



A RELEVANCE-THEORETIC STUDY TO SPEECH ACT OF COMMISSIVES

AHMED JUMAAH SALLAMA ALI ERSHAD RUSHDY

ABSTRACT

The current research deals with Pragmatic theory or "Relevance Theory" with reference to its relation with speech acts especially commissive verbs . This research is an attempt to clarify the term "Relevance Theory" and what it means. To understand how relevance theory works, it is necessary to take into account the role of context in distinguishing between the speaker's intention and hearer's interpretation. Consequently, Relevance theory is based on a definition of relevance and two principles of relevance: a Cognitive principle(that human cognition is geared to the maximization of relevance), and a Communicative principle(that utterances create expectations of optimal relevance). This study tries to explain the motivation for these principles and illustrate their application to variety of speech act commissives and pragmatic problems in these verbs. This paper is divided into four sections. The first one discusses the problem, aims, hypothesis, procedures, and value of the research. The second one



illustrates " Austin and Searle's Speech Act Theory" its classifications and taxonomies, Indirect speech act, and what are called happy and unhappy conditions. Section three includes Relevance theory, Cognitive and Communicative principles, Relevance and act of promise, and Data analysis. Finally, the last section is devoted to the conclusions of the study.

List of Tables

Table No.	Title	Page
Table. (1)	Searle's(1979) view of commissive speech acts	21
Table. (2)	The analysis of text (1)	22
Table. (3)	The analysis of text (2)	23
Table. (4)	The analysis of text (3)	24

List of Abbreviations

Number	The abbreviated form	The basic form
1	P	Proposition
2	S	Speaker
3	H	Hearer
4	O	Obliged
5	S1	Some
6	Poss	Possible

1. Introduction



Studying speech act verbs of commissives is a difficult task to the students of English. Speech act theory is a difficult theory of language use which stems in the field of pragmatics. Presenting an analysis of speech acts of commissives in the light of relevance theory which is a psycho pragmatic theory is one of the recent difficult studies in the field of linguistics in general, and pragmatics in particular. Few people who know the division of speech act theory and its pioneers- Austin and Searle.

The study aims at confirming that the relevance theoretic-study of speech act verbs of commissives has importance in improving learners' ability to make a balance between the speaker's intention and the hearer's understanding. A good knowledge in "Relevance Theory" enables one how to use a language accurately, appropriately, flexibly and how one can decode or encode speech. Presenting the taxonomies of relevance theory in a simple way to enhance the understanding of English learners, especially those who are interested in the study of the field of pragmatics.

The present study is hypothesized that the use of any speech act verb raises the contextual (cognitive) effects and reduces the amount of effort on the hearer's side. The relevance theory provides a clear explanation to the matters of



understanding the perlocutionary effect as the illocutionary act (force) made mutually (communicatively) manifest by the use of speech act of commissive to the hearer. The use of perlocutionary effect will be quite obvious to be realized by the hearer especially with speech acts such as promise, threatening, persuading, scaring, etc...

This study is limited to "Relevance Theory" with the respect to speech act verbs. It deals with communicative mutual understanding between a speaker and hearer. It shows the significance of relevance in reducing the effort in realizing a certain message in a certain context

The value of the study, in his attempt, is hoped to be useful for Iraqi learners of English as a foreign language to be a good grasp of speech act verbs of commissives. It may be useful for students of English in Iraq Universities particularly those who are interested in Pragmatics. It is also hoped that it will give an improvement and development to the students to support their competence in using English language accurately, appropriately, and flexibly.

SPEECH ACT THEORY: FROM AUSTIN TO SEARLE



2. Austin's Speech Act Theory

The first who proposed speech-act theory is John Austin. Austin (1962:20, cited in Rushdy, 2010:13) argues that sentences are not only used to describe states of affairs, but also to perform actions, standing against some verificationists.

Austin (1962:22) speech act is "To abandon the traditional approach of meaning, he relieved that semantics should be reduced to pragmatics.

Austin (1962:20, cited in Rushdy, 2010:13-14) gives two general types of speech act: constative (explicit) and performative. The former describes states of affairs; the latter is that act that does not describe or report states of affairs, and is not to belong to the truth-conditions either. Lyons (1995:238) sees that Austin showed the distinction in a way that constative is which carries truth and false values; performative carries out an action.

2.1 Austin's Taxonomy

Classification of speech act verbs is produced for the first time by Austin. Austin (1962:20) classifies the verbs of actions into five major categories as following :-

1- Verdictives : these " consist in the delivering of a finding, official or unofficial, upon evidence or reasons as to value fact



so far as these are distinguishable". Examples of this class are :acquit, hold, calculate, describe, analyze, estimate, date, rank, assess, and characterize.

2-Exercitives : one of these "is the giving of a decision in favor of or against a certain course of action or advocacy of it ...", "a decision that something is to be so, as distinct from a judgment that is so". Some examples of this class are :order, command, direct, plead, beg, recommend, entreat, and advise.

Request

is also an obvious example, but Austin does not list it. As well as the above, Austin also lists : appoint, dismiss, nominate, veto, declare, open, announce, warm, proclaim, and give.

3-Commissives: "The whole point of a commissive which Austin tells is to commit the speaker to a certain course of action". Some of the obvious examples are: promise, vow, pledge, covenant, contract, guarantee, embrace, and swear.

4-Expositives: "Are used in acts of exposition involving the expounding of views, the conducting of arguments and the clarifying of usages and references". Austin gives many examples of these, among which are: affirm, deny, emphasize, illustrate, answer, report, accept, object to, concede, describe, class, identify, and call .



5-Behavitives : This class, with which Austin was very dissatisfied (" a shocker" he called it). "includes the notion of reaction to other people's behavior and fortunes and of attitudes and expressions of attitudes of someone else's past conduct or imminent conduct".

2.1.1 Locutionary, Illocutionary and Perlocutionary

Austin (1962:20) classifies performatives into three types:

- 1. Locutionary act:** the utterance of the sentence with determinate sense and reference .
- 2. Illocutionary act (force) :** the making of a statement, offer, promise, etc. in uttering a sentence by the virtue of three conventional force associated with it or its explicit performative paraphrase .
- 3. Perlocutionary act :** the bringing about of the effects on the audience by means of uttering a sentence such effects being special to the circumstance of utterance .

Also Austin (1962:101) lists clear examples on these types of performance as following:

(i) Act (A) or locution

He said to me 'shoot her'! meaning by 'shoot' shoot and referring 'her' to her .



(ii) Act (B) or illocution

He urged (or advised, ordered) me to shoot her.

(iii) Act (C) or perlocutionary

He persuaded me to shoot her .

2.1.3 Happy and Unhappy

Austin (1962:20, cited in Levinson, 1983:229) specifies the use of speech acts to specific condition. He names them 'happy /unhappy' or 'felicitous / infelicitous' conditions. These are:

A (i): there must be a conversational procedure having a conversational effect.

(ii): the circumstances and persons must be appropriate as specified in the procedure.

B : the procedure must be executed (i) correcting (ii) completely.

C : often, (i) the person must have the requisite, thought, feeling and (ii) if consequent conduct is specified, then the relevant parties must do.

Realized in the wrong conditions, they may produce a very wrong speech act, for example :

(4) I hereby divorce you



If the speaker is not from Islamic religion and says this utterance to his wife, then he cannot get divorce. But, said this three times repeatedly by a Muslim person, then the action is performed.

2.2 Searle's Speech Act Theory

Searle (1968:169) reflects more emphasis on the role of studying and analyzing speech act. He supposed that when we use a language, we perform many actions, such as warning, promises, apologies, requests, swearing, and orders .

According to Searle's theory, speech act is based on the following principle: "speech acts are the basic or minimal units of linguistics communication ".

Searle (1979:13) emphases on the force of speech act which is a matter of gradation of a particular type of speech act. Thus, if we consider (directive) as a term to describe those speech act that attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to carry out an action, then a suggestion would carry a weak force whereas a command would carry a strong force. Searle used the idea of illocutionary force as a central plank of theory, particularly in his formal theory illocutionary logic.

2.2.1 Searle's Alternative Modification



Searle tries to modify some Austin's theory classification.

He gives the different classification of verbs, he writes:

"I believe, however, that my doubts Austin's taxonomy will have greater clarity and force after I have presented an alternative. What I propose to do is take illocutionary point, a its corollaries, direction of fit and expressed sincerity conditions, as the basis for constructing a classification"(Searle, 1979:12).

Searle (1979:2) tries to make a clear distinction between illocutionary verbs and illocutionary acts . As he supposed that illocutions are a part of language as opposed to particular languages and illocutionary verbs are always part of a particular language : German, French, Englishetc. Illocutionary verbs are good way or guide, but by no means fixed to difference in illocutionary acts. So Searle suggests many reasons on this case dissents from the opinion of Austin, they are the differences in illocutionary force or purpose e.g. the point of request is the same of the command, but is clear different force of illocutionary.



2.2.2 Searle's Taxonomy

Searle (1979:12) classifies and modifies alternative taxonomy which he regards as the basic categories of illocutionary acts. He discusses briefly how his classification related to Austin's one as following:

1. Assertive : the role of assertive class is to get the speaker's (in varying degrees) to something's being the matter, to the truth of the expressed proposition . All the members of assertive can be assess on the way which includes true or false.

2. Directives : these points of illocutionary in fact are attempts perform by the speaker to get the hearer to do something .

3. Commissives : these illocutionary acts whose point is to commit the speaker (again in varying degree) to some future course of action . It is a point of a promise to commit the speaker to do something is not necessarily to try to get himself to do it . It is a matter of request by the speaker to get the hearer to do something, it is an optional not obligate .

4. Expressives : the illocutionary point of this class is to describe the psychological degree specified in the faithfully condition about the state of affairs specified in the propositional content. The verbs of this class are (thank,



congratulate, apologize, condole, deplore, and welcome) .

You can notice in

expressives there is no direction of fit . In performing an expressive, the speaker is neither trying to get the world to match words nor the words to

match the world, rather the truth of the expressed proposition is assumed . As the following examples which mentioned by Searle :

(6) I apologize that I stepped on your toe; rather the correct English is, I apologize for stepping on your toe. Similarly, one cannot have:

(7) I congratulate you that you won the race.

Nor

(8) I thank you that you paid me the money . One must have :

8

(9) I congratulate you on winning the race(congratulations on winning the race).

(10) I thank you for paying me the money(thanks for paying me the money). These syntactical facts, Searle suggests, are consequences of the fact that there is no direction of fit in expressives.



(5) Declarations :the characteristic of this class is the successful performance of one of its members brings about the correspondence between the propositional content, and reality, successful performance guarantees that the propositional content corresponds to the world :

If I successfully perform the act of appointing you chairman, then you are chairman; if I successful perform the act of nominating you as candidate, then you are a candidate.

The surface syntactical structure of many sentences used to perform declarations conceals this point from us because in them there is no surface syntactical distinction between propositional content and illocutionary force. As Searle suggests about the distinction between illocutionary force and propositional content is :

*"I think in fact that in their use to perform
declarations*

their semantic structure is

*(11) I declare: your employment is (hereby)
terminated.*

(12) I declare: my position is (hereby) terminated"

(Searle,

1979:17).



Declarations bring about some alteration in the status or conditions of the referred to object or objects solely, in virtue of the fact that the declaration has been successfully performed. This feature of declarations distinguishes them from the other categories. (ibid)

2.2.3 Felicity Conditions

Austin (1982:7) puts rules or principles of felicity conditions which are as follows:

A (i) there must exist an accepted conventional procedure having and

certain conventional effect.

(ii) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.

B (i) the procedure must be done by persons both (1) correctly and (2) completely.

C (i) the procedure must do by person who has, feelings, and thought.

(ii) consequently, persons must conduct themselves to do relevant.

One of the felicity conditions is a religious circumstances shows the speech situation, in which persons of a particular



society and in a particular circumstances exist. When the speaker is a Christian priest and the hearer is an infant. So when they in the church with the presence of infant's parents .

(13) I baptize thee in the name of Father, son, and Holy Spirit.

This action will take place because this name will be his name lifelong.

2.2.4 Indirect Speech-act

Here under this title I will be discussing the cases of indirect speech acts. One of cases in which one illocutionary act is performed is indirectly by way of performing another.

The problem here appears with the performing of indirect speech acts is how it is possible for the speaker to say something and mean that thing, but also he may mean something else. A clear meaning consists in share in the intention to say something understanding in the hearer. A large part of this problem is how it is possible for the hearer to understand the indirect speech act when the utterance or the sentence he hears and interprets or understands means something else (Searle, 1979:31).

Indirect speech act means when the speaker wants to get some goals if the relation sentence structure has an ambiguous interpretation, the result between them is shown in



an indirect way. Speech act will be an indirect one (Searle, 1968:20, cited in Rushdy, 2010:17).

Also, Searle (1979:33) shows the typical case of the general phenomenon of indirection:

(14) student x : let's go to the movies tonight .

(15) student x : I have to study for an exam .

The utterance of (14) shows a direct proposal virtue of its meaning exactly, because of " let's ". And the utterance of (15) as the context suggested normally shows a rejection of the proposal, but not in virtue of its meaning .

3. Relevance Theory

Relevance theory may be seen as an attempt to work out in detail one of Grice's central which claims that an essential feature of most human communication is the expression and recognition of intentions (Grice, 1989:7).

Also Grice laid the foundations for an inferential model of communication, an alternative to the classical code model. According to the code model, a communicator encodes her intended message into signal, which is decoded by the audience using an identical copy of the code. According to the inferential model, a communicator provides evidence of her intention to convey a certain meaning, which is inferred by the audience on the basis of the evidence provided. Any utterance



is linguistically coded piece of evidence, so that verbal comprehension involves an element of decoding. So, the decoded linguistic meaning is just one of the inputs to a non-demonstrative inference process which yields an interpretation of the speaker's meaning.

The goal of inferential pragmatics is to explain or describe how the hearer infers the speaker's meaning or intention on the basis of the evidence provided. The relevance-theoretic account is based on another Grice's central claims; that utterances automatically create expectations in terms or items of a cooperative principle and maxims of quality (truthfulness), quantity(informativeness), relation(relevance), and manner(clarity), which the speakers are expected to observe (Grice, 1989:17, cited in Laurence and Ward,2004:607-368).

3.1 Relevance and Cognition Principle

Under this title we will introduce the basic cognitive notion of relevance and the cognitive principle of relevance, which lay the foundation for the relevance-theoretic method to pragmatics.



Intuitively, a chip (sight, a sound, an utterance, a memory) is relevant to an individual when it connects with background information he has available to yield conclusions that matter to him: say, by answering a question he had in mind, improving his knowledge on a certain topic, setting a doubt, confirming a suspicion, or correcting a mistaken impression. According to relevance-theoretic terms, an input of these items when its processing in a context of available assumptions yields a POSITIVE COGNITIVE EFFECT. A positive cognitive effect is a worthwhile difference to the individual's representation of the world – a true conclusion, for example:

(16) False conclusions are not worth having.

They are cognitive effects, but not positive ones (Sperber & Wilson, 1986:251).

Also as Sperber and Wilson lay that the most important type of cognitive effect achieved by processing an input or sharing in a context is a CONTEXTUAL IMPLICATION, a conclusion inference from the input and the context together, but from neither input nor context alone. For example:

(17) On seeing my train arriving.



I might look at my watching, access my knowledge of the train timetable, and derive the contextual implication that m train is late (this may achieve relevance by combining with further contextual assumptions to include further implication).

Other types of cognitive effect include the strengthening, revision or abandonment of available assumptions. Related to the previous example, the sight of my train arriving late might confirm my impression that the service, or

make me alter my plans to do some shopping on the way to work. According to relevance theory, an input is Relevant to an individual when, and only when its processing yields such positive cognitive effects.

The notion of a POSITIVE COGNITIVE EFFECT is needed to distinguish between information the merely SEEMS to the individual to be relevant and information that actually IS relevant. We are all aware that some of our beliefs may be false, and would prefer not to waste our effort drawing false conclusion. An efficient cognitive system is one which tends to pick out genuinely relevant input, yielding genuinely true conclusion (ibid).



Heuristic task of relevance theory:

- a- Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effect:
Test interpretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility.
- b- Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (or abandoned).

The benefit of heuristic task is to make the utterance of a speaker as easy as possible to understand by a hearer. Since relevance varies inversely with effort, the very fact that an interpretation is easily accessible gives it an initial degree of plausibility (an advantage specific to ostensive communication). It is also reasonable for the hearer to stop at the first interpretation that satisfies his expectations of relevance, because there should never be more than one. A speaker who wants his/her utterance to be as easy as possible to understand should formulate it. So that the first interpretation to satisfy the hearer's expectation of relevance is the one (s) he intended to convey. An utterance with two apparently satisfactory competing interpretations would cause the hearer the unnecessary extra effort of choosing between them.

When a hearer following the path of least effort arrives at an interpretation that satisfies his/her expectations



of relevance, in the absence of contrary evidence, this is the most plausible hypothesis about the speaker's meaning. Since comprehension is a non-demonstrative inference process, this hypothesis may well be false; but it is the best a rational hearer can do (Sperber and Wilson, 1986:13).

3.2 Relevance and Communication

Human cognition is efficient processing device. This efficiency can be defined in terms of the goals, with respect to goals, efficiency is seen as resolving a puzzle, catching a prey..... etc.(Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 246) efficiency aims to get the larger amount of goals with the minimal cost. These cognitive goals, Sperber and Wilsons claim, aim at maximizing relevance in general. Sperber and Wilson state that the term "Ostension" is used to give certain assumption manifest, by the speaker to the hearer, in relation to communication. Making assumption manifest to the hearer, the hearer is to get them to his cognitive efficiency (mental analyzing processes) which is done in mind to analyze items of information are given by the speaker, of both him and the communicator share moreover, it is then obvious that the assumption made manifest to the hearer will be worth processing to the hearer's cognitive environment.



This makes the speaker's intention more clear and the hearer is going to pay attention to that assumption.

Sperber and Wilson identify two types of intention Informative Intention which they define as "to make it mutually manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of assumption I"; and Communicative Intention which they define as "to make it mutually manifest to audience and communicator has this informative intention", From these two definitions, Sperber and Wilson define the ostensive-intention communication as :

*"The communicator produces a stimulus which
makes
it mutually manifest to communicator and
audience
that the communicator intend, by means of
stimulus,
to make manifest or more manifest to the audience
a
set of assumptions (T)" (ibid).*

Inferential communication—what relevance theory calls OSTENSIVE – INFERENTIAL COMMUNICATION



for reason that will shortly become apparent involves an extra layer of intention: Ostensive-inferential communication :-

A – The informative intention: the intention is to inform an audience of something.

B – The communicative intention: the intention is to inform the audience of one's informative intention (Sperber and Wilson,1986: 255).

3.3 Relevance and Act of Promise

This is the first of speech acts that related to the commissive group. Commissive verbs involve an obligation on the part of the speaker, and one of the measures used by Searle and Van der Veken for commissive verbs is the degree of strength of the commitment (Wifred,1991:95).

When we promise to do P (proposition), we are making a commitment to undertake P, even if we promise that someone else will do P. We are still making an undertaking to see it that person will do P. The effect of promise is to cause the hearer to believe that the speaker will undertake to do P. Additionally the obligation itself is such that what the speaker is doing is to place his credibility on the line (hhhs://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annette_Verschuren).



Wierzbicka(1987:440) gives the following conditions for promise: 1) I know that you want me to do P.

2) I know that you think that I may not do it.

3) I want to do it because you want me to do it.

4) I say: I will do it.

5) I want us to think that if I do not do it, people will not believe anything that I say I will do.

6) I say this, in this way, because I want to cause you to be able to think that I have to do it.

It seems reasonable that when I make a promise I have some reason to believe that you want me to carry out the promised action.

It seems reasonable that when I make a promise I have some reason to believe that you want me to carry out the promised action.

Hence 1) can be represented as know (S(speaker) wants H (hearer) to do S1(some) proposition). It also seems reasonable that I am making a promise to do P. because I have reason to believe that you may think that I won't do P. hence 2) can be represented as know (S. be 1(H. poss (possible) ~ do(S. P.).

Hence 3) is more problematical, I may promise to do something even though I do not particularly want to do it, 3)



appears to be an attempt to explain the reason for the promise, but I may make the promise simply because I ought to. There may be a feeling that I am obliged to carry out the action. This tentative belief of obligation could be represented as:

be 1 (S. poss. (O.(obliged) do (S. P.) .

Where O (...) is the deontic obligation operator, perhaps 4) should be a simple representation of the fact that P. will be carried out in the future:

Speak (S. H. will (do (S. P.) (achieve).

5) is an attempt at explaining the obligation placed upon the speaker by the promise, but I prefer to represent this as an effect of the speech act that the speaker is now under an obligation to do P. (or see that P. is done). Hence we can represent it as an effect:

be 1(H. O. (do (S. P.).

6) is now in effect redundant. I also believe that it is necessary that the speaker believes he is capable of carrying out his promise. Hence we need an extra cognitive state:

be 1(S. poss.(do (S. P.).

This gives us the schema for promise:

Action: speak(S. H. will do (S. P.).

Cognitive states: 1) know(S. wants (H. do (S. P.).

2) know(S. be1 (H. poss.(~do(S. P.).



3)be 1(S. poss.(O. (do(S. P.).

4)be 1(S. poss.(do(S. P.).

Presumed effect: be 1(H. O.(do(S. P.) , possible problems with promise are firstly that the hearer may question the speaker's veracity or commitment to carry out the promised action. A violation of condition (1) only occurs if the speaker mistakenly comes to conclusion that the hearer wants him to do P. The hearer may be slightly offended because the speaker had to promise to do P. Although the hearer never doubted that the speaker would do P. The speaker may not want to do P. but might make the promise anyway. Finally, the hearer might question the speaker's ability to carry out P (Wilfred, 1991:97).

3.4 Data Analysis

The class of commissives is a very wide phenomenon, and the narrower act of 'promising' should be viewed within this wider context, and their expressions can take on a variety of linguistic manifestations (Searle, 1979: 22-25).

Both Austin (1962: 157) and Searle (1979: 14), in their attempts to define commissives, say that commissives are those illocutionary acts whose point is to commit the speaker to some future course of action. For instance, (18) I can commit myself to a course of action simply by saying 'I



will do it', but if I say, 'I will do it', I may be making a commitment or I simply express an intention. Usually the context will make the meaning clear if there is ambiguity.

They argue that commissives are acts of undertaking obligations, but to undertake an obligation is not automatically to create one, even if the speaker uses a performative like :

(19) I promise to go to the station tomorrow.

18

The speaker's utterance may express his belief that an obligation is thereby created, but doesn't make the belief true even if the hearer shares the belief, and it is natural that the speaker is obligated to fulfill his commitment is a moral question not answerable by the theory of illocutionary acts.

Yule (1996: 54) presents two distinct definitions for commissives and directives. For him commissives are those speech acts that oblige the speaker to commit himself to some future action. They present the intention of the speaker like: 'promises', 'threats', 'refusals', and 'pledges'. These acts can be performed by speaker alone, or by speaker as a member of a group. In performing a commissive act, the speaker undertakes to make the world fit the words (via speaker) like in the following:



(20) I will be back.

(21) I am going to get it right next time.

(22) We will do our best.

Directives are those kinds of speech acts that speakers use to get someone else to do something. They present what the speaker wants. When the speaker uses a directive speech act, he attempts to make the world fit the words (via Hearer).

(23) I promise to be on time.

(24) We volunteer to put up the decorations for the dance.

For him, a commissive predicate is one that can be used to commit oneself or (refuse to commit oneself) to some future action. The subject of the sentence is therefore most likely to be "I or we". Furthermore, the verb must be in the present tense and there is some addressee, whether the utterance shows it or not, since the speaker makes a commitment to somebody (ibid).

In order to get a clear idea of commissive speech acts, one can see the following table.

Table. (1) Searle's(1979) view of commissive speech acts:

Commissive:	Promise, guarantee, pledge, vow, ... etc.
-------------	---



Propositional attitude(s):	S wants: H recognizes: S wants to do P
Presupposition(s)	S wants: H does P
Event type (P):	P is in the interest of H
Agent (P):	Action
Temporal	{Future}
Reference (P):	Speaker

The relevance-theoretic analysis of commissive speech acts goes as follows:

Text (1):

1. I promise to be at the station tomorrow.

The analysis of the above sentences in speech act theory stresses that there is an action that will happen in the future giving the illocutionary point that addresses the futurity in commissive acts. In relevance, it adheres the point that it makes the hearer understand that the speaker's intention (communicative intention) that is made communicative by the virtue of its utterance. This will not merely be the future action only, but rather it will raise cognitive effect and will



reduce the cognitive effort (the redundancy of the effort given by the hearer to understand the text above) in the hearer's mind. Not only this, it will raise the coherence of the text via the shared mutual knowledge that both the speaker and the hearer share. It is readily enough, by recognizing the act (heuristically) will raise the contextual effect needed to understand the future action. Using a commissive verb like (promise) will make the adequacy of the contextual effect exist in the text. Perlocutionary effect will be made easily

20

when it meets the relevance of the utterance via the truth that the speaker is bond by and restricted to. By this, communication is saved. The analysis will go like the following:

Table. (2): The analysis of text (1)

text	Speech act of commissive		relevance		comprehension	Adequacy	coherence
	Illocutionary act	Perlocutionary effect	Economy Strong	Redundancy Weak			
1	Promise	+	+	-	+	+	+

Text (2):

2. I pledge to leave smoking nearly.



The analysis of the above sentences in speech act theory stresses that there is an action that will happen in the future giving the illocutionary point that addresses the futurity in commissive acts. In relevance, it adheres the point that it makes the hearer understand that the speaker's intention (communicative intention) that is made communicative by the virtue of its utterance. This will not merely be the future action only, but rather it will reduce cognitive effect and will increase the cognitive effort (the redundancy of the effort given by the hearer to understand the text above) in the hearer's mind. Not only this, it will decrease the coherence of the text via the shared mutual knowledge that both the speaker and the hearer share. It is non-readily enough, by recognizing the act (heuristically) will raise the contextual effect needed to understand the future action. Using a commissive verb like (pledge) will make the adequacy of the contextual effect is not exist in the text. Perlocutionary effect will be made something hardly when it meets the relevance of the utterance via the truth that the speaker is bond by and restricted to. By this, communication is saved. The analysis will go like the following:

Table.(3): The analysis of text (2)

text	Speech act of commissive	relevance	comprehension	Adequacy	coherence
------	--------------------------	-----------	---------------	----------	-----------



	Illocutionary act	Perlocutionary effect	Economy Strong	Redundancy Weak			
2	pledge	—	+	—	+	—	+

Text(3):

3. I refuse to inform them about my plans.

The analysis of the above sentences in speech act theory stresses that there is an action that will happen in the future giving the illocutionary point that addresses the futurity in commissive acts. In relevance, it adheres the point that it makes the hearer understand that the speaker's intention (communicative intention) that is made communicative by the virtue of its utterance. This will not merely be the future action only, but rather it will reduce cognitive effect and will increase the cognitive effort (the redundancy of the effort given by the hearer to understand the text above) in the hearer's mind. Not only this, it will raise the coherence of the text via the shared mutual knowledge that both the speaker and the hearer share. It is readily enough, by recognizing the act (heuristically) will raise the contextual effect needed to understand the future action. Using a commissive verb like (refuse) will make the adequacy of the contextual effect exist in the text. Perlocutionary effect will be made easily when it meets the



relevance of the utterance via the truth that the speaker is bond by and restricted to. By this, communication is saved. The analysis will go like the following:

Table.(4): Analysis of text (3)

text	Speech act of commissive		relevance		comprehension	Adequacy	coherence
	Illocutionary act	Perlocutionary effect	Economy Strong	Redundancy Weak			
3	refuse	+	+	-	+	+	+

4. CONCLUSION

The study has come up with the following conclusions:

1. Speech acts of commissives are the ones that help to better understanding as analyzed according to relevance theory.
2. In the recognition of the speech acts of commissives, they will raise the contextual effects and reduce the amount of effort in the mind of the hearer.
- 3 . Perlocutionary effect, will be quite obvious and realized due to its relation to the hearer, since 'promise' for example and as is seen in the analysis, is the persuading of the hearer which, in its turn, help the hearer to draw a conclusion of the future action. By this, the hearer's cognitive effort is saved and the



result will be the relevance rather than the lost of effort (redundancy of effort)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Austin, J. L. (1962): *How To Do Things With Words* .
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Austin, J. L. (1982): *Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy* .
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Ershad, A. R. (2010): "A Relevance Theoretic Approach To
Study Redundancy In English Spoken
Discourse" (Unpublished M. A. Thesis, Tikrit University).
- Grice, P. (1989): *Studies In The way Of Words*. Harvard:
Harvard University press.
- https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Annette_Verschuren.
- Horn L. and Gregory W. (2004): *The Handbook Of
Pragmatics*. Oxford: Blackwell Press.
- Levinson, S. C. (1983): *Pragmatics* . Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
- Lyons, J. (1995): *Linguistic Semantics, An Introduction*.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Searle, J. (1968): *Speech Acts: An Essay In the Philosophy
Of Language*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University
Press.



Searle, J.(1969): ***Expression And Meaning Studies In The Theory Of Speech Acts***. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Sperber D. and Deirdre W.(1986): ***Relevance: Communication and Cognition***. Oxford: Blackwell press.

Wierzbicka, A.(1987): ***English Speech Act Verbs: A semantic Dictionary***. California: Academic Press.

Wilfred, P.(1991):***Speech Act Theory, Discourse Structure and Indirect Speech Act***. New York: University Of York.