

A Pragmatic Study of Linguistic Indeterminacy in Arabic with Reference to English: A Conversational Implicature-theoretic Perspective

By: Inst. Ali Ershad Rushdi

(College of Education for Humanities) (Tikrit University)

(ali.rushdi85@tu.edu.iq)

Samara Muhammad Ahmed

(College of Education for Humanities) (University of Tikrit)

(samarakh@tu.edu.iq)

ABSTRACT:

The present study tackles the phenomenon of linguistic indeterminacy. Linguistic indeterminacy is a term used to describe the lack of linguistic semantics to give the meaning of certain linguistic construction, a word, a phrase, and a sentence when they are used in certain contexts. As opposed to linguistic determinacy, linguistic indeterminacy is said to have a pragmatic meaning as intended by the speaker in certain contexts. The study shows that there are certain pragmatic subfields that can give account and fill the gap of the linguistic semantic shortage in figuring out the meaning intended in specific contexts. The study will also try to pragmatically analyze linguistic indeterminacy in Arabic and will be specified in the conversational implicature violations. Further, lots of deictic expressions can show up such linguistic indeterminacy as well as some indirect speech act verbs and implicatures. The study will present these pragmatic issues in what concerns linguistic indeterminacy respectively. The study will analyze three Arabic utterances based on the conversational implicature of Grice.

Keywords: Pragmatics, linguistic indeterminacy, implicature, irony, metaphor, deixis, flouting.

The study tries to answer the following questions:

1. Whether or not the Arabic language has such an indeterminacy thesis applicable to it?
2. Are Arabic utterances similar to those indeterminacies in English?
3. Is implicature applicable to Arabic in the light of the English analysis of linguistic indeterminacies?

The aims of this study are:

1. showing the similarities between English and Arabic from an indeterminacy perspective.
2. showing the similarities between Arabic and English in the perspective of linguistic indeterminacy.
3. analyzing Arabic utterances in terms of Grice's conversational implicature.

Further, the study hypothesizes the following:

1. the use of implicature can discover Arabic linguistic indeterminacy.
2. It is assumed that linguistic determinacy has a property of universality if it is found applicable to Arabic.
3. Linguistic indeterminacy is positively counted in Arabic in that it adds more to the meaning than the determinate one as they are quite dependent on the impact of context.

1. Pragmatics: Definitions

Pragmatics is best defined as the study of language in use. It deals with the studies of meaning in a rather different way other than the semantic one. Gazdar (1979: 8) defines pragmatics in terms of the comparison with semantics: 'Meaning - truth conditions = pragmatics'. In this regard, pragmatics has nothing to do with the truth-value of the logical semantic proposition.

Yule (1996:4) stresses that pragmatics can be defined as the study of the contextual meaning. Strictly speaking, context in this perspective plays a vital role in determining the meaning intended based on the shared-knowledge that both the speaker and the hearer share. Truly, many phrases and incomplete sentences are bridged and passed comprehended by depending on the context.

2. Context

Context, Mey (2001: 39), is an extra-linguistic term used in clarifying meaning out of their 'local paradigm of grammar'. Mey highlights the meaning of context. He mentions that context is dynamic and not static concept. It is construed as constantly alternative surroundings in the broader sense which helps the participants in the process of communication to communicate or interact and by its assistance communication proceeds. Mey stresses that 'context is action'. It is not only a reference. It draws our understanding about what things are for. Further, it gives the speaker's utterances their real and true pragmatic meaning. For example:

1. *It's a long time since we visit your mother.*

This sentence, when spoken a coffee table after dinner in a room of a married couple, has completely different pragmatic meaning than when the same sentence uttered by a husband to his wife while they are standing before a hippopotamus wall in the zoo. The second context allows an innocent remark to be as transmogrified into a pragmatic act of 'mother-in-law bashing' (speech-act of asserting)

Huang (2007: 13) defines context as the environment in which words, phrases, and sentences viz., utterances in this vein, are used. He states that the definition of context is not as easy as it may seem. Still, there is a lack of a precise definition of it. Broadly speaking, it can be defined as 'referring to any relevant features of the dynamic setting or environment in which a linguistic unit is systematically used. He mentions two types of context: physical and linguistic contexts.

3. Linguistic Indeterminacy

It is observed that there is often a diversity between what a speaker says and what s/he means, between the meaning of the linguistic expression he or s/he uses and the meaning s/he seeks to communicate by using it. Some distinction or others of this sort is made by pragmatists is confirmed by our daily experience as speakers and hearers. However, it is believed that there is gap between the meaning of the linguistic forms that a speaker uses and that of what a speaker means in specific contexts of these linguistic forms (Carston, 2002: 15)

The phenomenon of linguistic indeterminacy can be recognized as a part of what is meant by the speaker and not as part of what his/her linguistic string means. Irony, for example, means the use of specific sentences or words that intended to mean the reverse of the meaning of the same used sentences or words. So, a speaker may utter (2), when what s/he intends to communicate is that (Joan has an extensive poor sense of direction, and that it is laughable that she is going to make it on time):

2. *With her excellent spatial sense, Joan is sure to find a shortcut and be the first to arrive.*

Figurative uses of language generally tend to represent the saying/meaning distinction apparently. So, metaphor, metonymy and hyperbole, all involve saying one thing in order to communicate something else. All of these can be viewed as cases where what is said is not even a part of what is meant, but is merely a vehicle for conveying what is meant.

Huang (2007: 6) adds that in given cases of reference assignment, lots of uses of expressions can reveal the indeterminacies found in the literal use of the expressions, as in (3) below:

3. a. *The authorities barred the anti-globalization demonstrators because they advocated violence.*

- b. *The authorities barred the anti-globalization demonstrators because they feared violence.*

the assignment of reference for the anaphoric pronoun (they) depends crucially on our background knowledge about who would supposedly be advocating or get frightened of violence. The extralinguistic information employed here is responsible for the two opposing interpretations, namely, (they) refers back to (the anti-globalization demonstrators), as in (3a) or they may has a connection to (the authorities), as in (3b).

A one further implication of linguistic indeterminacy is that the ambiguity resolution. Only pragmatics can fill the gap between the sentences whose structures lack clarity as in (4) and (5) below:

4. *John is looking for his glasses.*

a. *glasses ¼ spectacles*

b. *glasses ¼ drinking vessels*

5. *They are cooking apples.*

a. *What are they doing in the kitchen?*

They are cooking apples.

b. *What kind of apples are those?*

They are cooking apples.

(4) is a case of lexical ambiguity and (5) is a case of syntactic ambiguity. In disambiguating (4) and (5), the contextual or real-world knowledge is needed to select the interpretation that the speaker has intended. All this indicates that certain linguistic phenomena can be handled naturally only by depending on the extralinguistic, pragmatic factors such as context, real-world knowledge, and inference. In other words, in order to fill the gap created by linguistic indeterminacy, pragmatics has to be included as a component in an overall theory of linguistic ability.

4. Linguistic Indeterminacy and Deixis

It is of plausible recognition that the context plays a major role in the diversity of meanings and let the meaning be figured out other than what the strings of the sentences really mean. Deixis, as Yule (1996: 7) defines it, means pointing via language. As it is widely common, it has several kinds. Deixis of person, place, time, discourse and societal are of such a category. Their usage can achieve certain grammatical and cohesive purposes. But, in fact, their use is not restricted to mere grammatical and coherent functions. It is an acknowledged fact that such grammatical category can do pragmatic functions related to the language and its users in their certain context. The linguistic indeterminacy can be accounted for in terms of such constructions.

Huang (2007: 6) stresses that deictic expressions can uncover the linguistic indeterminacy, as in the following:

6. *You and you, but not you, stand up!*

The three uses of the pronoun are a deictic expression. If anyone looks at such an expression, he will find out that these uses can only be figured out directly in the moment of their occurrences by monitoring the physical aspect in which such sentence is uttered. That is, the deictic parameter can be fixed only if the deictic expressions are accompanied by physical behavior of some sort (such as a selecting gesture or an eye contact), which requires an extralinguistic physical context.

5. Indirect Speech acts and Linguistic Indeterminacy

“Speech acts” is one of the most influential theories in the linguistics in general and pragmatics in particular. As first coined by Austin, it becomes a stone corner of pragmatics to stand against the so-called verificationist view that meaning is determinate in terms of the truth-value. Scholars of such a trend stress that the meaning of a sentence is only derivable in terms of logical perspective. That is, the proposition- the semantic sentence- undergoes certain verifications of truth value to be said to be true. And that all the sentences are determinate by the virtue of their being telling true stories or telling states of affair.

However, Austin has another alternative view. He assures that the majority of our utterance are found to do actions rather than stating affairs. So, he starts to generalize by saying that there are, completely right, sentences that can afford true and false to which Austin ascribes as “constatives” and that there are those utterances by which speakers perform specific acts in specific situation to specific audience. He calls the latter ‘performative utterances.’ Such utterances contain a ‘performative speech act’. So, in order to utter an utterance, the speaker initiates the “locutionary act” (the collection of sound and meaning having in mind the context of situation, then the speaker selects the intended “force” of “illocutionary force” or “acts”, to create an effect on his audience viz. “perlocutionary act” (Austin, 1962: 11). Austin explains that the most important of the acts is the “illocutionary act”, because it contains the force that carries the speech act like:

7. *I bet you six dollars it will rain.*

This utterance has nothing to do with truth-condition, given the situation and the speakers. Austin characterizes five major categories of speech-act verbs. These are:

- Verdicatives
- Behabatives
- Commisives
- Expositives
- Excersitives

Austin calls them the speech act verbs which require certain happy or unhappy conditions to be performed or sometimes he calls them “felicity conditions.”

Searle (1979: 31) stresses the importance of “indirect speech acts.” He proposes that when a speaker in a normal spontaneous conversation may tend to use forms of speech acts but in a rather hidden way. Indirect speech acts require specific contexts to be understood as well as specific felicity conditions. Searle (ibid: 32) develops his former indirect speech acts when he affirms that:

“The hypothesis I wish to defend is simply this: In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic, together with the general powers of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer. To be more specific, the apparatus necessary to explain the indirect part of indirect speech acts includes a theory of speech acts, certain general principles of cooperative conversation (some of which have been discussed by Grice (1975)), and mutually shared factual background information of the speaker and the hearer, together with an ability on the part of the hearer to make inferences.”

Searle (1979: 79) differentiates between the “sentence meaning” and “utterance meaning” in terms of “metaphor.” He confirms that the literal use of the words can determine the meaning when the literal meaning of the sentence is compatible with the intended meaning, and hence the sentence is said to be truth-conditionally true. But Searle also adds that when the utterance of these literal uses as found in metaphor. When they are not compatible with what they really mean.

8. Sally is a block of ice

Here, the metaphor used is only recoverable by the “indirect speech acts” relying on the “shared knowledge” and the context in which such indirect speech act containing a metaphor is used. The “linguistic indeterminacy” in (8) shows that metaphor can best be the example of it. In this regard, an indirect speech act is invoked. Thereby, the linguistic indeterminacy would be a problem for the semantic resolution for the sentence. In this case, as far as the hearers understand what is being said, then the indirect speech act that is being intended will resolve the problem of such a gap.

6. Conversational Implicature

Herbert Paul Grice is the famous English philosopher and linguist. Through his first article in 1958 entitled (Natural and Non-natural Meaning). He distinguishes between two kinds of meanings: the cognitive and the non-natural meaning. The meaning that results from the meaning of the words in the sentence to (the cognitive meaning) where the meaning of the words are decisive and are part of the mind’s capacity. The second kind of meaning is that which is resulted and derived from the shared knowledge and the context as it is implicated by the speaker and deduced by the hearer.

After that, Grice proposes his famous inventions of pragmatics which is the conversational implicature. Through lectures at Harvard University, he explains that there is something going on which directs the conversation and makes communication succeed. He clarifies that both speakers and hearers who are directed into a conversation are said to be following a cooperative principle (Grice, 1988: 24). There are two kinds of “implicature.” The “conversational implicature” which belongs to that kind of meaning that requires cooperation and resolution depending on the intentionality and the context, because it is implied. “Conventional implicature” is the kind of “implicature” which belongs to what is said and the meaning can be figured out from the linguistic units employed in the utterance. The utterance in this regard conveys more meaning than is literally said. When Grice first attempts to formalize this theory of meaning, he puts the principle called ‘The Cooperative Principle’ which has a supermaxim and from which other maxims split. The cooperative principle dictates:

“Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged”. From this principle for major supermaxims appear, he draws:

“a. Quantity:

(1) Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).

(2) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

b. Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true.

(1) Try to make your contribution one that is true.

(2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

c. Relevance: Be relevant.

d. Manner: Be perspicuous.

(1) Avoid obscurity of expression.

(2) Avoid ambiguity.

(3) Be brief

(4) Be orderly”

When Grice put together these “maxims” and “submaxims”, he was not prescribing rules for speaking and directing the conversations in the way that must walk hand in hand with these “maxims.” Rather, he admits that these maxims can be flouted, breeched or violated (Grice, 1988: 26-7).

He specifies two major types of “conversational implicature”: “particularized conversational implicature” and “generalized conversational implicature.” The former refers to the kind of “conversational implicatures” that require particular contexts to be readily communicative. The latter refers to the general use of these maxims, which are easily resolvable (Levinson, 1983: 107).

As for “conversational implicature”, it has shown that there are some weaknesses in the semantic analysis of certain linguistic units. “Conventional implicature” can show the “linguistic indeterminacy” in differentiating between ‘logical and =&’ and ‘and then and’. In this perspective, Levinson (1983: 96) explains the analysis as in the example below:

9. a. *The capital of France is Paris and the capital of England is London.*
 b. *The capital of England is London and the capital of France is Paris.*
 c. *The lone ranger jumped on his horse and rode into the sunset.*
 d. *The lone ranger rode into the sunset and jumped on his horse.*

If any one looks at (9a-b), seemingly, the coordination constituted by the logical ‘and’ does no harm in the sentence. But what about the (9c-d) examples? This would lead Grice to concentrate on both kinds of implicature. (9c-d) examples explain that the linguistic units (and then ‘and’) gives sequencing of the logical events. Hereby, it is important to notice that there are a large number of “linguistic indeterminacies” in the sense of the “conventional implicature.”

What appears to be more and more attentive to this respect of linguistic indeterminacy is that found in the conversational implicature. Conversational implicature is rich of such linguistic indeterminacies. It shows how much meaning is being communicated with the little of what the speaker says. The speaker, for example, when using ‘tautologies’, he conveys more meaning that what the sentence literally contains:

10. *War is war.*

In (10), it is not a mere declarative sentence. This utterance shows that it implies the miseries that the wars do in societies and how colossal destruction it may bring about.

1. Properties of Conversational Implicature

“Conversational implicature” is said to have important properties that distinguish it from other sorts of meaning studies. First, such meaning structures are characterized by the non-truth conditionality. Strictly speaking, they are not truth conditional because it does not contribute to the meaning of the proposition (Levinson, 1983: 113). They are also calculable or defeasible. This means that it must be possible to work out or to calculate the implicature based on the utterance, the maxims, and the context of the utterance. This is clearest in the case of particularized conversational implicatures, of course, but “generalized conversational implicatures” also take context into account. Moreover, recall that Grice’s point isn’t that the implicature is necessarily calculated but that it could be.

Another property which is “non-detachability”. Grice means that the implicature is attached to the semantic content of what is said, not to linguistic form, and therefore, “implicatures” cannot be detached from an utterance simply by changing the words of the utterance for synonyms.

In addition, implicatures are non-conventional meanings that do not fall under the typical interpretation of linguistic terms. A few arguments in favor of this have already been made under the topics of non-detachability and cancellability (or defeasibility). Furthermore, the “implicatures” cannot be part of the literal meaning of a sentence because you cannot determine a sentence's implicatures in a context until you know its literal meaning or sense. In terms of the indeterminacy, Levinson explains that the example in (11):

11. *John is a machine*

This could convey that John is cold or efficient, never stops working, or puffs and blows, or has little in the way of grey matter, or any and all of these. So, implicatures can have a certain ‘indeterminacy’ in some cases, incompatible with the stable ‘determinate’ senses usually assumed in semantic theories. For this reason, Birner (2013: 69) adds another property of “implicature” in that it is “indeterminate.” It is also believed that conversational implicature is said to be universal. That is, there is a possibility for this theory to be found in most languages around the world.

6.2 Exploitation of Conversational Implicature

Birner (2013: 42) asserts that the hearer's thought process typically involves an implicit inquiry into the speaker's intention that would make this statement cooperative. The response to such inquiry implies the likely aim of the speaker to the listener. Thomas (1995:68) stresses that there are four ways in which the speaker can behave with respect to the "Cooperative Principle"; the speaker can:

- observe the maxims,
- violate a maxim,
- flout a maxim, or
- opt out of the maxims."

Observing a maxim is to straightforwardly obey it. That is, it is to say the right amount, to say only what you have evidence for, to be relevant, or to be brief, clear, and unambiguous (depending on the maxim in question).

Violating a maxim involves deliberately disregarding or ignoring it in a subtle manner, with the intention of going unnoticed by the listener. An illustrative instance of this is a deliberate falsehood: The speaker knowingly utters something that is not true (contrary to the principle of Quality), with the anticipation that the listener will be unable to discern the deceit. Violations of maxims are usually designed to deceive.

Flouting a maxim is synonymous with violating it; however, in this scenario, the violation is deliberate and conspicuously done, with the expectation that the listener will recognize the violation. When I inform a friend that an exam was a breeze, I do not expect my friend to believe that I meant it literally, as an exam and a literal breeze are completely different. Here, the listener's thought process is along the lines of, "The speaker said something that blatantly violates the maxim of Quality; nonetheless, I must assume that they are trying to be cooperative. What meaning might they intend that would constitute cooperative behavior in this context?" What is the intended significance of cooperative behavior in this particular context? If the exam was described as a breeze, the assumption of overall cooperativity might lead the listener to consider the maxim of Relation and understand that the speaker intended to attribute a relevant characteristic of breezes (such as ease or pleasantness) to the exam. (Please note that in numerous instances, such as the present one, the expression has acquired idiomatic status, and the implied meaning no longer requires deliberate interpretation with each use of the phrase.) (Birner, 2013: 44).

Levinson (1983: 111) clarifies that flouting the maxim of relevance requires a very special context. As Grice notes, explanations of the maxim of relevance are a little harder to find because it is hard to construct responses that must be interpreted as irrelevant. But Grice provides an example like the following:

12.A: *I do think Mrs. Jenkins is an old windbag, don't you?*

B: *Huh, lovely weather for March, isn't it?*

Where B's utterance might implicate in the appropriate circumstances, 'Hey, watch out, her nephew is standing right behind you'.

Ultimately, opting to disregard the maxims entirely can be interpreted as a deliberate decision to abstain from engaging in the activity. If a person tries to initiate an argument with their spouse and replies by opening a newspaper and beginning to read, it can be deduced that the spouse has decided to withdraw from the argument. Similarly, the Fifth Amendment grants a defendant the right to refuse participation. By pleading the Fifth Amendment, the defendant can abstain from involvement in the courtroom proceedings without implying any additional meanings that could be associated with saying too little, as per the principle of Quantity. (However, those who regularly invoke their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent sometimes perceive guilt among those who hear them exactly because they have provided insufficient information.)

7. The Pragmatics of Arabic Linguistic Indeterminacy

Arabic language is rich in lexical items and a great deal of their uses. Obviously, many pragmatic uses can be found in Arabic in written and spontaneous speech. Arabic makes use of ironical, metonymical, hyperbolic, and other uses. As Levinson (1983: 109) shows, these literal uses are exploited to flout the maxims of the "cooperative principle." The following are the analyses of the Arabic uses of such floutings. Ali (2000:197) explains the "linguistic indeterminacy" of an expression in terms of Arabic Islamic legal testimonies, like:

(13) *But if he hits me unintentionally, shall I hit him back?*

Being intentional, in Arabic Islamic culture, would require that the 'accused' must be punished in the exact way that he did to the victim. But in unintentional one, this does not work likely. Ali shows that the primary cause of the aforementioned in (13) is the high level of relevance and appropriateness of the implicature, which is directly linked to the fact that implicatures are not definitive but rather unpredictable in nature. Similarly, it is appropriate for the hearer of (14) to claim (15) albeit the answer to his inquiry is explicitly said in (14), which means that the

appropriateness of inquiry (Husn al istifham) in (13) is not because of the invalidity of the counter implicature, but rather to its 'indeterminacy':


(14) I saw the sultan entering the town.

(15) Did you see the sultan himself or only his procession?

Inquiry could be motivated by searching for new information or seeking assurance for uncertain information already obtained by the questioner.

Text 1

(Context: In Glorious Quran the disbelievers are put in Hell for their bad works in life and that they blasphemed and lied to the Muslims and to themselves, consequently they are being tortured)



(المطففين: ٣٦)

(Will not the Unbelievers Have been paid back For what they did?)

(Trans: but they will also see something else: they will also see the arrogant braggarts brought low, who brought about their own downfall by their own actions.) (Yusuf Ali)

The meaning of the Glorious Ayah is translated. Some of the interpreters who depend on Arabic Grammar stress that the verb (Thuiba) is a verb that is used positively. That is, the one who is rewarded. In this Ayah, Ibn Aashur (2008: 589) interprets the word's use as a metaphorical one. So, in this case, the flouting of the maxim would be of great force because the disbelievers were laughing at the Believers; consequently, the disbeliever's last eternal place is in Hell, and the Believers laughed at the disbelievers. This Glorious Ayah shows more meaning with the "implicature" it gives and is interpreted pragmatically, which shows that the determinacy thesis has nothing to do with interpretations like this. The flouting here will surely be indeterminate, but it adds the meaning a more rhetorical meaning than the determinate literal one. In this regard, the indeterminacy of meaning interpretation is worth and more important than the literal meaning of the word.

Text 2

(Context: A Calls B four times but B was not aware because the B's phone was on the silent mode)

(أ) ميت مرة دكيت عليك وانت مترد.

(ب) التلّفون جان صامت.

A. I phoned you a thousand times and you didn't answer me.

B. It was silent.

In text 2 above, hyperbole is obviously used. Hyperbole is understood by (b)'s answer, though the hyperbole shows that it flouts the maxim of truthfulness namely, the maxim of Quality. Flouting Quality maxim, the hearer understands that it is an exaggeration to make 'urgent' the call she or he makes. So, the meaning conveyed by the literal use of hyperbole shows that there is a linguistic indeterminacy to bridge the gap with.

Text 3

(Context: Someone is walking in front of A and B whom both A and B do not like)

(أ) باوع اجه الاسد
(ب) فعلاً (ضحك)

A: Look! He is a real lion.

B: Indeed (Both laughing)

In the scenario of Text 3, "linguistic indeterminacy" is shown because of the use of the ironical utterance. This requires the context in which the third party is walking. As mentioned above, the use of irony, again, flouts the maxim of Quality, but the gain is much more than the literal use. The clue of understanding is that both speakers laugh. Here, the linguistic units formed by the string cannot support the utterance with a full understanding of it due to the "linguistic indeterminacy" of these linguistic words when they are combined in such a context. Stressed in this context, this would mean that the third person is not a really brave one since laughing is present. Sarcastically, both speakers appear to know that what they are saying is against the third person and that the literal meaning is not the one which is intended because the grammatical sentence cannot give the exact meaning intended.

8. Concluding Remarks

The study sums up the following conclusions:

1. Arabic language is quite similar to English as far as linguistic indeterminacy is concerned. As the analysis shows, the meaning implied in Arabic utterances is yet reflected in the same way, pragmatically, as that in English.
2. "Linguistic indeterminacy" in Arabic is accounted for from a pragmatic perspective and is fruitful in that though the Arabic utterances contain these "linguistic indeterminacies," the message is still clear and understood, which is compatible with English utterances.
3. Since "linguistic indeterminacy" is found in the two languages, and perhaps more than the Arabic and English languages, it is worth noting that such a pragmatic property lets scholars think it might be universal.
4. "Linguistic indeterminacy" brings about the intended meaning in that it depends on the context and that the meaning it gives is much nearer to the intended one than that which appears in the literal sense.
5. Most of the linguistic indeterminacies result from the literal use like (hyperbole, irony, metaphor) which communicates more meaning than literally mentioned.

References

- Ali, M. (2000): *Medieval Islamic Pragmatics: Sunni Legal Theorists' Models of Textual communication*. London. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Austin, J. (1962): *How to Do Things with Words*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Birner, B. (2013): *Introduction to Pragmatics*. London: Blackwell Publishers.
- Grice, P. (1988): *Studies in the Way of Words*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Huang, Y. (2007): *Pragmatics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Levinson, S. (1983): *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- May, J. (2001): *Pragmatics: An Introduction*. London: Blackwell Publisher.
- Searle, J. (1969): *Speech acts: Essays in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Searle, J. (1979): *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thomas, J. (1995): *Meaning in Interaction*. London: Taylor and Francis.
- Yule, G. (1996): *Pragmatics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.