' that can be used in apology, refusal and comforting could delude and even deviate the participants' recognition of the accurate pragmatic meaning of certain situations.

As for question #2 posed, the qualitative and quantitative comparative analyses between the performance, the percentages and the overall scores of both the high proficiency and low proficiency groups' scores did prove that the former outperformed the latter in the perception of the whole SAs investigated. This finding also goes in line with Koike's (1996) and Cook & Liddicoat's (2002) findings. Hence hypotheses #2 has also been positively proved.

Furthermore, lacking L2 cultural pragmatic knowledge, low proficiency participants had solely based their perception on the lexical features apparent in the utterance overlooking the contextual aspects upon which half part of the pragmatic meaning of utterances depend. On the contrary, following up English films and TV shows (as few of them declared), high-proficiency participants were able to make use of their contextual knowledge as well as their linguistic mastery to assign the right SA in the situations. This finding calls for L2 teachers and material developers to make use of authentic and audio-visual materials, such as films, videos, CDs and DVDS in L2 classrooms so as to enhance L2 pragmatic awareness.

Finally, different realizations of non-conventional L2 SAs, highly indirect non-conventionality of certain utterances plus the lack of L2 cultural and pragmatic knowledge were definitely the main reasons behind the participant's PF in figuring out the right illocutional forces. This also requires that metapragmatic aspects of L2 SAs should be salient in L2 classroom settings to enhance both perception as well as production of the FL learners' L2 utterances.

Future Studies:

To make the role of both linguistic and contextual features in comprehending the illocutionary forces of non-conventional ISAs of more confidence, inquiry of other non-conventional ISAs in differing contexts could be adopted in further studies. Besides, a think-aloud interview of how participants infer the pragmatic

meaning of utterances could also be manifested as a post-task interview or written comments to investigate the metacognitive abilities of the L2 learners.

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Appendix A

The Multiple-Choices Test

Name:---------- **Gender:**----------

Age:---------- **Nationality:**----------

Dept.---------- **Class:**----------

Score average in English:----------

During daily interactions, people would imply their intended meanings to save faces; therefore, it is the duty of the hearer to guess these hidden meanings. Accordingly, how would you interpret the following statements if you would be in their supposed related contexts. Select from the given suggested choices for each situation the interpretation that you think would best suite such context ? Mark your choice with ✔ put between the two brackets for the speech act you think to be meant in that context.

1. **Sonia: "I am having some people to dinner this Saturday, and I don't know if you are free by this time?"**
   Henri: "Oh, I'll try to finish everything by then."
Sonia means: invitation( ) order( ) request( ) suggestion( )

2. **Waiting so long at a date, one would say: "I waited for you for more than twenty minutes! What happened to you?"**
   apology( ) complaint( ) request( ) acceptance( )

3. **On a death of someone's elder son, a closest friend would say: "Well, I am really sorry about the greatest loss in your family."**
comforting( ) apology( ) suggestion( ) complaint( )

4. **With an open door at a class in a cold day, an academic tutor standing on a stage would say to his students: "It's very cold in here!"**
compliment( ) suggestion( ) request( ) warning( )

5. **A guard saying to a passerby: "It would be dangerous if you cross that line. I wouldn't if I were you!"**
warning( ) suggestion( ) request( ) promise( )

6. Henri: "We're having some people over Saturday evening and wanted to know if you'd like to join us."
   Sonia: "Oh, I'd love to be with you but this Saturday just isn't going to work!"
Sonia means: comforting( ) refusal( ) acceptance( ) request( )

7. A mother to her child: "You'll get burned if you touch that stove!"

suggestion( ) warning( )
complaint( ) order( )

8. Two friends sitting at a table having their dinner, one would say: "Oh, I can't reach that mashed potatoes!"

apology( ) advice( )
request( ) complaint( )

9. One would say to his room-mate who is having an exam the second day: "I'm so sorry. I didn't realize I left the stereo on. I'll turn it down right now. I'll make sure to keep the volume down."

offer( ) comforting( ) apology( )
complaint( )

10. Someone to his friend who is recovering from certain critical problem: "Things always happen for a reason and may be you are better off this way."

request( ) compliment( ) apology( )
comforting( )

11. A mother to her son: "You left the light on!"

The son: "It wasn't me, mummy!"

preference( ) apology( ) reprimand( )
request( )

12. A: "Can't you look where you're going? See what you've done!"

refusal( ) warning( )
apology( ) complaint( )

13. B: "Oh! I'm so sorry about this. Actually I'm in a hurry for the class. Anyway, I'll be willing to cover all the repair."
refusal( ) warning( ) apology( )
complaint( )

14. On a telephone call, one would say to his friend: "If you are not busy on Saturday, I am having a party."
request( ) invitation( )
apology( ) greeting( )

15. A mother to her daughter: "Must I have asked you hundred times to keep that window closed!"
preference( ) reprimand( )
apology( ) compliment( )

16. Henri: "Would it be possible for you to meet me tomorrow?"
Sonia: "Well, I have lots of things to manage!"
Sonia means: compliment( ) assertion( ) acceptance( )
refusal( )

Appendix B
Explanations of the Multiple Choice Test

Table (1): Definitions of Speech Acts & Explanations of their Relative Test Items.

Eliciting stimulus act	Definitions of speech acts	DCT items	H status relative to S's	Interlocutors involved	Explanations of DCT items
invitation	S asks H to make use of occasion for H's benefit.	#1	equal-distance	friend vs. friend	inviting a friend to dinner
		#14	equal-distance	friend vs. friend	inviting a friend to a party
request	S asks H to do service for S's benefit	#4	higher-status	academic teacher vs. students	requesting to close a class door
		#8	equal-distance	friend vs. friend	requesting to handle mashed potatoes at dinner table
apology	S expresses his regret for an offence committed on H's behalf to set things right	#9	equal-status	room-mate vs. room-mate	apologizing for leaving stereo on with volume high
		#13	equal-distance	young man vs. young man	apologizing for denting a car
refusal	S expresses his denial for not fulfilling the H's intention	#6	equal-distance	friend vs. friend	refusing to join an evening party
		#16	equal-distance	friend vs. friend	refusing a get-together with a friend
complaint	S reacts with displeasure or annoyance to an action committed by H that has affected the S unfavorably	#2	equal-distance	friend vs. friend	complaining for waiting long at a date
		#12	equal-distance	young man vs. young man	complaining for wrong doing
comforting	S expresses his sympathy and soothes H's sad or hurt feelings to encourage him	#3	equal-distance	friend vs. friend	comforting a friend on death of his elder son
		#10	equal-distance	friend vs. friend	comforting a friend on recovering from certain critical problem

Eliciting stimulus act	Definitions of speech acts	DCT items	H status relative to S's	Interlocutors involved	Explanations of DCT items
warning	S advices H not to do things for H's own benefit	#5	higher-status	guard vs. passer-by	warning against crossing a line
		#7	higher-distance	mother vs. son	warning against touching a stove
reprimand	S blames H for disobeying S's order/ carelessness	#11	higher-distance	mother vs. son	blaming for carelessness (leaving the light on)
		#15	higher-distance	mother vs. son	blaming for disobedience/ carelessness

Appendix C

Table (2): Frequency Counts, Percentages and Overall Average Score for <u>Request</u> in the related items.

request					
Q4					
multiple choice speech acts	**compliment**	**suggestion**	**request**	**warning**	**score**
frequency count	**1**	**4**	**14**	**11**	**2.3**
percentage	**3%**	**13%**	**47%**	**37%**	
Q8					
multiple choice speech acts	**apology**	**advice**	**request**	**complaint**	**score**
frequency count	**4**	**2**	**19**	**5**	**3.2**
percentage	**13%**	**7%**	**63%**	**17%**	
Average score					**2.8**

Table (3): Frequency Counts, Percentages and Overall Average Score for Invitation in the related items.

invitation					
Q1					
multiple choice speech acts	**invitation**	**order**	**request**	**suggestion**	**score**
frequency count	**18**	**2**	**4**	**6**	**3.0**
percentage	**60%**	**7%**	**13%**	**20%**	
Q14					
multiple choice speech acts	**request**	**invitation**	**apology**	**greeting**	**score**
frequency count	**1**	**28**	**1**	**0**	**4.7**
percentage	**3%**	**93%**	**3%**	**0%**	
Average score					**3.8**

Table (4): Frequency Counts, Percentages and Overall Average Score for Comforting in the related items.

comforting					
Q3					
multiple choice speech acts	**comforting**	**apology**	**suggestion**	**complaint**	**score**
frequency count	17	10	1	2	2.8
percentage	57%	33%	3%	7%	
Q10					
multiple choice speech acts	**request**	**compliment**	**apology**	**comforting**	**score**
frequency count	2	3	1	24	4.0
percentage	7%	10%	3%	80%	
Average score					3.4

Table (5): Frequency Counts, Percentages and Overall Average Score for Apology in the related items.

apology					
Q9					
multiple choice speech acts	offer	comforting	apology	complaint	score
frequency count	1	3	25	1	4.2
percentage	3%	10%	83%	3%	
Q13					
multiple choice speech acts	refusal	warning	apology	complaint	score
frequency count	2	1	25	2	4.2
percentage	7%	3%	83%	7%	
Average score					4.2

Table (6): Frequency Counts, Percentages and Overall Average Score for Refusal in the related items.

refusal					
Q6					
multiple choice speech acts	comforting	refusal	acceptance	request	score
frequency count	1	22	3	4	3.7
percentage	3%	73%	10%	13%	
Q16					
multiple choice speech acts	compliment	assertion	acceptance	refusal	score
frequency count	0	8	2	20	3.3
percentage	0%	27%	7%	67%	
Average score					3.5

Table (7): Frequency Counts, Percentages and Overall Average Score for Warning in the related items.

warning					
Q5					
multiple choice speech acts	**warning**	**suggestion**	**request**	**promise**	**score**
frequency count	**22**	**4**	**3**	**1**	**3.7**
percentage	**73%**	**13%**	**10%**	**3%**	
Q7					
multiple choice speech acts	**suggestion**	**warning**	**complaint**	**order**	**score**
frequency count	**0**	**29**	**1**	**0**	**4.8**
percentage	**0%**	**97%**	**3%**	**0%**	
Average score					**4.3**

Table (8): Frequency Counts, Percentages and Overall Average Score for Reprimand in the related items.

reprimand					
Q11					
multiple choice speech acts	**preference**	**apology**	**reprimand**	**request**	**score**
frequency count	**1**	**1**	**18**	**10**	**3.0**
percentage	**3%**	**3%**	**60%**	**33%**	
Q15					
multiple choice speech acts	**preference**	**reprimand**	**apology**	**compliment**	**score**
frequency count	**3**	**25**	**2**	**0**	**4.2**
percentage	**10%**	**83%**	**7%**	**0%**	
Average score					**3.6**

Table (9): Frequency Counts, Percentages and Overall Average Score for Complaint in the related items.

complaint					
Q2					
multiple choice speech acts	apology	complaint	request	acceptance	score
frequency count	4	22	4	0	3.7
percentage	13%	73%	13%	0%	
Q12					
multiple choice speech acts	refusal	warning	apology	complaint	score
frequency count	3	10	1	16	2.7
percentage	10%	33%	3%	53%	
Average score					3.2

Table (10): Frequency Count Percentages & Overall Average Score in Relation to Participants' Proficiency Levels.

Speech Act Type	Items No.	High proficiency		Low proficiency	
		frequency percentage	overall score	frequency percentage	overall score
invitation	Q1	100	5.0	83	4.2
	Q14	100	5.0	83	4.2
Overall		100	5.0	83	4.2
complaint	Q2	83	4.2	58	2.9
	Q12	78	3.9	17	3.3
Overall		81	4.0	38	3.1
comforting	Q3	72	3.6	33	1.7
	Q10	94	4.7	58	2.9
Overall		83	4.2	46	2.3

Speech Act Type	Items No.	High proficiency		Low proficiency	
		frequency percentage	overall score	frequency percentage	overall score
request	Q4	61	3.1	25	1.3
	Q8	78	3.9	42	2.1
Overall		69	3.5	33	1.7
warning	Q5	100	5.0	33	1.7
	Q7	100	5.0	92	4.6
Overall		100	5.0	63	3.1
refusal	Q6	89	4.4	50	2.5
	Q16	100	5.0	17	0.8
Overall		94	4.7	33	1.7
apology	Q9	94	4.7	67	3.3
	Q13	94	4.7	67	3.3
Overall		94	4.7	67	3.3
reprimand	Q11	83	4.2	25	1.3
	Q15	100	5.0	58	2.9
Overall		92	4.6	42	2.1