

Conflict of Power and Moral in Preventive Diplomacy Application

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Abstract

The inconsistency between security requirements and moral considerations appears clearly after the end of Cold War, due to the conflicts (internal ethnic conflicts) which has happened from one side, and the necessity of international community to find acceptable ways to prevent outbreak like this conflicts in the future from another side. Wherefore, we are trying in this article clarifying this dilemma “the inconsistency”, and searching for the suitable mechanism to resolve it.

Keywords

Consonance, Initiatives, Preventive, Peace, Security

I. INTRODUCTION

Geopolitical environment, resulted from the end of Cold War, has created many new types of violent conflicts not taking the forms of major wars between the superpowers, or other states, but it shaped in internal ethnic conflicts, left states powerless and less able than ever to do its security function and became more reliance on others to provide

security, so are no longer able to cope with arising problems by individual initiatives.

This situation necessitated to find a formula for international regulation vary depending on the threats to international security that emerging from the end of the cold war, as a result, preventing violent conflicts shaped a priority of the international community.

In this point, the moral principles became bound, according specific conditions and considerations, with state national interests and its conjunction with security obsession, which weakened the use of peaceful compromises, and the add a high impulsion toward excessive use of military force, or what today named, hard power, leaded, in contrary relation, to influence the performance of diplomatic administrative of crises and its methodology dependent on soft power.

Here we wonder, whether it is possible to find a realist and practical formula capable of reducing the states' intense tendency toward the use of force in its relations with each other, and inside it alike, and provides it, as well, with reasonable consonance between security requirements and moral considerations, specially that the security requirements, directly and sensitively, touch the state sovereignty, which makes difficult to break through its rigid barriers, as it is presented as indisputable and non-negotiable issues. The question here, therefore, is there a possibility that preventive diplomacy introduce a mechanism be able to deal with this sensitivity of situation?.


II. PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY WITHIN PREVENTIVE ACTION

The term preventive diplomacy suggests different things to different people and there is no agreed-upon meaning among scholars. In general, preventive diplomacy is a part of comprehensive strategy designed to deal with violent conflicts and disputes, a strategy called, preventive action or conflict prevention.

According to Muggah & White, conflict prevention includes activities such as the strengthening of human rights oversight mechanisms and efforts to address the root causes of conflict such as improvements in governance, social and economic well-being, equality, and the management of common resources. Monitoring, containment, and risk reduction are all aspects of conflict prevention. Preventive diplomacy includes activities such as good offices, facilitation, mediation, conciliation, adjudication and arbitration. Despite of conflict prevention is broader, the purpose of both preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention is to stop armed conflicts before they escalate. Together the two concepts are often referred to as 'preventive action. Muggah & White note that there are experts who consider preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention to be two separate concepts, while others consider preventive diplomacy to be one part of conflict prevention.¹

Whatever called, preventive action, in general, has a supreme goal tries to achieve. Carnegie Commission has defined this goal is to prevent the emergence of violent conflict, prevent ongoing conflicts from spreading and prevent the re-emergence of violence.² In addition, Carment & Schnabel seeing this action intends to identify and create the enabling conditions for a stable and more predictable international security environment.³

Based on this description, preventive diplomacy has mechanisms has to do in action. Desmond Ball contends that preventive diplomacy should only be about diplomacy and not about preventive deployment of military units or interference in the internal affairs of any country. He further argues that the conduct of preventive diplomacy should fully respect the principle of sovereign equality, political independence of states, territorial integrity and non-interference in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.⁴



Hence, preventive diplomacy pivots on non-forcible action or measures, primarily diplomatic in nature, which depend on the goodwill of the parties concerned,⁵ namely, consensual political and diplomatic action taken by sovereign state with the consent of all directly involved to prevent disputes and conflicts from arising or from escalating into armed confrontation.⁶

Lund gave institutional dimension to the term when he referred to actions and institutions use to keep disputes from escalation when and where international relations and national politics fail to manage tensions, and this efforts begin before this disputes reach to the point of confrontation with military action.⁷

At this point, preventive diplomacy express third parties efforts, may be state or group of states or international or regional organizations, to contain external and internal tensions and crisis threaten to erupt into widespread-armed conflict likely to endanger international peace and security.

The UN is a major initiative in this field undertook by the leaders of the international community after two brutal and

ruinous world wars, those leaders had adopted preventive action as basis of its work in "maintenance of international peace and security", and endorsed it as a fundamental goal in its various forums, since preventive action consider integral part of its daily work of negotiating stipulated in chapter VI of charter, especially article 33 which offer a menu of choices for resolving disputes peacefully before they turn into violence.⁸

Therefore, the concept of conflict prevention grew along with establishment of the UN, and the second UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, has crystallized the contemporary concept of preventive diplomacy notion in mid-fifties of the twentieth century, he regarded the international organization as a mechanism that empowered nation-states' governments to implement, in its conflict, preventive diplomacy, in accordance with the organization purposes and principles, to bloc these conflicts in its local borders. In this way, preventive diplomacy was used to define the actions taken to prevent regional conflicts from becoming wars.⁹

Although the term was one of the main tools employed by the United Nations to resolve international conflicts, but it plunged by the cold war. At the end of cold war, the term recovered its magic, since the international security environment seemed more complex by adding domestic and international dimensions to the original map of the explosive crises region here and there, which is imperative for decision-makers re-evaluation these crises, and to devote some attention to the concept, and extension the work of organizations, whether international or regional, to extend to what was a day at the heart of the jurisdiction of the State.¹⁰

After almost forty years of neglect and marginalization, the term was revived and re-defined to suit the context of this environment. In the early nineties of the last century, specifically in June 1992, the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, submit a report known under the name " An Agenda for Peace", he noted special reference to preventive diplomacy and diplomatic

methods considered it the more effective mechanism in terms of aiming at reducing tensions between the parties concerned, and to prevent disputes from escalating into actual conflicts, by act quickly to resolve the main causes of the conflict. Boutros-Ghali has defined preventive diplomacy in this report as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur".¹¹

Ghali gave a more comprehensive and broader to preventive diplomacy through the use of several procedures and mechanisms to ensure access to the desired objectives in the peaceful settlement of the conflict and contain it early before exacerbated and spread. He also put it into peer supplementing with other concepts and mechanisms underlying the work of the International Organization for the settlement of disputes and building the environment of the post-settlement. And he has linked it, in a manner cannot be separated, with Peace-Making, Peacekeeping, Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Peace-Enforcement.¹² A close look at each one of these mechanisms, emphasizes and shows the extent of this interdependence in terms of the fact that some of them based on cooperation and exchange of views and negotiation, and integrated with other which represents operational work, and other active post-crisis or conflict to avert the return to the starting point, and another is working to provide the conditions of building stable and lasting peace environment.

His successor in the Secretariat, Kofi Annan, affirmed in its annual report on the work of the organization in 1999, that preventive diplomacy is a central component of preventive action or preventive strategies, which included, as well as preventive diplomacy, all of the mechanisms mentioned in Ghali's Agenda for Peace, which aimed at the long term, addressing the root causes of conflicts, to prevent the outbreak of devastating conflicts in the first place.¹³

Also he confirmed in his report which was issued under the title "Prevention of armed conflict" 2001, that conflict prevention is a central obligation of member states set forth in the charter of the UN, and the organization efforts to prevent conflicts should be consistent with the objectives and principles charter, specially under chapter VI of the charter.¹⁴ He pointed out elsewhere, that enforcement procedures, mentioned in Chapter VII of the charter, must be the legitimate means of last resort to prevent massive violations of fundamental human rights, or other serious threats to peace.¹⁵ His view have agreed high-level Panel view, which was formed for the purpose of giving the UN a comprehensive view on dealing with the serious issues that threaten the international community, such as problems relating to good governance and social, economic and humanitarian development, human rights and gender equality, the restoration of the security sector, it is all have implications for international peace and security if they get away from national borders of the State concerned.¹⁶

The organization's work in these areas has given the concept an internal dimension, and highest demands of the state to assume its responsibility to protect its citizens, which prompted his successor, Ban Ki-moon, which expressed a similar conception of prevention, to emphasize that the responsibility to protect one of the most important priorities.¹⁷

The work of international organization in this direction aimed at building an international culture based on preventive action, which prompted Kofi Annan to invite the international community to shift from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention, although he think that building such culture is not easy, furthermore its benefits lie in the distant future, therefore, put forward a comprehensive vision of prevention strategies with the many joints that make up a whole preventive action for the organization.¹⁸ It is a call that preceded by Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly

Conflicts, which devoted a whole chapter in its final report to culture of prevention.¹⁹

III. PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND THE USE OF FORCE

The use of force almost always represented a behavioral and strategic foundation of dealing between states, and the role of force did not retract to the minimum in international relations, and in internal relations between the ruler and the ruled as well, since the concerned parties did not show a lot of marked interest with peaceful settlement of disputes and its most important means of diplomacy, which these parties used it in many cases for political gain only.

However, excessive or unjustified use of hard power subjected to provoke political and institutional counter reactions, so the long and bitter experience of international policy in dealing with this power upheld the importance of another type called soft power, which depends on nontraditional factors capable of practicing an influence in world affairs. Joseph Nye how created the term, although emphasized commanding or directive manner of power, which is based on the temptations or threats, and that it will continue to play an important political role, but he thinks that the sources of power moving away from the emphasis on military force, hence the power have indirect face impose the others on want what power holder wants, this what called the indirect or optional face of power, combined with non-material resources of power such as culture, ideology and institutions, this is the soft power.²⁰

This matter, otherwise, make the power relating to the possession as much as possible of power demonstration means, which became more diverse and dispersed, but this time, these methods tend to be non-material, so no one today can, according to Niall Ferguson, underestimate the strength of ideology, religion, faith and morale.²¹

With this transition in power meaning and application, diplomatic activities has been affected, and international society paid more attention to moral considerations, especially with the rise of new actors such terrorism which hit in deep everywhere.

Although power fragmentation contributed, very exceedingly, in resulting defect in desirable balance of power, but in other side, urged international community seeking for institutional solutions to limit use of force, which still has effects in and on diplomacy and its mechanisms of negotiation, dialogue and communication. For these reasons, it was be incumbent upon diplomacy adaptation with developments and variables of international game rules, and endeavor to find structure and environment enable it performance its work and access its goals effectively in order to gain all parties consent.

The revival of ethical considerations was being as perfect theory consisting of serious activation of international institutions role, and pose alternative procedures through ensure offer solutions basket which would allow the parties concerned an opportunity to choose. So preventive diplomacy betting on some international ethics which the states rely on to achieve its objectives and maintain its status and prestige, and to make these ethics deterrents restrict of extremism in the exercise of power, fearing that expose it to punishment imposed by the international community.

However, the work of preventive diplomacy, according to this equation, or as Hammarskjöld wanted to be, was the subject of controversy and disagreement among the international scientific community, and put a potential of opinion difference among experts about the scope of preventive diplomacy, and more broadly on the scope of variety preventive measures, basing on datum whether resort to force or not in work of preventive diplomacy. We can monitor two directions in this regard. The first Based on the

main principles of preventive diplomacy established by Hammarskjöld, which are:²²

- 1- The principle of consent and acceptance of all conflict parties.
- 2- The principle of the inadmissibility of recourse to force, except in the case of legitimate self-defense.
- 3- The principle of fairness and impartiality, subjecting peacekeeping operations to the principles and objectives of the UN charter.

As it is diplomacy, it hails peaceful means of disputes settlement, then the recourse to force be not part of its work. And as it is consensus, as stated in the definition of ARF, it does not be employed without of the consent of the parties involved in the conflict and their complete satisfaction.²³ So according to this opinion that preventive diplomacy is limited to non-violent interactions that lead to a constructive dialogue between the adversaries exclude, explicitly, the resort to armed force.²⁴ This direction argues that post-cold war conflicts and disputes showed there was no military solutions to these conflicts and disputes in time of asymmetrical war, which its challenges to security and stability require a new preventive measures, in the forefront, preventive diplomacy, which, although its difficulty, but it is not impossible.²⁵

This view criticizes Boutros-Ghali plan, and believe that some of its clauses are contrary to the Hammarskjöld principles, as impose peace and penalties measures, which take on the basis of chapter VII of the charter, contrary to the principle of the inadmissibility of resorting to force.²⁶ Furthermore, the resort to military force and the enforcement procedures will draw the international community constantly to conflicts, not merely immune to the settlement, but it is, moreover, would weaken confidence in the UN,²⁷ which not created to carry out peacekeeping operations, even that this term is not mentioned in the charter, even the ICJ, in the Certain Expenses of the UN, refused to identify any particular article in the charter as legal basis for peacekeeping.²⁸

The report of the panel on UN peace operations' view was identical to view mention above when it recognized that the UN does not wage war, and when enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing states, with the authorization of the SC acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.²⁹

According to this point of view, the UN had established, mainly, to prevent wars and take over tasks of preventive diplomacy.³⁰ This type of diplomacy, according to Stedman, means nothing more than talking, especially where antagonists are willing to respond to reasoned appeals for nonviolence.³¹

The UN effort and work is a diplomatic, not political, effort, so it focuses on preventive diplomacy, not preventive action. Therefore, the preventive international organization diplomacy represents moral and ideal mechanism strength of the success of the diplomatic approach without the need for military action and to impose a solution by force could costs spend many of money and lives.

Thus, the supporters of this point of view see that although rarity of studies dealing with the role of incentive strategies, but it could have great potential to prevent conflict in case of understanding better,³² which push some theorists to call for development of an "inducement theory" to supplement traditional deterrence theory.³³

The other opinion stems from a term preventive, see it as a normative multi-use concept, which allows used for multiple political purposes. If the diplomatic persuasion and political pressure was essential means for the prevention of conflict, it is possible, as well, to rely on military deterrence, or even the use of military strikes.³⁴ Incentives are not, according to Cortright, a policy unto themselves; it is a part in a larger mix of policy instruments. Although conventional political analysis focuses on coercive instruments such as resorting to military force or threat of it, and economic sanctions, but the practice of diplomacy, when it is studied carefully, one can

note that it contains significant and positive element of inducement. And he believes that the combination of carrots and sticks, of inducements and coercive measures, defines the success of diplomacy.³⁵ Here diplomacy operates according to the logic that power is a tool of diplomacy, influence in and on diplomacy and its mechanisms of communication, dialogue and negotiation, it was possible to use force beside diplomacy in the international crisis management.

According to this opinion there is no central strategy of preventive diplomacy fit all types of emerging conflicts, which require a variety of strategies blends coercive elements could put a credible deterrent, with the persuasive elements and assurances that give a positive motivation for cooperation. And use any one of these strategies in accordance with the positions that some of them may require coercive elements more than others, while other situations require a more persuasive elements, which requires design and implement appropriately tailored strategies for each unique case.³⁶

Therefore, this opinion away from the principles of Hammarskjöld and analyze what lists in the Boutros-Ghali's agenda for peace. It believes it includes military and nonmilitary measures, coercive and non-coercive diplomatic measures alike. The agenda have defined, frankly, preventive deployment of military forces as one of the preventive diplomacy strategies.³⁷

This view approximate between preventive diplomacy and other mechanisms mentioned by Ghali in his agenda for the settlement of disputes, since the fact indicates that preventive diplomacy does not just mean negotiating and adopt the language of threat in the negotiation, at times, but, if approached with other processes that correlated with them, such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement, can be seen it is involving an act of military might resort to it in accordance with Chapter VII if the situation threatened to explosion and proliferation.³⁸ Then the UN wage war. The decentralization of military enforcement to coalitions of willing is a product of

pragmatism and cannot really be justified on the basis of the principle that the UN does not wage war as propounded by the panel.³⁹

Moreover, Kofi Annan did not rule out the use of force under Chapter VII, as mentioned above, although he made it a means of last resort. He confirmed this in an article in *The Economist* in December 2004, saying that it "peaceful prevention should have a priority, but if it fails, we must be able to rely on the use of force".⁴⁰ Thus, this point of view concludes that the peace enforcement including the application of armed force to enforce a cease-fire. It is purely as hierarchical work, begin with threat, but if this threat prove ineffective and it was not enough to make intransigent party back down, then the use of force, with the risk of prolonged involvement in a civil war, will be probable.⁴¹

The Carnegie Commission have been resolved the argument by divided preventive action into two parts, the first is "Operational Prevention"⁴² which is measures apply when crisis or violence is imminent. The second is "Structural Prevention"⁴³ which is measures addressing the root causes of deadly conflict. The first part has range of options cover two track of diplomacy. The track one diplomacy is official and governmental, which may use hard and soft tools of prevention.⁴⁴ The track two is unofficial and non-governmental activities take place outside official government channels.⁴⁵

In sum, how we classify preventive diplomacy and when we put it, that is relating to whole prevention strategy. If we knew that the core of prevention is the avoidance of the use of force,⁴⁶ then we will realize that preventive diplomacy represent the soft tool of this strategy, which consider as nonviolence procedures to prevent the use of force in internal and external conflicts alike.

Why we see that or adopt this point of view, so the diplomatic efforts embark according to chapter VI of charter. The article 39 considers the borderline between preventive

diplomacy efforts and the use of force. According to this article, when the SC determines if there is a threat or breach to peace or not. If the decision was in behalf of existence of threat or breach of the peace, then the preventive diplomatic effort is over, so what it tried to prevent has been occurred and weapon language has been begin, at this stage, another diplomatic effort embark, certainly not preventive.

VI. FORCE VS. MORAL = SECURITY VS. SOVEREIGNTY

The debate of (power or moral) always considered as centric question in critique turning points that threaten international peace and security. The international community has tried to maintain international peace and security by finding mechanisms and organizations or arrangements that lessen use of force to minimum and raise the ethical considerations. These endeavors have been made clear more in the wake of major wars which swept most of the world, and were a flagrant expression of what can be up to the excessive use of force in the name of balance and maintain security. Therefore, several international orders has shown in heel of these wars which invoked policy makers and scholars to take collective security seriously by find organizational framework that states joined it voluntarily, this framework has represented in "League of Nations" and "United Nations".⁴⁷

The end of cold war, which weakened to large degree collective security mechanism, has been accompanied by the emergence of nationalist, ethnic and religious conflict in many places around the world,⁴⁸ and exceeded in its impacts the national borders of the states. The first years after the end of this war have witnessed more than 90-armed conflicts, the great majority of them were ethnic conflict, which is enjoined to find appropriate ways to deal with such conflicts before they turn into a high level of violence.⁴⁹ In light of this, the traditional concept of international security changed, this was an indication of change in the level of political analysis of the security dilemma, which arises, according to Posen, when

proximate groups of people suddenly find themselves newly responsible for their own security.⁵⁰

Meanwhile, the debate about the responsibility that should UN take it, returned to the international arena, but the charter of the organization focuses only on the wars between nations, did not mention directly internal or civil conflicts, which have been marginalized during the cold war because of the requirements of the international security environment at that time, which negatively impacted on the work of the international organization with regard to its first principle in maintenance of international peace and security. But it took a different character after the cold war; it has been adapted to the context of civil and ethnic wars,⁵¹ fear of becoming widespread wars.

Furthermore, the 11 September 2001 attacks has been shown that terms like "borderless world" or "two sovereignties" suggesting that a different kind of world was in the making, took their place, so something new in international politics seemed to be happening. Power has been become more widely spread and more diffuse, and conflict became, rather than between and within states, between non-state actors⁵² which enter a conflict with the state and on its behalf sometimes. As countless individuals and groups are becoming global actors along with states, insecurity and vulnerability are rising. Therefore, more state sovereignty crumbles because of, for example, terrorism and fighting it.⁵³

All these events invoked the international community to think again in two concepts related closely to state survival, which are sovereignty and security. As preventive action may involve the use of force that is it clash with sovereignty of state and its national security. Thus, all the attempts of international community to organize mechanisms for international security based on collective action of these community components, pivoting about reduce the use of force which maybe violate state sovereignty and threat its national security.

These two concepts lie at the core of diplomatic practice and theory. The split of state among many of its components comes not only the breakdown of traditional diplomatic domains and activities, but also the creation of new actors, new arenas, and new fields of diplomatic activity – all of which cuts across the traditional Westphalian notion of sovereignty.⁵⁴ This notion changed because it entered a new age witnesses a shift in security concept which broadened and redefined to include the individual as the referent object of security, and the definition of a security threat as a threat to the quality of individuals life.⁵⁵ This concept named "Human Security" which closely related to the state sovereignty.

The humanitarian aspects of new concept of security challenging the traditional notion of security, this challenge because that many security matters are often thought to be within the realm of domestic, not international, responsibility, which pushed the critical approach to claim that the state posed a potential threat not just externally, but also to its citizens.⁵⁶

The state sovereignty at home requires both authority and control, but when the sovereign lose its ability of controlling and its authority become weak, then the anarchy spread even to the neighbors, the intervention become a necessity and, at this point, the Westphalian sovereignty undermined. International law gave the right of intervention to international community on condition that SC recognizes that a genocide problem, or other, within a state poses a threat to international security.

The fear of genocide, which lightened the concept of Human Security, inspired international community to take "R2P" seriously, but this responsibility means in somehow the "Right to Intervene". In the topology of power, dominant states will likely continue to intervene at the time and place of their choosing.⁵⁷ In other words, Human Security, which may lead to intervention under humanitarian justification has been

criticized and considered as a political agenda,⁵⁸ which promote insecurity instead of strengthening the security.

Developing countries, particularly, interpret the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as a device by which the industrial democracies reassert neocolonialist hegemony.⁵⁹ Although many individuals from these countries argue that sovereignty is not an absolute, and it requires from national leaders take their responsibility towards their citizens,⁶⁰ and protect them from fear and want, because they believe that such protection could best be achieved only through the security of the state which acts as protector from both external and internal threats.⁶¹

War against terrorism put together sovereignty and security to the test because terrorists do not care about the sovereignty and challenges the traditional way of maintain security. Stanley Hoffmann adopted a point of view contrasts the developing countries' which fearing from this war and its aftermaths. He said: "Indeed, the beneficiaries of antiterrorist war have been the illiberal, poorer states that have lost so much of their sovereignty of late. Now the crackdown on terror allows them to tighten their controls on their own people, products, and money. They can give themselves new reason to violate individual rights in the name of common defense against insecurity. Meanwhile terrorism does not care about the sovereignty of either its enemies or the allies who shelter them, it ultimately reinforces the state at the same time as it tries to destroy it".⁶²

In fact the Human Security is an institutional matter related closely to international organizations, particularly the UN. But the UN's capabilities, in use of force and intervene to save people who need to be protect from genocide or other similar threat, are limited, and its charter do not mention how it should deal with intra-states disputes, albeit this charter mandate Security Council to determines that bad situation inside a state poses a threat to international security with possibility to spread into another states.

V. CONCLUSION

At a time when the international system faces a precarious peace-building process in the Middle East and while we are trying to figure out the threat and nature of further global terrorist activity, it is important not forget that there already exists a number of complex conflicts in the international system that continue to disrupt peace and endanger the security of many peoples and societies.

Also, the emergence of the issue of human rights and the threat it poses to international security, made the states responsible for providing protection to its citizens, as the problems arising from denial these rights made the international community responsible for preventing civil wars caused by this denial, by seeking for alternatives to military intervention which not only violates the sovereignty of the target country, but it is also a messy and unpredictable measure.⁶³

Many works focused on giving the political legitimacy of military intervention when necessary and emphasized of non-coercive measures as a good strategy seeks consensus of international community. Therefore, humanitarian intervention has been considered an extension of preventive diplomacy as it involves attempting to stop large-scale human rights abuses or to prevent the outbreak of conflict and create the conditions for a durable, positive peace. But the basis of humanitarian intervention represents a tension between the principles of human rights, state sovereignty, and international order.⁶⁴

Although the contents of the emerging principles for justified intervention are highly contested, the practice of UN authorization thus far suggests that states lose their right to nonintervention when: (1) the state engage in widespread and systematic human rights abuses; (2) the state collapses and humanitarian catastrophe results; (3) the state government is

illegitimate and as a consequence poses a threat to international peace and security. Then, two situations where humanitarian intervention is relatively unproblematic: in the case of genocide, there is a legal obligation to intervene under the Genocide Convention; and in cases of complete state failure, there is no real sovereignty to violate.⁶⁵

We see that even if there is no sovereignty in true sense, the use of preventive diplomacy requires the political will of disputing parties to resolve conflicts through peaceful measures and to accept external assistance to facilitate these processes. This may involve building trust and creating political space for negotiation, through humanitarian assistance or preventive deployment, to reduce imminent threats of conflict.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in its report "The Responsibility to Protect" 2001 posed three constitutive elements of this responsibility, which are, responsibility to react, responsibility to prevent, and responsibility to rebuild. It has been sought to redefine sovereignty, as Deng et al mentioned, so that it would no longer constitute a guarantee against interference but would instead be synonymous with responsibility.⁶⁶

The report distinguished between root cause prevention and direct prevention, both involve economic, political, legal and military measures.

Carnegie Commission report recognized between operational and structural prevention, the latter involve the measures that address the root causes of deadly conflict economically, socially, culturally, and humanly. The scholars who interested in preventive action easily see that Carnegie Commission report was broader than International Commission in detail the measures that address to prevent the conflicts and disputes.

This considerable matter pushed the UN to find and develop a comprehensive strategy able to prevent violent conflicts inter- and intra-states, by chain of actions, at the

head of it, "Preventive Diplomacy". This has shown and cleared in many reports of commissions that the UN constituted to put the cornerstone of its action in this realm.

The role of UN in codification the use of force field clearly came to light in its charter's articles that its founders persisted in strengthening it to avoidance disputes among UN organs, and then take root the role of organization in international conflicts peaceful settlement, and emphasize the UN's preventive diplomacy that indicated implicitly in chapter VI. This is not mean the international community represented in UN refrain from using force when peaceful means fail, especially in case of atrocities, because international community obligate, ethically and morally, to take its responsibility to prevent any violation to human dignity, freedom, and rights. In this case the means of coercion used for ethical goals, due to human is above what he is established, the state, as he could do that previously he can do it again and again.

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(The author classify these tools, according to Hugh, that hard tools contain enforcement, non-forcible coercion and mediation with muscle, while soft tools contain mediation, conciliation, fact-finding, good-offices, peace conferences, envoys, conflict prevention centers and hot lines).

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